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Supreme Court Justices' uniform professional backgrounds have
drawn increasing criticism. Yet it is unclear how diverse professional
training would affect the Court's decisions. This Article offers the first
empirical analysis of how Justices with diverse professional training
vote: It examines a unique period when Justices with formal legal educa-
tion sat with Justices who entered the profession by reading the law
alone.
The study finds that Justices' levels of agreement and politically in-
dependent voting vary significantly according to their professional train-
ing. In cases which divided the Court, Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education (1) voted together more often and (2) voted more
independently of their appointing presidents' ideologies than Justices
without this background.
These findings substantially qualify earlier views on the desirability
of Justices without formal legal education. Diversity in professional
training is consistent with calls for a more politically responsive Court. It
does not support arguments for an optimally diverse group of decision-
makers, however, unless one is also willing to accept diminished political
independence that has been shown to accompany diverse professional
training.
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SCHOOLING THE SUPREME COURT
INTRODUCTION
Currently, the Supreme Court is comprised of Justices with more
homogeneous professional training than ever before.' Although the Jus-
tices' cookie-cutter backgrounds have drawn increasing criticism,2 it is
unclear how appointing Justices with diverse professional training would
affect the Court's decisions. This Article offers the first empirical analy-
sis of how Justices with diverse professional training vote. It examines a
unique period when Justices with formal legal education sat with Justices
who entered the profession by reading the law alone.
The study finds that Justices' levels of agreement and politically in-
dependent voting vary significantly according to their professional train-
ing. In cases which divided the Court, Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education (1) voted together more often and (2) voted more
independently of their appointing presidents' ideologies than Justices
without this background. These findings substantially qualify earlier
views on the desirability of Justices without formal legal education.
Calls for appointment of Justices without formal legal education re-
flect different conceptions of the Court. The view that the Court's deci-
4
sions track public opinion, for example, supports scholars' claims that a
Court comprised entirely of formally educated lawyers will stray too far
from popular will. 5 Other scholars find legal training irrelevant to resolv-
ing the sliver of exceptionally difficult cases that the Court hears.6 These
1. Benjamin H. Barton & Emily Moran, Measuring Diversity on the Supreme Court with Bi-
odiversity Statistics, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (2013) (contrasting an extremely low
level of educational diversity on the current Court with higher historical levels). Some also note
current Justices lack diverse professional experience in positions held before they were appointed to
the bench. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012)
("[T]he current Supreme Court is the first in U.S. history to lack even a single member who ever
served in elected office."); see also Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background
Theory and the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2008) (noting that the initial Roberts
Court Justices "were sitting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals at the time of an opening on the Supreme
Court").
2. See, e.g., Barton & Moran, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that the lack of diversity in educa-
tional background prevents the Court from being "optimally diverse"); John Denvir, Proudly Politi-
cal, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 27, 33 (2002) ("If we admit that the Court plays a political rather than a legal
function, then there is no reason to limit its membership ... [to lawyers]."); Lee Epstein, Jack
Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 903, 960 (2003) (arguing for Jus-
tices with diverse career experiences and against a norm of prior judicial experience); Adrian Ver-
meule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (2007) ("[I]t would be a good
idea . . . to appoint a . . . nonlawyer professional to the Court.")
3. Denvir, supra note 2, at 33; Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1720, 1731-32 (1988); Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1570-71.
4. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14-15 (2009).
5. Denvir, supra note 2, at 33-34.
6. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732 (suggesting that if "most appellate cases" do not involve
the "law traditionally taught" in law schools, then perhaps "some appellate judges ... need not be
lawyers"). The view that law plays an insignificant role reflects a widely held perception of the
Supreme Court. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 190 (2010)
(arguing that "legally uncertain cases" leave Justices free to decide cases in accordance with their
"political views"); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 293 (2008) ("[T]he bin containing
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scholars suggest appointing Justices with training in fields other than
law. Diverse training will help Justices decide cases that implicate
knowledge from other fields7 and offset bias common to Justices with
.. 8legal training.
Despite their different outlooks, these scholars all question modem
criteria for selecting Justices. From Justice Robert Jackson on, every
Justice appointed to the Court has attended law school.9 In recent dec-
ades, presidents have responded to a highly politicized confirmation pro-
cess by nominating Justices with increasingly homogeneous educational
backgrounds.'0 Critics of this educational and professional homogenei-
ty' identify another limitation created by the current appointments pro-
cess. Presidents will no doubt feel pressure to sacrifice professional di-
versity for traditional credentials, which are beyond senatorial re-
proach.12
cases that are . . . legalistically indeterminate is chronically overflowing in the Supreme Court.");
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdiscipli-
nary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 253, 255-59 (1997) (describing views of political scien-
tists, Critical Legal Studies scholars, and legal realists).
7. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732; Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1570-71.
8. Barton & Moran, supra note 1, at 21 (noting lack of diversity in educational background
prevents the Court from being "optimally diverse"); Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1570 ("[I]t would be
a good idea . .. to appoint a . . . nonlawyer professional to the Court."); see also Epstein, Knight &
Martin, supra note 2, at 960 (arguing for Justices with diverse career experiences and against a norm
of prior judicial experience).
9. Jackson, appointed in 1941, was the last appointee who attended law school but did not
receive a law degree before his admission to the bar. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
1789-Present, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2014). James Byrnes, also appointed in 1941, was the last Justice who never
attended law school. See id. Since 1953, all presidents except the second President Bush consulted
the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary regarding prospective
federal judicial nominations. AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 1 (2009). The Committee bases its evaluation "solely" on candi-
dates' "professional qualifications," and provides that "[a] Supreme Court nominee should possess
an especially high degree of legal scholarship, academic talent, analytical and writing abilities, and
overall excellence." Id at 9. It seems difficult for a contemporary candidate to obtain these qualifica-
tions without a law degree.
10. Barton & Moran, supra note 1, at 20-21; Patrick J. Glen, Harvard and Yale Ascendant:
The Legal Education of the Justices from Holmes to Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 129,
130-31 (2010) (current Justices all attended Harvard, Yale, or Columbia Law School); Timothy P.
O'Neill, "The Stepford Justices": The Need for Experiential Diversity on the Roberts Court, 60
OKLA. L. REV. 701, 702-03 (2007) (after Bork's failed nomination, presidents turned to Ivy League
graduates in response to increased pressure to "sell" nominees to the Senate as "expert legal techni-
cian[s]"). For a summary of scholarship addressing politicization of the confirmation process in the
late twentieth century, see Christine Kexel Chabot, A Long View of the Senate's Influence Over
Supreme Court Appointments, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1229, 1240-45 (2013).
11. Glen, supra note 10, at 146 (presidents' "mindset[s]" should be open to nominating Jus-
tices from a more "diverse" set of law schools); O'Neill, supra note 10, at 735 (calling for a return to
Justices with "varied backgrounds"). For example, some scholars have argued for appointment of a
Justice with experience in politics. Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning
Politicians to the Supreme Court, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1356 (2010) (arguing for a Justice with
political experience); Epstein, Knight & Martin, supra note 2, at 905 (arguing against a norm of
prior judicial experience).
12. Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
381, 409-10.
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Before this study, however, there was little reason to think Justices'
voting behavior would vary according to differences in educational
background. Past empirical studies have found Justices' political affilia-
tions to predict their votes far more consistently than educational back-
grounds.13 Neal Tate's leading Supreme Court study, for example, found
partisanship significantly predicted Justices' liberal votes in both civil
liberties and economics cases.14 But attending a more prestigious under-
graduate institution was only weakly associated with liberal votes in a
more limited subset of economics cases.'5 Tate did not identify a rela-
tionship between educational background and votes when he extended
his study to an earlier period of the Court,16 and studies of federal courts
of appeals reach similarly mixed results.17
Still, these earlier studies consider relatively small differences in
educational backgrounds: whether judges who attended less prestigious
institutions vote differently than judges who attended more prestigious
institutions.'8 This study considers a much larger difference in profes-
sional training. Historically, some Justices who attended law school, in-
13. George, supra note 1, at 1350-53 (explaining that while education is not a social back-
ground variable "consistently correlated with judicial behavior" it is "well established that political
affiliation of ... [an] appointing President is a strong predictor of how a judge will vote in a case");
see also Cross, supra note 6, at 252, 275 (noting that the attitudinal model, which political scientists
have used to predict "decisions according to the political ideology" of Supreme Court Justices, does
a good job of "accurately" predicting the Court's decisions) (citing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993)).
14. C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SC. REV.
355, 361 tbl.3 (1981).
15. Id.
16. C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute
Models ofSupreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. Sc. 460, 474 tbl.1 (1991) (not
including education as an explanatory factor for liberal decisions); see also Jilda M. Aliotta, Social
Backgrounds, Social Motives and Participation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 267,
277, 279 (1988) (demonstrating that Justices with less prestigious legal education voted to concur or
dissent more frequently than Justices with prestigious legal education).
17. James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675,
1715 tbl.11, 1717 (1999) (finding a significant relationship between attendance at a less selective
college and pro-union votes by federal court of appeals judges); Michael W. Giles & Thomas G.
Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917, 930-31 (1975)
(finding judges' school desegregation decisions were significantly correlated with attendance at a
Southern college or law school); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 374, 382 (1966) (failing to identify significant relation-
ships between prestige of law or undergraduate education and liberal case outcomes in federal court
of appeals cases); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1464-66
(1998) (finding that elite law school attendance was not a significant explanatory factor in district
court votes on the constitutionality of federal sentencing guidelines); see also Stuart S. Nagel, Multi-
ple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 258, 270 (1974)
(finding that, at the state level, attending high-tuition law schools was strongly associated only with
votes favoring criminal defendants).
18. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 382.
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cluding Justices Brandeis and Holmes, sat with other Justices who en-
tered the profession by reading the law alone.19
Formal legal education was introduced to make up for perceived de-
ficiencies in legal education of lawyers who read the law.20 Legal train-
ing in the university setting was designed to instruct students in "ele-
ments and first principles upon which the rule of practice is founded,"2'
and supplement the "mere details and procedure" they tended to absorb
in a law office.2 2 Formal legal education took hold and has been common
professional training for all Justices since Robert Jackson.23 More recent-
ly, however, some scholars have questioned the utility of legal education
for a Court whose decisions may be viewed as political or resolving is-
sues where law does not supply a single correct answer.24 This Article
identifies significant differences in how Justices with diverse profession-
al training voted and finds that diversity favors calls for a more political-
ly responsive Court.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines three separate lines
of reasoning leading scholars to question the value of formal legal educa-
tion and uniform professional training in Justices. It also explains how
these views align with different conceptions of the Court. Finally, it de-
scribes historical differences between reading the law and formal legal
education.
Part II sets forth empirical analysis of votes cast by Justices with
and without formal legal education. The study combines recently collect-
ed historical data25 with more recent data26 to analyze votes for appoin-
tees from Justice Noah Swayne (1862) through Justice Robert Jackson
(1941), and other Justices with whom they sat. Considering the body of
non-unanimous cases that divide the Court, this study reveals two signif-
19. See Lee Epstein et al., THE U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES DATABASE (Jan. 26, 2010),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/justicesdata.htmi (accessible by clicking on "Legacy Version" link)
(hereinafter Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE].
20. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1949, 1962-64, 1972 (2012) ("Academic legal instruction .... was a response to the
sentiment reflected by Blackstone that an office apprenticeship by itself was not enough." (footnote
omitted)); see also discussion infra Part I.D. To be sure, Justices such as Joseph Story and Stephen J.
Field attained greatness notwithstanding their lack of formal legal education. See HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS app. A, at 374 (5th ed. 2008). This study
measures differences in voting rather than merit.
21. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32.
22. Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of
Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 760 (1976).
23. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 9.
24. See Denvir, supra note 2, at 33; Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732; Vermeule, supra note 2,
at 1570.
25. Christine Kexel Chabot & Benjamin Remy Chabot, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters?
Supreme Court Voting Alignments, 1838-2009, 76 Mo. L. REV. 999, 1001-02 (2011) [hereinafter
Chabot, Mavericks]; Chabot, supra note 10, at 1230-31.
26. Harold Spaeth et al., THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE (July 23, 2014),
http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php [hereinafter Spaeth et al., SUPREME COURT DATABASE].
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icant differences in voting patterns of Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education.
First, Justices with formal legal education voted together more often
than other Justices, even controlling for Justices' political inclinations
and other potentially explanatory factors. Second, Justices who shared
the benefit of formal legal education voted independently of ideologies
of their appointing presidents. Votes of Justices who lacked this educa-
tional background, however, were significantly predicted by ideologies
of appointing presidents.2 7 Thus, during a period that was not generally
characterized by politically predictable voting, presidents had varied
levels of success in appointing like-minded Justices. Presidents lost sig-
nificant political influence when they appointed Justices who attended
law school.
Part III explores the study's implications for proposals to enhance
diversity of Justices' professional training. In light of the study's find-
ings, diverse professional training should not be viewed as an unqualified
good. Instead, it should be understood as a feature that favors some con-
ceptions of the Court more than others. Appointing Justices without for-
mal legal education is consistent with calls for a more politically respon-
sive Court. In the past, presidents who appointed Justices without formal
legal education bolstered their ability to place like-minded Justices on the
Court.
To the extent enhanced political responsiveness is desirable,28 the
study suggests a further critique of the appointments process. As a prac-
tical matter, presidents who wish to win confirmation must nominate
candidates with impeccable resumes and degrees from a handful of elite
law schools.29 By limiting presidents to a pool of candidates with formal
legal education, the appointments process may be understood to impede
presidents' ability to update and shape the Court's political views as fully
as they might.
Conversely, the study casts doubt on assumptions that legal educa-
tion is irrelevant or associated with inherently problematic biases in Jus-
27. This study considers Justices politically predictable when their votes are predicted by
ideologies of their appointing presidents. See infra notes 158-61, Part II.C.I. Justices who vote
independently of their appointing presidents' ideologies are considered apolitical.
28. John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 667-68 (1993) (arguing
for a strong presidential role and against "compromise" nominees); Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10
("A system in which presidents are relentlessly driven to nominate only the most moderate Justices
will not serve the best interests of either the Court or the nation."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) ("[I]t is ap-
propriate, and indeed essential, for the appointing and confirming authorities to consider ideology [in
judicial appointments]."); cf Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament ofJudges?, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 299, 318, 321 (2004) (arguing Justices should be selected or evaluated using a merit-based
tournament, which would make ideological considerations in judicial appointments more transpar-
ent).
29. Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10.
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tices' decisions. Comparing Justices with and without formal legal edu-
cation shows Justices with formal legal education have a distinct bias,
but this bias favors politically independent decisions. Offsetting this bias
would promote a more politically responsive Court. Moving the Court in
a more political direction is not a mere matter of error correction. Instead
it implicates a normative debate about how politically responsive the
Court should be.
This Article concludes that diverse educational background is
linked to significant differences in how Justices voted. Calls to eliminate
the prerequisite of formal legal education should be understood to pro-
mote certain conceptions of the Court better than others. Justices without
formal legal education are desirable only if one is also willing to accept
a less politically independent Court.
I. WHY ARE LEGAL SCHOLARS QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR JUSTICES
WITH FORMAL LEGAL EDUCATION?
Scholars who question the value of Justices with formal legal edu-
cation have adopted three separate lines of reasoning. First, a Court com-
prised entirely of Justices with formal legal education may disserve cer-
tain conceptions of the Court. Consider the view that the Court's hold-
ings track public opinion and can be updated through elected officials'
appointments of new Justices.30 A more politically responsive Court
could resolve the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" 3 1 posed by judicial
32review. To this end, Christopher Eisgruber and John Denvir contend
that the Court's constitutional decisions should be viewed as serving a
democratic, representative function.33 Denvir carries this argument to the
conclusion that nonlawyer Justices will further enhance the Court's polit-
ical responsiveness.34
Second, law and legal education may not impede the Court's repre-
sentative function so much as they fail to describe grounds upon which
the Court's decisions are based. If law and legal education are irrelevant
to many judicial decisions, then perhaps the Court should include some
30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374 ("Undoubtedly, the fact that Presidents select Supreme
Court justices and the Senate confirms them plays some role in ensuring that the Court heeds the cry
of public opinion.").
31. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
32. The difficultly arises when unelected, life-tenured Justices override decisions made by
elected officials. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 161 (2002). Freidman's 2009 book, The Will
of the People, suggests that the Court's ability to track current public opinion mitigates this difficul-
ty. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374.
33. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 205 (2001) (the
Court's function in interpreting the Constitution "should be regarded as serving a pro-democratic
purpose"); Denvir, supra note 2, at 31-34.
34. Denvir, supra note 2, at 33-34 (suggesting that a Court comprised entirely of lawyers with
uniform educational backgrounds cannot claim a broad "democratic pedigree" and speak for the
"current political aspirations of the American people.") (reviewing EISGRUBER, supra note 33).
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Justices with training in other disciplines. Fred Schauer raises this ques-
tion in his account of appellate judging in "hard cases."35 He doubts legal
education helps judges decide these cases because the underlying dis-
putes are not likely to be informed by "law traditionally taught in most
law schools."36
Finally, a Court comprised only of formally educated lawyers may
suffer from lack of diverse professional training.37 Adrian Vermeule con-
tends the Court needs Justices with expertise in another discipline to in-
crease the Court's technocratic competence.3 8 The strong form of his
argument insists these expert Justices not have formal legal training.
Complete professional diversity is needed to correct for lawyer Justices'
systematic biases.
Fred Schauer and John Denvir do not set forth elaborate proposals,
but question the utility of lawyer Justices based on understandings of the
nature of appellate decision-making or normative goals for the Court.
Adrian Vermeule offers a more detailed proposal.3 9 He asserts that Jus-
tices with expertise in other disciplines will bolster the Court's techno-
cratic competence and offset biases systematic to Justices with uniform
legal training.40 The discussion below elaborates on these scholars' posi-
tions.
A. It's All Politics
Legally trained Justices do not rest easily alongside the goal of a po-
litically responsive Court. The appointments process has long been
viewed as an important mechanism for updating the Court's political
views.4 1 Presidents have often attempted to place like-minded Justices on
the Court, either by packing the Court with additional seats or by careful-
ly considering the ideology of potential Supreme Court nominees.42 Pres-
idents have recently enhanced their ability to appoint ideologically com-
patible Justices, notwithstanding an aggressive Senate.43 But as a practi-
cal matter, presidents are still limited to a pool of candidates with formal
35. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1718, 1726.
36. Id. at 1732. Schauer focuses on appellate judging generally, but the lack of a determina-
tive role for law and legal training in "hard cases" seems especially likely to apply to Supreme Court
decisions. Id. at 1718, 1726.
37. Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1571.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1570.
40. Id. at 1591-92.
41. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 379; Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-85 (1957), reprinted in 50
EMORY L.J. 563, 570 (2001) (arguing that frequent appointments can ensure "the policy views
dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the
lawmaking majorities of the United States").
42. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 8-11 (describing court-packing plans proposed by FDR and
used by Abraham Lincoln's generation); Chabot, supra note 10, at 1245-46 (describing presidents'
consideration of ideology of Supreme Court nominees).
43. Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 fig.2.
2015] 225
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
legal education." And lawyer Justices may be predisposed to vote inde-
pendently of their appointing presidents.
Christopher Eisgruber develops underpinnings of an argument
against legally trained Justices in his book, Constitutional Self Govern-
ment.45 He asserts Justices who decide constitutional issues should be
viewed as serving a representative, democratic function.46 Eisgruber con-
tends Justices are qualified to make these representative judgments be-
cause they have a democratic pedigree. This pedigree reflects their ap-
pointment by elected officials, 47 through a process that ensures Justices
will hold mainstream moral views.4 8
Once in office, Justices' life tenure allows them to uniquely repre-
sent people by virtue of "disinterestedness" rather than "legal acumen.'A9
Eisgruber does not expressly advocate Justices without formal legal
training. He notes, however, that a Court comprised solely of lawyers
may have difficultly claiming a broad democratic pedigree.50 He also
notes legal training may give Justices a "natural, and destructive, tenden-
cy to . . . conceiv[e] of constitutional interpretation as a technical legal
exercise."5'
John Denvir carries Eisgruber's theory to the conclusion that the
Court should have nonlawyer Justices.52 Like Eisgruber, Denvir points
out that a Court comprised entirely of lawyers is likely to be politically
out of touch.53 Such a Court would send "the wrong signal to the citizen-
ry at large; it tells them that constitutional law involves technical issues
44. Presidents have strong incentives to nominate Justices from elite law schools in order to
win confirmation. See Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10.
45. EISGRUBER, supra note 33.
46. Id. at 205 (arguing that the Court's function in interpreting the Constitution "should be
regarded as serving a pro-democratic purpose"). Eisgruber thus departs from customary justifications
of judicial review as safeguarding "electoral and legislative processes" or "protecting individual
rights." Id. at 46-47, 221 nn.2-3 (distinguishing theories advanced in works such as JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), and Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998)).
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; EISGRUBER, supra note 33, at 4 (describing judicial selec-
tion process as one that is "both political and democratic").
48. EISGRUBER, supra note 33, at 66 (explaining that federal judges "are chosen on the basis
of (among other things) conformity to mainstream conceptions of political justice").
49. Id at 3 ("What distinguishes the justices from the people's other representatives is their
life tenure and their consequent disinterestedness, not their legal acumen."); see also id at 59. Ac-
cording to Eisgruber, Justices should be understood to speak for the views of all people. In this way,
judicial review makes up for the fact some people's views are inevitably overlooked by majority rule
or legislation passed by elected members of Congress. Id. at 18-19 (describing how majority rule
does not adequately account for concerns of "the whole people"). This understanding, however, is in
tension with democratic responsiveness advanced by elected officials in the appointments process.
Nor does Eisgruber clearly identify an under-represented group distinct from minority interests,
which might be protected by traditional rights-based review.
50. Id. at 66-67.
51. Id. at 208.
52. Denvir, supra note 2, at 33.
53. Id.
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on which they should have no view."5 4 Denvir specifically addresses
lawyers, not legal education.5 Still, formal legal training is required to
become a lawyer, and it is clearly intertwined with problems Denvir
identifies. He disfavors limiting Justices to an unrepresentative portion of
the population with a unique technical skill set.56 These flaws apply to
persons who attended law school as much as they apply to lawyers in
general.
Denvir instead hopes presidents will start appointing lay Justices in
order to create a Court of "high politics." 57 This Court could claim "a
broader democratic pedigree" and "will possess greater sensitivity to the
current political aspirations of the American people."58 Denvir urges
presidents to appoint Justices like former President Jimmy Carter59 or
historian Gerry Wills.60 Thus, lay Justices offer one reform that will help
the Court "better perform its essential democratic function."
Denvir acknowledges his proposal might lead to different types of
political responsiveness. One possibility is that it will create partisan
Justices who act "as agents of . .. political parties" or the presidents who
appointed them.62 Alternatively, it may create a court of "high politics"
which speaks for broader democratic interests and accounts for views
that are not adequately represented in the electoral process.63 Denvir
strongly prefers the latter outcome, a Court of high politics, to a partisan
Court.64
But he does not support his preference with a clear description of
what interests a non-partisan court of high politics is supposed to repre-
sent.6s Denvir's concern over interests which are not well-represented in
the political process, for example, may overlap with minority interests
which are typically protected by "rights-based," counter-majoritarian
66judicial review. Denvir fails to describe a court of high politics with a
discernable set of interests that can be identified and measured empirical-





58. Id. at 33-34.
59. Presumably a younger Jimmy Carter: he is currently 90 years old.
60. Denvir, supra note 2, at 34.
61. Id at 33.
62. Id at 35.
63. Id Denvir includes a list of "great" Justices who reflect broader democratic interests
rather than partisanship. His list includes Earl Warren, William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, John
Paul Stevens, and David Souter. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. This is also a flaw in Eisgruber's work. See supra note 49.
66. For example, some of the Justices Denvir considers "great," Justices Warren and Brennan,
are generally understood as promoting rights-based, counter-majoritarian review in constitutional
areas such as criminal procedure. Denvir, supra note 2, at 35.
2015] 227
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tive function identified by Denvir: the function served by a partisan court
that reflects views of Justices' appointing presidents.
Denvir's reforms also go beyond appointment criteria and call for a
separate constitutional court (indeed, his position is inspired by the
French Conseil D'Etat).7 This would be an even more radical step than
adding lay Justices to the current Court, and it would require change be-
yond the scope of reforming current appointments practice. Thus, this
study focuses on the first step in Denvir's proposal: enhancing the
Court's political responsiveness by appointing lay Justices to decide the
entire mix of cases before the Supreme Court.
To assess this aspect of Denvir's proposal, it would be helpful to
know what happened when presidents appointed Justices without formal
legal education in the past. Is there any reason to think they might be
more politically responsive than other Justices? This study addresses the
question by measuring whether Justices who shared the benefit of formal
legal education were more or less independent of the ideologies of their
appointing presidents than Justices with diverse educational back-
grounds. As explained below, the comparison shows educational diversi-
ty is related to greater levels of politically responsive voting.
B. Judging Where the Law Has Run Out
Fred Schauer questions the need for appellate judges who are for-
mally educated lawyers.68 His question follows logically from the thesis
that appellate judging "occupies" a severely under-determined "corner of
law." 69 Appellate cases stand apart from most disputes, which are gov-
erned by clear legal rules capable of channeling human behavior "with-
out case-by-case intervention of lawyers and judges.70
Schauer's description of appellate cases builds on George Priest's
and Benjamin Klein's case-selection hypothesis.7' Priest and Klein hy-
pothesize that disputes people choose to litigate are unlikely to be a "ran-
dom" or "representative sample" of all disputes.72 People tend to litigate
cases where issues are up for grabs, while they settle cases where issues
are more clear-cut. For appeals, which often focus on legal issues, par-
ties tend to pursue cases where the law is under-determined. As Schauer
explains, cases brought to appellate courts are "likely largely to consist
67. Id. at 33.
68. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732.
69. Id. at 1720.
70. Id. For example, vast numbers of people file their tax returns by April 15 of a given year,
on average people drive more slowly on roads where the speed limit is lower, and almost all arrests
in the United States are accompanied by Miranda warnings. Id. at 1719.
71. See id at 1723-26.
72. Id at 1723 (quoting George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984)).
73. Priest and Klein's basic model predicts plaintiffs will proceed to trial in cases where they
have a 50% chance of winning and settle other cases. Id. (citing Priest & Klein, supra note 72, at 5).
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of cases in which both sides can make more or less equivalent legally
plausible arguments from the positive law." 74
Viewing appellate decision-making through the lens of the case-
selection hypothesis, Schauer identifies "fascinating convergence among
quite divergent theories of law."7 All theories grant judges some amount
of discretion in resolving cases. When "the positive law runs out," for
example, the "positivist judge" permissibly exercises "discretion" to re-
solve a case based on "non-legal sources."7 6 This is not much different
than realist claims that "positivist legal sources do not resolve appellate
cases."77 Thus, no matter what one's theory of law, appellate cases call
for the exercise of some judicial discretion.
Of course, not all cases that are litigated and appealed fall within
this model. People will sometimes bring easy cases. Thus, a multi-
member court needs at least some appellate judges with legal training to
act as "traffic cops" and issue legally predictable rulings in these cases.
But once judges dispose of easy cases, they are left with hard cases in
which the law has run out.
This Article studies non-unanimous Supreme Court decisions.
Scholars and judges view most of the cases the Supreme Court hears as
hard.79 And cases resolved non-unanimously are hard not only because
the Supreme Court agreed to hear them, but also because the Justices
themselves could not agree on a single outcome.80 By definition, at least
one Justice invested additional time and political capital in the case by
writing a dissent.
In hard cases, Schauer contends law plays a much less important
role. Judging these cases is not likely to be a "legal" process that values
"skills taught in the first year of conventional . . . law schools."8' Thus,
there is no need for appellate judges to be formally educated lawyers.
Judicial selection might instead focus on "politics, morals, economics,
74. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1726-27.
75. Id. at 1731.
76. Id. at 1729.
77. Id. at 1730. And perhaps the case-selection hypothesis would also align with Ronald
Dworkin's views, if appellate cases tend to be those in which "two different results could have
roughly the same degree of 'fit' with the existing sources of decision." Id.
78. Id at 1731.
79. POSNER, supra note 6, at 293 ("[Tlhe bin containing ... legalistically indeterminate
[cases] is chronically overflowing in the Supreme Court."); Cross, supra note 6, at 285 ("Virtually
none of the disputes that reach the Supreme Court are easy cases" (quoting Vincent Blasi, Praise for
the Court's Unpredictability, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1986, at 23) (internal quotation mark omitted));
Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 837, 851 ("[T]he Court considers . .. many 'very hard' cases .... ); Frederick Schau-
er, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 409 (1985) ("[T]here are no easy cases in the Supreme
Court.").
80. This is not to say all unanimous cases are easy. Sometimes the Court resolves hard cases,
such as Brown v. Board ofEducation, unanimously. Schauer, supra note 79, at 408.
81. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732. Schauer also notes that judging is not likely to value the
"technical skills of most practicing lawyers." Id.
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and a wide range of other factors that might now be relevant under one
theory or another of non-legal decisionmaking."82
Schauer's analysis provides an intriguing starting point for thinking
about qualifications of appellate judges. He does not subscribe to a par-
ticular theory of non-legal decision making. His proposal does not re-
quire judges to be "electorally responsible," and it does not address
other mechanisms to enhance judicial accountability, such as the ap-
pointments process or limited terms of office.
Still, given the questions Schauer raises, it would be interesting to
know whether Justices with formal legal education decide cases differ-
ently than Justices without formal legal education. And it would also be
interesting to know whether legal education is associated with lower
rates of political voting. It may be necessary to make more of a choice
than Schauer himself makes about the desirability of politically respon-
sive judges.
C. Optimal Diversity
Adrian Vermeule offers the most thoroughly developed proposal for
lay Justices.8 While his primary concern is enhanced technical compe-
tence in a field other than law,85 the extreme version of Vermeule's ar-
gument calls for "nonlawyer professional[s]" who do not have a degree
in law.86 He argues completely diverse professional training is needed to
offset common biases held by Justices with formal legal training.87
As a starting point, Vermeule opts out of realist models of decision
making, in which cases are "legally indeterminate" or unavoidably polit-
ical.88 He bypasses these models on the assumption they present an easy
case for lay Justices." Persons with legal training have no special exper-
tise in deciding political or indeterminate issues. Thus, Vermeule under-
stands lawyer Justices to have no advantage over lay Justices in deciding
legally indeterminate issues.
Instead of a realistic model Vermeule adopts "artificial assump-
tions," which he claims "are maximally biased in favor of pure lawyer
82. Id.
83. Id
84. Vermeule, supra note 2.
85. Vermeule makes a convincing case for having a Justice with expertise in another field.
This Article takes issue only with his call to eliminate legal expertise. It does not question the bene-
fits Vermeule associates with Justices who have a degree in both law and another field.
86. Id. at 1570 (also noting fallback position of Justices with a degree in both law and another
field).
87. Vermeule focuses on the difference between lawyer and lay Justices, but his definition of
lawyer hinges on formal legal education: a "lawyer" is a "person who has attended an accredited law
school and been admitted to the bar." Id. at 1578 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 1577 (noting his argument "does not depend upon these views" that "many appellate
cases are legally indeterminate" or that law is "just politics" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. Id
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Justices."90 The assumptions are: "[T]hat law constitutes an objective
body of knowledge; that professional training confers distinctive exper-
tise in that knowledge; that all cases have right answers; and that judges
are (1) sincere and (2) vote their view of the legal merits."9 ' According to
Vermeule, relaxing any of these assumptions will merely bolster the case
92for lay Justices.
Vermeule's right answer model allows him to estimate relative error
rates for lay and lawyer Justices.93 His argument against Justices with
legal education depends on lay Justices' ability to offset error-producing
bias common to lawyer Justices. After outlining Vermeule's general ar-
gument, this Article elaborates on problems raised by his failure to quan-
tify the desirable bias he believes lay Justices will introduce.
Fundamentally, Vermeule's decision to sidestep a realistic model of
decision-making hinges on assumptions about relative expertise and fails
to adequately account for the role of bias. Vermeule does not directly
address the possibility that lay Justices will follow personal political
preferences more closely than lawyer Justices in cases where law is inde-
terminate. Checking this type of political independence should not be
viewed as mere error correction, but as a feature that favors advocates of
a more politically responsive Court.
1. Likely Error Rates for Lay Versus Lawyer Justices
Under Vermeule's model, all Supreme Court cases have a single
right answer. This assumption allows him to estimate costs and benefits
based on likelihoods lay or lawyer Justices will err in different types of
cases.94 Vermeule estimates relative error rates for three different types
of cases. First, there are cases where the right answer depends on con-
ventional legal arguments and sources.9 5 Second, there are cases where
the right answer turns on specialized, non-legal knowledge.96 An exam-
ple might be a tax case involving complex accounting issues. Third, there
are cases where the right answer turns on knowledge that is both non-
legal and non-specialized.97 An example is a case turning on "evolving




93. Id. at 1581.
94. He does not include other possible costs or benefits, such as the effect on the Court's
reputation with the general public.
95. He calls these "autarkic" cases. Id. at 1582.
96. Id. at 1582-83.
97. Id. at 1582.
98. Id. at 1582 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005)). Vermeule calls the
second and third categories of cases "nonautarkic" because their outcomes depend on non-legal
knowledge. Id
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Employing the Condorcet Jury Theorem,99 Vermeule asserts a more
diverse body of decision-makers is more likely to reach a correct answer
in a greater number of cases.'00 Vermeule's basic model assumes inde-
pendent voting and focuses on the marginal benefit of adding a single,
more competent voter.1oi Some benefits are easy to predict: lawyers are
more likely to reach the correct answer in legalistic cases, while account-
ants are more likely to reach the correct answer in tax cases involving
difficult accounting issues.10 2
It is harder to predict error rates for cases in which the right answer
does not turn on specialized expertise held by any member of the Court.
Is an accountant Justice likely to improve the Court's odds of reaching
the correct decision in a case turning on specialized knowledge in anoth-
er field, such as history? Would the same be true for a decision turning
on non-specialized knowledge, such as "evolving standards of decen-
cy"?l 03 For Vermeule, the answer to both of these questions is yes.
He answers yes because he expects lay Justices to offset lawyer Jus-
tices' "correlated or systematic" biases in these cases.'05 Vermeule as-
sumes lay Justices will improve decision making simply because they
hold different and countervailing biases than lawyers. Thus, Vermeule
contends lay Justices' ability to offset lawyers' common biases will re-
duce mistakes in cases that do not involve subjects in which either law-
yer or lay Justices have expertise.106
Vermeule's concern over lawyers' correlated biases also leads him
to disfavor dual-competent Justices with a degree in law and another
field.'07 A dual-competent Justice would share the same systematic bias-
es held by other Justices with formal legal education. Vermeule argues
the Court would be better off with a Ph.D. economist or some other pro-
fessional who has no legal training.'os
99. Id. at 1586 (citing MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF
PROBABILITY THEORY TO PLURALITY DECISION-MAKING (1785), reprinted in CONDORCET:
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL THEORY (lain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds. &
trans., 1994)). The Theorem is essentially a law of large numbers. Vermeule emphasizes certain
diversity benefits that may flow from larger groups of voters-increases in average competence and
correction for systematic biases held by smaller groups. Id. He does not argue, however, that the
Court should have more than nine Justices.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1589.
102. Vermeule also notes lay Justices may have broader beneficial effects on the Court: they
may enlighten their colleagues, receive deference from their colleagues, or help the Court write more
carefully-reasoned opinions within their particular area of expertise. See id. at 1594-97.
103. Id at 1587, 1589-90 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 561).
104. Id at 1591.
105. Id at 1589-90.
106. Id. at 1588-89.
107. Id at 1598.
108. Id. at 1611. He lists Harvard economics professor Andrei Schleifer as potential nominee.
Id.
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2. Bias and Voting According to One's Political Inclinations
Correction of error-producing bias, then, is central to Vermeule's
argument: "[O]ptimal design of a decisionmaking group must consider
not only voters' competence . . . but also the nature and direction of their
biases where they do make mistakes."09 Vermeule argues that Justices
without legal training are needed to offset biases held by lawyers. 110
Vermeule notes, for example, that as a group people who choose to
attend law school and become lawyers may favor "conventional morali-
ty," lack concern for "social justice," and prefer "cumbersome . . . pro-
cesses for generating policy.""' While in theory these biases may be
worrisome, Vermeule ultimately professes "uncertainty" about the sys-
tematic nature of these biases for lawyers.112 He nevertheless advocates
diversity on the assumption that lay Justices will provide different and
countervailing biases."
3
But Vermeule's assumptions about benefits flowing from biases
held by lay Justices are untested and uncertain. He does not quantify or
elaborate on the direction of helpful, offsetting bias that he expects lay
Justices to introduce. He assumes any difference in professional training
will do, so that in terms of bias correction alone, the Court could benefit
just as much from appointment of an "astrologer" as it could from ap-
pointment of a PhD economist."14
Without specifics, however, it is difficult to accept that the bias in-
troduced by a nonlawyer professional-whom Vermeule prefers to the
astrologer because of her enhanced technological competence-will have
a desirable effect. It may be that Justices with training in another profes-
sion share many of the biases held by legal professionals. The critical
"in-group," in other words, may be white-collar professionals who hold
advanced degrees from elite institutions."5
More fundamentally, Vermeule's failure to identify desirable biases
introduced by lay Justices raises questions about his decision to skirt
realistic models of decision making. Recall that Vermeule's right answer
109. Id. at 1589.
110. Id. at 1591 ("[L]ay Justices lack the systematic biases ... that arise from lawyers' com-
mon professional training.").
Ill. Id. at 1588 n. 56 (citing studies).
112. Id. at 1593-94 ("We lack essential knowledge about ... the degree to which lawyers'
biases are correlated . . . .").
113. Id. at 1605-06.
114. Id. at 1611 ("[A]ppointing an astrologer to the Court might dilute lawyerly biases . . .
115. Consider Riley v. California, in which a unanimous Court held that police may not search
a person's cellphone without a warrant. 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). The Justices' ability to relate
to privacy concerns arising from cellphone searches has led to the case being described as a "yuppie"
spin on search and seizure law. Nina Totenberg, Rare Unanimity in Supreme Court Term, With
Plenty of Fireworks, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 6, 2014, 3:12 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/06/329235293/rare-unanimity-in-supreme-court-term-with-plenty-of-
fireworks (internal quotation marks omitted).
2015] 233
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
framework sidestepped realistic models of decision-making based solely
on considerations of relative expertise. He assumes that legal training
confers no superior expertise where law is indeterminate.'6 But these
assumptions obscure important considerations of bias. Although legal
expertise may not play much role in a realistic model, bias still seems
relevant, and is perhaps even more relevant to how Justices resolve inde-
terminate or inherently political issues.
In the real world-where many cases do not have a single right an-
swer-it may be that legal training is nevertheless associated with dis-
tinct biases omitted by Vermeule. That is, legally trained judges may be
more inclined to decide cases independently of their personal political
inclinations. This potential bias implicates a normative debate over how
political or independent judges should be."' A proposal that offsets or
mitigates politically independent voting should not be viewed as mere
error correction. Instead, attempting to offset or mitigate independent
decision-making favors one side of a normative debate about the nature
of the Court.
To assess Vermeule's call for Justices without formal legal educa-
tion, then, it would be helpful to know whether Justices who attended
law school are more or less politically independent than other Justices.
At least some scholars would find proposals to enhance political voting
problematic, and likely more worrisome than in-group biases held by
lawyers. In this case, perhaps dual-competent Justices, who have exper-
tise in both law and another field, might offer a better tradeoff than Ver-
meule originally assumes.
D. Historical Differences in Legal Education
The proposals above all question the need for Justices with formal
legal education. This study considers empirical evidence from a unique
historical period when the Court had a mix of Justices with and without
formal legal education. These Justices' varied educational backgrounds
reflect a transition in legal education in the United States. Before admis-
sion to the bar required a law degree, it required aspiring lawyers to
spend a fixed period of time reading the law." 8 Many lawyers satisfied
116. Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1577. This is similar to Schauer's position that legal training
does not matter in indeterminate cases. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732.
117. Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and Ameri-
can Legal Realism, 127 HARv. L. REV 2464, 2492 (2014) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013)) (noting "normative" debate in which "[flormalists
argue that law should play a greater role in judging" whereas "realists" contend "policy preferences
should trump formal considerations").
118. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW
82-84 (1921).
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this requirement by apprenticing under the supervision of a practicing
lawyer, without attending law school."9
The apprenticeship system "left much to be desired."l20 While ap-
prentices gained valuable exposure to "professional tradition[s]" as well
as relationships with established attorneys,121 it was difficult to find time
for the systematic study of law in a busy office. Law clerks tended to
spend a great deal of time "copying writs" with "little opportunity for
constructive reading." 22 They were often "left alone" to wade through
opaque law books while their "teacher[s] tended to business."l23 Alt-
hough some aspiring lawyers had better experiences, "[a]s a rule" prac-
ticing lawyers did not have time to "pay much attention" to their stu-
dents. 124
Sir William Blackstone'25 spearheaded reform by arguing that "the
study of law should be undertaken at the university." 26 According to
Blackstone, apprenticeship would leave a lawyer "uninstructed in the
elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is founded,"
such that "the least variation from established precedents will totally
distract and bewilder him." 27 Legal education in the university setting
would permit students to focus on "principles and first questions rather
than mere details and procedure." 28
Thomas Jefferson led early attempts to offer professional legal
training in a university setting in the United States. He "initiat[ed] uni-
versity instruction in professional law" at William and Mary College.129
In addition to courses in moral philosophy, the college included a school
of "Law and Polic[y]," which was chaired by Chancellor George
119. Id. Of the Justices who did not attend law school, only Samuel Freeman Miller and James
Byrnes were self-taught. Other Justices who did not attend law school read the law by apprenticing
with a practicing attorney. See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19.
120. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1949, 1962 (2012).
121. Roscoe Pound, The Law School and the Professional Tradition, 24 MICH. L. REV. 156,
158 (1925); see also A. Christopher Bryant, Reading the Law in the Office of Calvin Fletcher: The
Apprenticeship System and the Practice of Law in Frontier Indiana, I NEv. L.J. 19, 22 (2001).
122. Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124, 128 (1976).
123. Id. at 133.
124. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 166 (1911).
125. Blackstone authored Commentaries on the Laws of England, which also became a highly
influential treatise in the United States. Nolan, supra note 22, at 735-37.
126. Nolan, supra note 22, at 760. Although apprentices may have had opportunities to take
undergraduate courses in "moral philosophy," they seem ill-suited to Blackstone's desire for en-
hanced professional training. Mark Warren Bailey, Early Legal Education in the United States:
Natural Law Theory and Law as a Moral Science, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 318 (1998). The moral
philosophy courses "lacked the specifics necessary to prepare lawyers for [law] practice." Id.
127. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32.
128. Nolan, supra note 22, at 760. Although Blackstone's hope for separate schools of law
"never came to fruition in England ... it did obtain acceptance many years later in the United
States." Id.
129. REED, supra note 118, at 116.
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Wythe.130 Wythe's course covered professional law, required students to
read Blackstone, and also offered opportunities to participate in moot
courts and legislatures.'3 '
By 1784, the first American school of law, "organized strictly to
prepare students to be lawyers, and distinct from a general bachelor's
degree course," was established in Litchfield, Connecticut.'32 Judge Tap-
ping Reeve organized the Litchfield Law School to accommodate an
overflow of students in his law office. Judge Reeve's fourteen-month
course used Blackstone's Commentaries and covered topics running the
gamut of private law.'33 His program's distinctive feature was systemat-
ic, daily lectures.'34 The school closed shortly after Reeve's death, when
it began to struggle "to compete with the newly opened law programs at
Harvard, Columbia, Yale," and other universities.3 5
University law schools originally "offered one- to two-year courses
of study consisting of lectures and readings of treatises in . . . areas of
law considered important at the time."' 3 6 Decades later, Christopher Co-
lumbus Langdell "became the Dane Professor and Dean at the Harvard
Law School" and "ushered in several innovations that characterize the
modem American law school."'37 Although shifts to the case and Socrat-
ic methods promoted inductive reasoning and changed students' educa-
tional experiences, the program continued to emphasize formal study of
law in an academic setting.'38
As this history makes clear, formal legal education evolved over
time and was not as standardized as it is today. Formal legal education of
Justices in this study ranged from Litchfield's treatise-style lectures to
Harvard's case method.139 Notwithstanding the variety of educational
offerings, however, formal legal education offered students regular and
systematic instruction in general principles of law.140 Law schools were
130. Id
131. Id at 116-17. John Marshall, who sat on the Court before the period covered by this
study, participated in this program. Id at 116-17 n.2.
132. Steve Sheppard, An Introductory History ofLaw in the Lecture Hall, in I THE HISTORY
OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999); see also REED,
supra note 118, at 129 n.3.
133. Id.
134. REED, supra note 118, at 131.
135. Sheppard, supra note 132, at 13.
136. Spencer, supra note 120, at 1969 (describing how topics included "constitutional law,
American jurisprudence, English common law, equity, pleading, evidence, bailments, insurance,
bills and notes, partnerships, domestic relations, conflict of laws, sales, and real property").
137. Id at 1973.
138. Id at 1974. Historically, law schools did not focus on practice skills because they were
taught in law office apprenticeships that often followed law school. Id. at 1972.
139. For example, Ward Hunt attended Litchfield Law School, while Louis Brandeis attended
Harvard Law School in the 1870s, as it was transitioning to the Socratic method under Dean Lang-
dell. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 9; Spencer, supra note 120, at 1973 (noting transi-
tion occurring after Langdell became Dean in 1870).
140. Sheppard, supra note 132, at 13.
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designed to make up for perceived deficiencies in legal education of
lawyers who read the law alone. It follows that people who chose to at-
tend law school may better understand or appreciate some aspects of law
than people who entered the profession by reading the law alone. 141
The study does not attempt to disentangle alternative reasons why
Justices who attended law school may vote differently than others. It
could be law school attendees gained more knowledge of the law, or it
could be that they simply value law taught in school more than others.
Either reason would provide a basis to reconsider the wisdom of elimi-
nating formal legal education as a prerequisite for the Supreme Court.
1I. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This section examines how Justices with and without formal legal
education voted. It reports empirical analysis of voting data from a
unique period when Justices who attended law school sat with Justices
who entered the profession by reading the law alone. Specifically, the
analysis measures whether common background in formal legal educa-
tion explains why some Justices agreed more than others, even control-
ling for political inclinations and other alternative explanations for their
agreements. It also identifies whether Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education voted more or less politically than others.
The results are striking. First, Justices with formal legal education
agreed with one another significantly more than they agreed with other
Justices.14 2 When considered alongside Justices' political inclinations and
several other potentially explanatory variables, common background in
formal legal education is the only significant predictor of Justices'
votes. 143
Second, political voting patterns differ significantly for Justices
with different educational backgrounds. Justices who attended law
school were less politically predictable than other Justices.'" Ideologies
of appointing presidents predict agreements with Justices who did not
attend law school, but they lack significant predictive power over votes
cast by Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education.145
The sections immediately below provide an overview of data and
methodology supporting these findings. Readers who wish to skip this
141. This study focuses on attendance at law school rather than earning a law degree. During
the historical period covered here, many more Justices attended law school than earned law degrees.
Attending law school for a shorter period could still establish important differences: Justices may
still gain more information about general principles of law during their initial period of study, and
enrollment might indicate greater concern for law taught in law school.
142. See infra note 185 and Figure 1.
143. See infra note 185 and Figure 1.
144. See infra note 186 and Figure 2.
145. See infra note 186 and Figure 2.
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background and proceed directly to results should consult the Results
section beginning in Part II. G.
A. Data
This study draws on a unique historical data set that records every
time two Justices who sat together agreed or disagreed in a vote on the
judgment of non-unanimous cases decided from 1862 to 1949.146 When
combined with more recent voting records reported in the Spaeth United
States Supreme Court Database,14 7 the data record voting alignments in
4,444 non-unanimous cases.148 The study focuses on non-unanimous
cases because they best illuminate differences between Justices' voting
patterns. 149
B. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is Justices' pairwise rates of agreement in
non-unanimous cases.150 Agreement rates are a time-honored metric that
reflects the same information contained in a leading measure of ideology,
Martin-Quinn scores.
This study calculates agreement rates in two steps. First, for each
non-unanimous case, it records whether two Justices agreed in a majority
or minority vote on the judgment.152 Second, the study adds each case in
which the pair agreed and divides this number by the total number of
146. See generally Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1001-02. The data exclude a small
percentage of individual Justices' votes for opinions the Supreme Court Historical Society coded as
separate opinions or statements rather than majority, concurrence, or dissent. Id at 1042 n. 142.
147. Spaeth et al., SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 26. Agreement rates in this paper
were calculated using the release including votes from 1953-2009. The historical data set has 1,924
non-unanimous cases and Spaeth's has 2,520. Historically there were a smaller number of non-
unanimous cases because Justices wrote far fewer dissents before the 1920s. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey
A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL.
SC. 362, 363 fig.1 (2001); Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, the
Judges' Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. Q. 471, 476 fig.1, 478 fig.2, 479
fig.3, 480 fig.4 (1977).
148. This study begins with cases in 1862 and ends with cases in 1975, which is the last year
William Douglas was on the bench. Douglas was the last Justice on the Court who sat with both
Justices with and without formal legal education during his tenure on the Court. (Jackson was the
last appointee to sit with Justices with mixed educational backgrounds, but Douglas remained on the
Court for a longer period of time.) Thus the data cover cases decided over a decided over a 103-year
period.
149. See Chabot, supra note 10, at 1248.
150. It is not helpful to include unanimous cases, because they offer no additional information
about Justices' relative positions. Id.
151. This metric follows "some of the earliest empirical studies of the Supreme Court," in
which "political scientist Herman Pritchett constructed tables showing how often each pair of Justic-
es was in agreement, or how often each pair dissented together." Joshua B. Fischman & David S.
Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133,
163 (2009) (citing C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SC. REV. 890 (1941)). For an illustration of how it reflects the same
information contained in Martin-Quinn scores, see Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1011 fig.2
(discussing similarities between percentages of agreement and Martin-Quinn Scores for 2009).
152. It counts votes for a majority, plurality, or concurrence as part of the majority coalition
and votes for a dissent as part of a minority coalition.
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cases in which the pair sat together. This calculation provides a rate of
agreement for each pair of Justices who sat together.
Paired agreement rates capture differences and similarities in voting
behavior without noise that may be introduced by directional coding of
case outcomes.153 In non-unanimous cases, for example, Justice Brandeis
agreed with Justice Stone 85% and Justice Holmes 81% of the time.
Brandeis agreed with Justice Butler in only 45% of non-unanimous cas-
es. Note that unanimous cases do not add to the analysis because Brande-
is will agree with other Justices at the same rate in unanimous cases.
Paired agreement rates also yield a large number of observations for
regression analysis. The voting records reflect agreement rates for forty-
one Justices, from Swaynel54 through Jackson, and all other Justices with
whom they sit, for a total of 551 paired agreement rates. The study ex-
cludes a handful of Justices for whom no political inclination scores are
available.'55 It ends with paired records for Justice Jackson, because he
was the final appointee to sit with Justice James Byrnes. Byrnes was the
last Justice on the Court who never attended law school.156 All Justices
since Jackson sat only with other Justices who attended law school, so
their voting records provide no insight into how variation in educational
background might influence voting patterns.
C. Explanatory Variables
This Article focuses on whether Justices' agreement rates can be
explained by two variables: proximity of Justices' political inclinations
and education. These explanatory variables are described below.
153. Directional coding would identify whether a Justice voted in favor of a liberal or con-
servative outcome for each case. While in theory directional coding could capture the same differ-
ences or similarities in Justices' votes, it is extremely difficult (perhaps impossible) to objectively
identify a single conservative or liberal outcome across all areas of the Court's docket. See Fischman
& Law, supra note 151, at 161-62; Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the
United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415 (2013); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
775, 778-79 (2009); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis
of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480, 493 (2009). This study avoids judgments in-
volved in directional coding by looking to Justices' agreement rates alone.
154. Although Justices before Swayne also had mixed educational backgrounds, Justices sitting
before Swayne had decided significantly fewer non-unanimous cases upon which to calculate per-
centages of agreement. Paired voting records for Swayne begin with all Justices appointed after
Swayne, and so on.
155. As explained infra Part II.C.1, my measure of Justices' political inclinations is a leading
political science metric known as presidential DW-NOMINATE scores. I exclude Justices for whom
no presidential scores are available: Cardozo, Roberts, L.Q. Lamar, Fuller, Matthews, Woods, and
Harlan I.
156. As noted earlier, although Jackson was the last appointee whose paired voting records I
consider, my voting records go beyond Jackson's tenure to William Douglas. Though Douglas was
appointed before Jackson, Douglas had a longer tenure on the Court, and was the last sitting Justice
who had opportunities to vote with Justices who lacked formal legal education.
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1. Proximity of Justices' Political Inclinations (POL DIST)
The proxy for a Justice's political inclinations is the ideology of the
appointing president, which has been one of the most popular predictors
of judicial ideology.'57 Though ideology of appointing presidents has
typically been measured according to the president's political party,58
partisan affiliation offers only a rough metric of ideology.159 This study
improves on partisan measures by using leading political science metrics,
known as DW-NOMINATE Scores, which were developed by Keith
Poole, et al.1 60
Poole et al.'s DW-NOMINATE scores, or an earlier variant of these
scores, have helped explain judicial behavior or identify judicial ideology
in several prominent studies. 161 As explained by Lee Epstein, Andrew
Martin, Jeffrey Segal, and Chad Westerland, Poole's work in this area
makes a "profound contribution . . . to the study of American political
institutions."l62 Poole et. al.'s scores account for "var[ied] . . . ideological
intensity" among presidents of the same party'6 3 and have been found to
"outperform[]" parties of appointing president as a predictor of judicial
behavior.64
157. Fischman & Law, supra note 151, at 167 ("The most popular proxy for a judge's ideolo-
gy ... has been the party of the official who appointed the judge."); George, supra note 1, at 1352
("It is well established that political affiliation of ... [an] appointing President is a strong predictor
of how a judge will vote in a case.").
158. Fischman & Law, supra note 151, at 167.
159. Id. at 170.
160. See Keith Poole et al., "Common-Space" DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped
Standard Errors (Joint House and Senate Scaling), VOTEVIEW.COM,
http://www.voteview.com/dwnomjoint.asp (last updated Feb. 6, 2013).
161. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 165 n.6 (2005) (identifying Poole's measure of appointing president's ideology as a
predictor of Justices' votes in recent time periods); CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC
SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER
THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 117, 119-21 (2007) (using DW-NOMINATE score as measure of
nominating president's ideology and finding that unconstrained presidents select ideologically prox-
imate Justices); Chabot, supra note 10, at 1260 fig. I (presidential DW-NOMINATE scores generally
have significant predictive power over Justices votes, even controlling for variation in senatorial
DW-NOMINATE scores); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Fed-
eral Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 631 (2001)
(using Poole and Rosenthal's "first dimension common space scores to measure the ideological
preferences of the appointing President and relevant senators" and finding that both presidential
ideology and ideology of home state senator helped predict court of appeals judges' votes); see also
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 166, 172-75 (2007) (using
common space scores to identify median judges on panel of court of appeals judges).
162. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306 n.4
(2007).
163. Fischman & Law, supra note 151, at 174.
164. Epstein et al., supra note 162, at 306-07 (describing Giles' study). Studies of district and
court of appeals judges have found it helpful to consider not only ideologies of appointing presi-
dents, but also ideologies of opposing-party home-state senators, to predict judges' voting behavior.
See, e.g., Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 161 at 632; see generally Fischman & Law, supra
note 151, at 173-74 (discussing studies). This senatorial role reflects the practice of senatorial cour-
tesy, which is not understood to play as significant a role across all Supreme Court appointments.
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 161, at 22-23 (unlike Senators from states where there is a district
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This study focuses on how proximate a pair of Justices' political in-
clinations-or ideologies of appointing presidents-are. To measure
proximity, the study calculates absolute distance between DW-
NOMINATE scores for a particular pair of Justices' presidents.165 The
distance between scores of appointing presidents provides a metric of
how close or distant a pair of Justices' political inclinations are.
For example, Justice Brandeis was appointed by a liberal president,
Woodrow Wilson, while Justices Butler and Stone were appointed by
conservative Presidents, Harding and Calvin Coolidge.1 66 Wilson has a
DW-NOMINATE score of -0.612581,6 while Harding and Coolidge
have scores of 0.144168 and 0.533545, respectively. Thus the absolute
distance between Wilson and Harding is 0.756749, and between Wilson
and Coolidge is 1.146126. These distances provide a proximity of politi-
cal inclinations, or "POLDIST," variable that can be compared to paired
voting records for all Justices.
Recall that for the Justices above, proximity of political inclinations
has only limited ability to explain agreement rates. Justice Brandeis votes
with Justice Butler at a politically predictable low rate (45%). This is
what one would expect from Justices whose political inclinations (and
ideologies of appointing presidents) are not proximate. But the explana-
tion does not hold for Justices Brandeis and Stone. Their political incli-
nations are even less proximate, but they voted together 85% of the time.
Perhaps these voting patterns make more sense in light of the fact that
Justices Brandeis and Stone both attended law school, but Justice Butler
did not.
2. Educational Background (FORMALED)
"FORMAL ED" is a dummy variable identifying similarities or dif-
ferences in Justices' formal educational backgrounds. Pairs of Justices
who both attended law school received a 1, all other pairs received a 0.168
This coding identifies whether pairs of Justices who share the benefit of
formal legal education find more or less to agree about than other Justic-
es. The coding compares them to other pairs where one or more Justice
did not attend law school.16 9 This study draws information on Justices'
educational backgrounds from U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database.170
court or court of appeals vacancy, "senators do not expect to have much of a say in ... the nomina-
tion" of Supreme Court Justices); Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 161, at 628.
165. Appendix A infra provides a detailed description of this calculation.
166. This study uses scores for Stone's initial appointment as Associate Justice.
167. As explained in Appendix A infra, this is a weighted score combining the first and second
dimensions of DW-NOMINATE scores.
168. One might argue paired voting records for Justices who did not attend law school should
be excluded, as they show no variation (all zeros) for this variable. I included them because they are
still important in considering whether Justices who did not attend law school vote politically.
169. While it is also possible to compare pairs of Justices who both read the law to pairs of
Justices where one or more attended law school, this study focuses on agreements reached by Justic-
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D. Control and Interaction Variables
Simply considering the explanatory power of political inclinations
and educational background could be misleading. It may be that factors
other than education and political inclinations explain varied levels of
agreement between different groups of Justices. To account for this pos-
sibility, the study includes control and interaction variables reflecting
other likely predictors of Justices' agreement. This section provides an
overview of control and interaction variables, and Appendix A provides
a more detailed description of each control and interaction variable.
The first control variables are Justice-level fixed effects variables.
These variables control for Justices who may have had generally inflated
agreement rates and suppressed political voting due to historical norms
of consensus.'7 ' The fixed effects allow the regression to measure varia-
tion in each Justice's rates of agreement by calculating a unique starting
point (or intercept) for each Justice. The unique starting point ensures
Justices who have generally inflated agreement rates do not skew the
analysis and cause the regression to unduly downplay politically predict-
able voting by other Justices. Fixed effects properly focus analysis on
whether intra-Justice variation in agreement rates is significantly ex-
plained by differences in proximity of political inclinations, educational
backgrounds, or other control variables.'72
A second group of control variables looks to two types of profes-
sional experience: experience as a prosecutor or as a judge. Both of these
experiences have been found to help predict Justices' votes in historical
cases.73 The third group considers three of the Justices' personal attrib-
utes: familial economic status, non-urban origins, and regional origins.174
The latter two have been found to explain historical voting patterns in
earlier studies.'75 This study also considers whether familial economic
es with common background in formal legal education. Thus, the study captures whether Justices
who have common formal professional training have more to agree about than other Justices. This
scenario also reflects the most likely change in the Court's composition following the appointment
of a Justice without formal legal education. It is highly unlikely a lay Justice would initially sit with
even one other Justice who also lacked formal legal education.
170. Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19 (variable 37: name of nominee's law
school; variable 38: law school status).
171. The norms controlled for here are ones that would generally inflate rates of agreement
with all other Justices. Thus they would operate independently of differences in educational back-
ground and provide an alternative explanation for apolitical voting by certain Justices. For discussion
of historical norms of consensus on the Court, see generally Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note
147; Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship,
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1335 & fig.8 (2001); infra Appendix
A.
172. As noted in Appendix A, infra, results for fixed effects controls are not included in graph-
ic results because they calculate a unique starting point for each Justice in the study.
173. Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 473-74 & tbl.1.
174. Religion was not included because Tate and Handberg's historical study did not find a
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status explains agreement rates.'76 The study draws information for all
control variables in the second and third group from the U.S. Supreme
Court Justices Database.177
Last, the study uses interaction variables to identify differences in
predictive power of political inclinations for distinct groups of Justices.
These variables control for the possibility that politics has predictive
power, but only over certain subsets of Justices. The regressions accom-
plish this by interacting political inclinations with two sets of dummy
variables.
The first regression uses dummy interaction variables to compare
political voting of Justices appointed before and after 1925. This interac-
tion variable accounts for the possibility that politics does help explain
votes, but only for Justices who were appointed after 1925. These later-
appointed Justices might have had more opportunities to vote politically
because the Judiciary Act of 1925 gave later appointees greater discre-
tion to hear politically divisive cases.
The second regression adds different dummy interaction variables.
It compares political voting for pairs of Justices who both attended law
school to political voting for pairs where one or more Justice did not
attend law school.179 It may be that Justices who share the benefit of for-
mal legal education are more likely to agree on grounds independent of
politics than Justices who do not share the same professional training. A
detailed description of these interaction variables is reported in Appendix
A.
E. Hypotheses
Regression analysis identifies whether changes in Justices' agree-
ment rates can be explained by differences in educational backgrounds,
176. The opportunity to apprentice with a practicing lawyer was often facilitated by social
connections available to persons from well-to-do families. Bryant, supra note 121, at 26. Thus,
Justices who read the law were not necessarily from families with more limited financial resources
than those who attended law school.
177. See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19.
178. See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 237(a), 43 Stat. 936, 937.
179. This study also includes a test in which the interaction between legal education and politi-
cal inclinations was added to the first regression. The combined regression failed to identify a signif-
icant individual coefficient for either the FORMALED dummy or FORMALED dummy interact-
ed with political inclinations. Still, this result does not necessarily mean the FORMALED variables
lack significant explanatory power: the variables may be correlated, and thus have significant joint
explanatory power that is not identified by either individual measure.
This study included an F-test to determine whether both legal education variables (the
FORMAL ED dummy and FORMALED dummy interacted with political inclinations) jointly
have significant explanatory power when considered in the same regression. It compares the differ-
ence in explanatory power of regressions with and without the two educational variables. The F-test
measures whether the regression including the educational variables has significantly more explana-
tory power than one would expect from adding random variables without explanatory power. This
test yielded an f-statistic of 5.5663, which establishes the joint effect of these educational variables is
significant at the 1% level.
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proximity of political inclinations, or control variables. The analysis tests
two hypotheses about the relationship between formal legal education
and Justices' voting patterns:
1. Common background in formal legal education significant-
ly explains Justices' agreements, even after one controls for
alternative explanations of political inclinations and other
background variables.
2. Political inclinations significantly predict agreement with
Justices who never attended law school, but they do not
predict agreement between Justices who share the benefit of
formal legal education.
F. Analysis
This study tests these hypotheses using two OLS regressions. so The
first regression considers the general explanatory power of a common
background in formal legal education, controlling for political inclina-
tions and other background variables.i' The second regression includes
the same control variables but focuses on whether Justices who share the
benefit of formal legal education vote more or less politically than other
Justices. 182
If proximate political inclinations predict rates of agreement, the re-
gressions will yield a significant negative coefficient for the POLDIST
variable. The expected coefficient is negative for the following reason:
Justices whose votes can be explained politically will agree less with
Justices whose expected political inclinations (ideology of appointing
president) are more distant from their own. Justice Brandeis, for exam-
ple, agrees with Justice Butler far less than he agrees with his fellow
Wilson appointee, Justice John H. Clarke. Justice Butler was appointed
I80. This study uses OLS regressions because the dependent variable reflects rates of agree-
ment rather than binary (0 or 1) outcomes. It also reports Justice-level clustered standard errors, to
help adjust for heteroskedasticity, or variance in unobservable factors, which may be uneven from
Justice to Justice. For a detailed explanation of this methodology, see Chabot, supra note 10, at
1254-55.
181. (AgreeRate)i, = ai + P*(POL_DISTij) + P2*(POLDI STi)*(POST_ 1925) +
03*(FORMALED) + P4*(JUEX) + Ps*(PROEX) + P6*(ECON) + 37*(NONURBAN) +
ps*(REG) + F.
Where (AgreeRate),i is the percentage of cases in which Justice i and Justice j joined the
same majority or minority coalition on the judgment, POLDIST is the absolute distance between
Justices' political inclinations as reflected by their appointing president, FORMALED = I if both
Justices attended law school, 0 otherwise, and other variables are coded as described above and in
Appendix A. The intercept (ci) is allowed to vary across Justices.
182. (AgreeRate),i = ai + 0 1*(POLDISTij) + P2*(POLDISTi.)*(FORMALED) +
P4*(JUEX) + Ps*(PRO EX) + Pe6*(ECON) + 0 7*(NON URBAN) + ps*(REG) + F.
Where (AgreeRate)j is the percentage of cases in which Justice i and Justice j joined the
same majority or minority coalition on the judgment, POLDIST is the absolute distance between
Justices' political inclinations as reflected by their appointing president, FORMALED = I if both
Justices attended law school, 0 otherwise, and other variables are coded as described above and in
Appendix A. The fixed effects variables allow the intercept (a) to vary across Justices.
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by a more conservative president than Justices Brandeis and Clarke, and
thus Brandeis' differing levels of agreement are politically predictable.'83
Of course, it may be that other background variables have predictive
power that political inclinations lack. FORMALED and other back-
ground control variables are coded as dummy variables, with a 1 for Jus-
tices who share background traits associated with particular voting pat-
terns and 0 for Justices who do not. Thus, if a background variable has
predictive power, one would expect that Justices who share that back-
ground experience or trait will agree with one another at a higher rate.
This should yield a significant positive coefficient for the dummy back-
ground variable.
G. Results
Both regressions identify significant differences in Justices who
share the benefit of formal legal education. As illustrated by Figure 1,
Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education agree with one
another significantly more than other Justices.
183. See Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1023-24 & tbl.3.
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Figure 1: Predictive Power of Common Background in Formal Legal
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Estimated for Justices appointed from Swayne through Jackson and
all other Justices with whom they sit, excluding Justices for whom ap-
pointing presidents have no DW-NOMINATE scores.184 ** denotes
p< 0.05; p-values are estimated with clustered standard errors, and error
bars denote 95% confidence intervals. N=551. Adj. R2 =0.1939. See Ap-
pendix Bfor a detailed table of regression results.
Indeed, common background in formal legal education is the only
significant predictor of Justices' agreements. One can be highly confi-
dent, at the 5% level, that the true relationship is not zero. This educa-
tional background is significant even controlling for likely alternative
explanations, such as Justices' political inclinations pre- and post- 1925.
The findings support the first hypothesis: common background in formal
legal education significantly explains Justices' agreements.
Beyond overall predictive power, it is helpful to consider how polit-
ical voting patterns might differ for Justices with diverse educational
backgrounds. Figure 2, below, summarizes the difference between Jus-
tices with and without formal legal education.
184. See regression equation supra note 181. For a list of excluded Justices see supra note 155.
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Figure 2: Predictive Power ofProximate Political Inclinations Over Jus-
tices'Agreement Rates, Comparing Justices with Common Background
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Estimated for Justices appointed from Swayne through Jackson and
all other Justices with whom they sit, excluding Justices for whom ap-
pointing presidents have no DW-NOMINATE scores.85 ** denotes
p< 0.05, and p-values are estimated with clustered standard errors. The
regression also fails to identify significant explanatory power for control
variables. N=551. Adj. R 2=0.2016. See Appendix B for a detailed table
of regression results.
Here, the difference between the two groups is significant and strik-
ing. Proximity of Justices' political inclinations has significant explana-
tory power over votes cast with Justices who lack formal legal education.
(Recall that the expected result for political inclinations is negative be-
cause one expects politically close appointees to agree at higher rates and
politically distant appointees to agree at lower rates.)'86 Justices who
share the benefit of formal legal education are significantly less political-
ly predictable than others. Indeed, for Justices with common background
in formal legal education, politics' explanatory power loses significance
and shrinks to almost zero. These results support the second hypothesis.
185. See regression equation supra note 182. For a list of excluded Justices see supra note 155.
186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education vote less politi-
cally than others.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Empirical analysis identifies a significant relationship between for-
mal legal education and Justices' agreements in non-unanimous cases. In
addition, Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education vote
apolitically while other Justices do not. These findings should give pause
to advocates of Justices without formal legal education. They cast doubt
on assumptions that legal training is irrelevant to Supreme Court deci-
sion-making.
This section describes how the findings relate to specific arguments
advanced by Denvir, Schauer, and Vermeule. It then explains how evi-
dence from historical voting records bears on current conceptions of the
Supreme Court.
A. Independence, Diversity, and a More Politically Responsive Court
John Denvir calls for Justices without formal legal education.'87 He
hopes this reform will help the Court serve an enhanced representative
function.'88 This study provides further reason to think diverse educa-
tional background will bolster the Court's representative function.
Recall that variables measuring Justices' political inclinations re-
flect ideologies of Justices' appointing presidents.189 Justices who share
the benefit of formal legal education voted independently of their ap-
pointing presidents' ideologies. Votes cast with Justices who never went
to law school, however, were significantly predicted by ideologies of
their appointing presidents.'9 0
Of course, Denvir himself would find these results consistent with a
less desirable form of representation: Justices who mirror views of their
appointing presidents.'91 This enhanced representation may be imperfect
because appointing presidents may select Justices preferred by "extrem-
ists in their own party" rather than Justices "who capture the mainstream
of popular thought." 92
187. Denvir, supra note 2, at 33.
188. Id.
189. See supra Part II.C.1.
190. See supra fig.2.
191. Denvir, supra note 2, at 34-35. Denvir focuses on constitutional cases, while the non-
unanimous cases in this study were not limited to constitutional cases. There is no reason to think
legal issues in constitutional cases will be more determinate or that voting in constitutional cases will
be less political than in other cases. See Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Measuring Deviations from Expected Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
sTUD. 819, 830-31 (2008). Thus, results from the general sample of non-unanimous cases still raise
questions about political voting in constitutional cases.
192. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374.
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Still, responsiveness to views of an appointing president may offer
an attractive outcome,'93 even if it is second best in terms of responsive-
ness to current public opinion. Justices who reflect their appointing pres-
idents' views would have enhanced representative qualities. Their votes
may be understood to reflect dominant political forces at the time of their
appointments.19 4 And these views may be updated by every subsequent
appointment.19 5 Barry Friedman describes this facet of the appointments
process as playing "some role in ensuring that the Court heeds the cry of
public opinion."'9 6 Given that Justices without formal legal education
more closely reflected ideologies of their appointing presidents in the
past, this option may also be desirable to current presidents.
Nevertheless, a nominee who never went to law school seems an
unlikely choice for presidents who desire like-minded Justices. Since the
1970s, presidents have redoubled their efforts to appoint politically com-
patible Justices and achieved unprecedented success in doing so.'9 7 At
the same time, however, the Senate has resumed an aggressive role in
opposing nominees to the Court.198 Geoffrey Stone points out that the
Senate is less likely to put up a fight over nominees with impeccable
professional qualifications.' 9
Thus, the Senate gives presidents strong incentives to choose candi-
dates whose professional qualifications are beyond reproach.200 Indeed,
recent appointments reflect a narrower than ever range of educational
backgrounds -currently all Justices attended Harvard, Yale, or Colum-
bia Law School.20' Harriet Miers's nomination drew criticism because
193. Some scholars call for broad presidential discretion to appoint Justices with more extreme
views. See McGinnis, supra note 28, at 667-68 (arguing for a strong presidential role and against
"compromise" nominees); Stone, supra note 12, at 460 ("A system in which presidents are relent-
lessly driven to nominate only the most moderate Justices will not serve the best interests of either
the Court or the nation.").
194. "When a party wins the White House, it can stock the federal judiciary with members of
its own party," and these judges will provide extended "partisan representation" during their time on
the bench. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REv. 1045, 1067 (2001); see also Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of Ideology: A Principled
Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 147
(2009) (describing this theory of partisan entrenchment).
195. In his seminal 1957 article, majoritarian Robert Dahl asserted that frequent appointments
ensure "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." Dahl, supra note 41, at 570.
196. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374. Friedman also points out that the appointments process is
imperfect due to lower frequency of vacancies on the Court and ideological drift. Id. This does not
mean appointments themselves have no effect, but that their influence on the Court could be en-
hanced if presidents had the ability to make appointments more frequently.
197. Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 fig.2.
198. Stone, supra note 12, at 383-84.
199. Id. at 410 ("[T]here is a substantial correlation between perceived [inferior] qualifications
and hotly-contested nominees.").
200. See Glen, supra note 10, at 141; O'Neill, supra note 10, at 703.
201. Glen, supra note 10, at 148.
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she attended a non-elite law school.20 2 Presumably, a nominee who never
went to law school would be even more objectionable to the Senate.
As a result, presidents who want to win confirmation of ideological-
ly compatible Justices are unlikely to choose nominees who never at-
tended law school. This limitation adds to complaints raised by critics of
an overly aggressive senatorial role in the confirmation process.203 Even
if presidents have generally succeeded in appointing Justices who reflect
their views,204 they cannot further enhance their political influence by
205
appointing Justices without formal legal education. Thus, the confir-
mation process prevents presidents from creating a more politically re-
sponsive Court by enhancing its educational diversity.
B. Does the Law Run Out More Quickly for Justices Who Never Attended
Law School Than for Other Justices?
Schauer questions the need for formal legal education because he
assumes it is unrelated to the work appellate judges do in deciding hard
cases.206 The cases in this study are hard not only because they were
heard by the Supreme Court, but because the Justices themselves could
not agree on a unanimous outcome. In these hard cases, the study identi-
fies significant relationships between Justices' educational backgrounds
and their votes. Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education
found more to agree about than other Justices, and they also voted signif-
icantly less politically than other Justices.
These findings call Schauer's assumption into question. It may be
that Schauer is generally correct, the law does run out in hard cases. But
his understanding fails to account for the possibility that the law may run
out more quickly for some people than others. Perhaps people who never
went to law school are less well equipped or predisposed to abide by
potentially governing legal principles than people who attended law
school. For example, would a person without formal legal training be as
likely to concede that a contested policy issue is governed by the doctrine
of stare decisis?207
Given these possibilities, and evidence that Justices who attended
law school vote differently than others, the value of formal legal educa-
tion should not be assumed away. One should hesitate before dismissing
202. Id. at 144 (noting that Miers's "legal education at Southern Methodist University served
as a lightning rod for criticism over her nomination to the Court").
203. Some scholars object to an aggressive Senate, which drives presidents to nominate only
middle-of-the road Justices. See McGinnis, supra note 28, at 667; Stone, supra note 12, at 459.
204. Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 fig.2.
205. Presidents' appointments power is also limited by their lack of control over when a vacan-
cy on the Court occurs. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374 (noting that presidents' influence is dimin-
ished as Justices' "period of service is going up").
206. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1731-32.
207. See Schauer, supra note 79, at 434 ("Law seems almost unique in its use of authoritative
interpretations.").
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it as useless training that bears no relationship to judicial decision-
making. Instead, eliminating this prerequisite should be viewed as a
choice about the direction in which the Court should move. Is it desirable
to call for Justices with qualifications that have been associated with
enhanced political voting? Future dialogue on this issue should directly
confront possible changes brought about by eliminating Justices who are
formally educated lawyers.
C. Is Eliminating Legal Education in Technocratic Justices a Good
Tradeoff?
As noted above, this study focuses on the strong version of Ver-
meule's proposal, in which he argues that optimal diversity requires ap-
pointment of a professional who does not also have a degree in law.208
Vermeule argues completely diverse professional training is necessary to
correct for lawyers' systematic biases.209 This study identifies politically
independent voting as a distinct bias held by lawyer Justices. It therefore
calls into question Vermeule's assumption that checking lawyer Justices'
bias would serve only a neutral, error-correcting function.
Vermeule, of course, calls for Justices whose lack of legal training
is offset by professional training in another field.2 0 But it is unclear this
expertise would check a Justice's tendency to vote in favor of her politi-
211
cal inclinations2. Without training in law, moreover, a lay Justice may
be less inclined to grasp or value legal frameworks that could shape the
outcome of a particular case. Again, legal doctrines such as stare decisis
may be less appealing to lay Justices than they are to Justices with formal
legal education.212 As a result, they may be prone to view a greater num-
ber of decisions as discretionary. And, based on what happened in the
past, the proposal must account for the possibility that lay Justices' exer-
cise of discretion will be biased in favor of their own political inclina-
tions.
Not everyone considers political bias undesirable. Vermeule does
not address its desirability, beyond his assumption that diverse views-
here more versus less political bias-have the benefit of offsetting one
another. This may have some value under Vermeule's artificial model,
which focuses on enhanced competence in reaching the "right an-
,,213 i o
swer[].' But it is not clear why bias would necessarily have a favora-
208. Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1570.
209. Id at 1598-99.
210. Id at 1598.
211. In administrative law, for example, the New Deal vision of the agency as an expert and a
political decision maker has been heavily criticized. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmeri-
can Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683-87 (1975). Technocratic decisions made by
judges may be political as well.
212. See supra Part III.B.
213. Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1577-78.
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ble offsetting effect under more realistic assumptions where the right
answer is up for grabs.
Introducing more political bias or checking a Justice's tendency to
vote independently should not be viewed as mere error correction. In-
stead, it is a side effect that is desirable only for persons willing to accept
a more politically responsive court. In light of this study, one should not
discount the possibility that formally educated lawyers are better able to
set aside personal political views.
These findings qualify Vermeule's assumption that lay Justices will
serve a desirable, bias-checking function. For those who object to a more
political Court, the weak version of Vermeule's proposal-appointing a
dual-competent Justice who has formal legal training in addition to ex-
pertise in another discipline214_TepfeSents a more compelling option.
The compromise also presents a more realistic option for future appoint-
ments. A nominee with a law degree as well as a Ph.D. in economics
may be more palatable to the Senate than a nominee with a Ph.D. in eco-
nomics alone.215 Thus, presidents who wish to add a Justice with diverse
professional training and experience may consider dual-competent Jus-
tices a more attractive option.
D. Enhanced Political Voting and the Current Court
The proposals above are all influenced by the possibility Justices
without formal legal education will enhance political voting on the
Court. The study establishes this possibility using historical evidence-
the only available evidence on voting patterns of Justices without formal
legal education. One should not expect historical evidence to map per-
fectly into the present or perfectly predict votes cast by a hypothetical
future Court including lay Justices. There are no doubt important differ-
ences between the historical period studied and today.
Nevertheless, it would also be unwise to ignore the only available
evidence of what happened during the time when the Court included
Justices without formal legal education. The study identifies enhanced
political voting by Justices without formal legal education. And this oc-
curred in a period not generally characterized by politically predictable
voting on the Court. Further, Justices who voted politically in the past
were at least lawyers with informal legal training. A lay Justice appoint-
ed today might have no training in law whatsoever.216 Such a Justice may
be even less likely to reach agreement on legal and apolitical grounds
than Justices who read the law.
214. Id. at 1581.
215. See generally Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10.
216. Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1585.
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Moreover, the study controls for alternative explanations as to why
the Court voted less politically in the historical time period.2 17 Politically
independent voting cannot simply be attributed to generally inflated rates
of agreement due to norms of consensus or fewer opportunities to hear
218politically salient cases before 1925. Current proposals to eliminate
Justices with formal legal education should acknowledge that this back-
ground has been significantly associated with enhanced political voting
in the past.
If anything, changes in appointments criteria seem more likely to
enhance political voting now than in the past. Since 1925, the Court has
enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion219 to fill its docket with cases in-
volving politically salient issues.220 Further, politically salient issues
themselves have become more divisive in an era of enhanced political
polarization.221 And since the 1970s presidents have enjoyed unprece-
dented success in selecting Justices whose votes reflect ideologies of
appointing presidents.222 In a Court that is already well-situated to grow
increasingly political, there is more reason than ever to think Justices
without formal legal education could enhance this tendency.
Still, one might wonder whether the modem Court has become such
a "political court"223 that it cannot be pushed in an even more political
direction. This query fails, however, to account for evidence of the polit-
ical independence the Court has retained. As a matter of constitutional
structure, Justices are not elected and hold life tenure once in office.224
Nor do Justices hold themselves out as political actors. In confirmation
hearings, for example, Supreme Court nominees "have long insisted that
their 'personal predilections' have no place in the judicial enterprise."225
And once in office, Justices maintain the appearance of neutrality by
publicly justifying their decisions with opinions incorporating "prece-
217. See supra Part II.D (describing variables and interactions that account for norms of con-
sensus and different levels of political voting by Justices appointed before and after 1925).
218. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
219. The Court gained discretion over its docket under the Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229,
§ 237(a), 43 Stat. 936, 937. For a more detailed discussion of this change, see infra Appendix A, Part
C.2.
220. Justices today also have more clerks than in the past. It is not clear this would alter the
way Justices without formal legal education decide cases. First, a Justice would need to decide she
wants to hire a clerk with a degree in law rather than another field. Second, adding clerks would only
matter if lay Justices vote differently based on diminished understanding of the law. If these Justices
grasp competing legal arguments but simply value the law less, it is unclear law clerks would make a
difference.
221. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized De-
mocracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 278-79 (2011).
222. Ideology of appointing presidents has predicted Justices' agreements better than ever
since the 1970s. See Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 & fig.2.
223. POSNER, supra note 6, at 269 (dubbing the Supreme Court a "political court").
224. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § I.
225. Carolyn Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality and Confessing Subjectivity in Supreme Court
Confirmation Hearings, 88 CHI-KENT L. REV. 455, 465 (2013).
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dent-based" arguments.226 Justices have also been known to "expressly
disclaim . . . personal policy preferences" in their opinions.
227
Beyond appearances, many Supreme Court decisions defy political
explanation.22 8 Since the 1940s the Court has decided "[a]bout 29 per-
cent" of "orally argued decisions" unanimously.229 Just last term the per-
centage of unanimous decisions spiked to 66%.230 In unanimous cases,
Justices appointed by Republicans and Democrats, and who have staked
out as ideologically distant positions as Justice Sonia Sotomayor and
Justice Clarence Thomas, nevertheless agree on the same case outcome.
Thus, it is not surprising that "ideology" has been found to play "only a
small role in unanimous decisions."23'
Even non-unanimous decisions, which no doubt reflect a "substan-
tial ideology effect,"232 still leave room for explanatory factors other than
Justices' expected political preferences.233 In recent decades, for exam-
ple, ideology of appointing presidents has gained statistically significant
predictive power over Justices' agreements in non-unanimous cases.23 4
But variation in ideology of appointing presidents (along with variation
in ideology of Senates to whom Justices were nominated) explains only
17% of the variation in Justices' rates of agreement.235
Beyond predictors of Justices' votes, Justices' actual voting align-
ments also provide evidence of ideologically independent voting. For
example, Justice John Paul Stevens's general voting record places him at
the far left of the Court's ideological spectrum, whereas Justice Antonin
Scalia has a conservative voting record that places him at the opposite
236end of the spectrum. Justices Stevens and Scalia nevertheless voted
226. Cross, supra note 6, at 260, 325.
227. Id. at 261 (quoting Justice Stevens' disclaimer of ideological reasons for the decision in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)) (internal quota-
tion mark omitted).
228. See generally Solum, supra note 117, at 2487-88 ("[R]esults reported in Behavior of
Federal Judges make it clear that a purely ideological model does not fare well at any level, even the
United States Supreme Court. The data strongly suggest that law and legal preferences play an
important role in explaining judicial behavior.").
229. EPSTEIN, LANDES, & POSNER, supra note 117, at 124.
230. Kedar S. Bhatia, Stat Pack for the October Term 2013, SCOTUSBLoG 5 (July 3, 2014)
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/SCOTUSblogStat Packfor OT I3.pdf, Kedar Bhatia, A Few Notes on
Unanimity, SCOTUSBLOG (July 10, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/a-few-
notes-on-unanimity (noting that the Court's resolution of 38% of cases in 9-0 opinions without any
concurrence was also higher than in previous years).
231. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 117, at 136; Solum, supra note 117, at 2477.
232. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 117, at 149.
233. Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1013-14.
234. Chabot, supra note 10, at 1261-62 & fig.2.
235. Id. at 1261 fig.2, 1272 App. B (reporting Adj. R2d =.1724 in column 2).
236. See Randy Schutt, Graph of Martin-Quinn Scores of Supreme Court Justices 1937-Now,
WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Sept. 17, 2014), http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Graph ofMartin-
Quinn Scores of SupremeCourtJustices 1937-Now.png. For more information about Martin-
Quinn scores, see Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Mar-
kov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
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together in a non-trivial 43% of non-unanimous cases.237 Indeed, ideo-
logically "disordered" voting coalitions, with extremes such as a Ste-
vens-Thomas or Scalia-Souter-Ginsburg dissent,238 are not uncommon:
Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist identify significant numbers of ideologi-
cally disordered votes in non-unanimous cases.239 They conclude "unex-
pected voting patterns are frequently caused by other considerations
outweighing ideology in the thinking of at least some Justices."240
Justices have cast surprisingly independent votes even in high pro-
file cases. Take Justice Roberts's decision to vote with the liberal bloc of
the Court and uphold the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.241 Roberts's
decision was surprising because he parted company with Justices Thom-
as, Scalia, Alito, and Kennedy and was the only Republican appointee to
find the Act's mandate constitutional.242 Roberts's decision has been
explained in legal and institutional terms that transcend basic political
243inclinations.
No matter what the theoretical explanation for judicial independ-
ence, it is a trait that has been significantly associated with going to law
school.244 Thus, one should pause before assuming a Justice who lacks
formal legal education will maintain current levels of judicial independ-
ence. It is difficult to imagine a candidate who has not formally studied
the role of precedent, for example, explaining to the Senate how she will
follow it, much less skillfully incorporating precedent into an opinion.
And, based on what happened in the past, one should not expect Justices
without formal legal education to do as well seeking or reaching politi-
cally independent grounds for agreement with their colleagues. Proposals
to enhance the Court's professional diversity should account for this
study's significant link between diverse professional training and en-
hanced political voting.
237. Chabot, supra note 10, at 1248 (discussing voting records through 2009).
238. Edelman, Klein & Lindquist, supra note 191, 834-35 tbl.3.
239. Id. at 830 tbl.i (noting ideologically ordered voting, by select natural court, in only 36-
57% of all non-unanimous cases).
240. Id. at 843.
241. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
242. Id.
243. Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 86 (2012)
(accepting accounts of Roberts's opinion as "institutionalist and as resisting government compul-
sion"); Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: "Reasonable Interpretation" and the Affordable
Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118 (2012) (arguing that Roberts "transcended . . . polarized
political debates" through "analytical convergence" and the "law"); Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB
v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2013) (noting that Rob-
erts's opinion reflects his ability to see both dominant and alternative constitutional gestalts).
244. See supra note 185 and Figure 2.
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CONCLUSION
This study links diverse educational backgrounds to two significant
differences in how Justices voted. Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education (1) voted together more often and (2) were less
politically predictable than other Justices without this background. Pro-
ponents of Justices without formal legal education should recognize that
educational diversity has been associated with greater levels of political-
ly predictable voting in the past.245 This enhanced political voting may
occur even if a Justice without formal legal education sits with other Jus-
tices who attended law school.246
Advocates of a more politically responsive Court should generally
find Justices without formal legal education desirable. In the past they
reflected views of their appointing presidents more closely than other
Justices. These findings suggest another critique of the appointments
process for advocates of a strong executive role.247 By limiting presidents
to a pool of candidates with formal legal education, the appointments
process impedes presidents' ability to update and shape the Court's polit-
ical views.
On the other hand, appointing a Justice without formal legal training
should not be understood to promote optimal diversity in a purely neutral
manner. It should also be understood to have an important potential side
effect: enhanced political voting. Complete professional diversity should
be expected to improve decision making only if one considers enhanced
political voting an improvement.
This study considers one type of diversity in professional training
that is no longer present on the Court. Future studies might expand the
inquiry to consider how educational and professional diversity relate to a
wider array of judicial behavior. Are judges with certain backgrounds
more likely to apply particular legal doctrines or favor formalism or
pragmatism in judging?
These future inquiries can help identify differences associated with
enhanced professional and educational diversity on the bench, as well as
the normative goals diversity is likely to serve. For now, however, formal
legal education is associated with significant differences in how Supreme
Court Justices voted. Justices who attended law school voted together
more often and less politically than Justices without the same educational
background. A Court including Justices without formal legal education
should not be expected to maintain the same level of political independ-
ence as a Court comprised entirely of Justices who attended law school.
245. See supra note 185 and Figure 2.
246. See supra note 185 and Figure 2.
247. See McGinnis, supra note 28, at 667; Stone, supra note 12, at 460.
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APPENDIX A:
A. Explanatory Variables: Calculation ofAbsolute Distance Between
Appointing Presidents' D W-NOM7NA TE Scores(POLDIST)
As noted in Part II, above, proximity of two Justices' political incli-
nations was calculated using the absolute distance between their appoint-
ing presidents' DW-NOMINATE scores. This section provides a detailed
description of DW-NOMINATE scores used in the study.
The DW-NOMINATE scores rank presidents from liberal to con-
servative on a scale of -I to + 1. They are derived from roll call votes cast
by each member of Congress and are comparable across different Con-
gresses. The scores rank presidents in equivalent terms based on the posi-
tions presidents take on particular congressional roll call votes.
For the historical time period covered here, it is important to con-
sider both dimensions of liberal and conservative ideology represented
by DW-NOMINATE scores.248 The first dimension addresses the "basic
issue of the role of government in the economy."2 49 The second dimen-
sion picks "up regional differences within the United States,"250 often
accounting for issues of race or other dimensions, which may divide
251
members of the same party.
To account for both dimensions, the study incorporates a combined
DW-NOMINATE score. It assigns each dimension the weight recom-
mended by their authors. First dimension scores receive a weight of I
and second dimension scores receive a weight of 0.4638.252 For Justices
who were elevated to Chief Justice while serving as Associate Justices,
such as Chief Justice Edward White, the study uses DW-NOMINATE
scores for the initial nomination to the Court. 253
248. See, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-EcONOMIC
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 129 (1997). Historical DW-NOMINATE scores for presidents are
based on limited numbers of observations. See generally VOTEVIEW.COM,
http://www.voteview.com/ (last visited Oct. I1, 2014). They nevertheless remain the best available
metrics of presidential ideology beyond party.
249. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Party Polarization: 1879-2010,
VOTEVIEW.COM (Jan. I1, 2011), http://voteview.com/polarized america.htm.
250. Id.
251. POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 248, at 232.
252. Keith Poole et al., "Common-Space" DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Stand-
ard Errors (Joint House and Senate Scaling), VOTEVIEW.COM (Jan. 22, 2011),
http://www.voteview.com/dwnomjoint.asp.
253. The study makes a further adjustment for Charles Evans Hughes. Hughes originally
served as an Associate Justice but then left the Court to run for president in 1916. See 3 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 448-49 (1924). He was later appointed
Chief Justice in 1930. Id. Because there are DW-NOMINATE scores for only Hughes's initial
appointment, the study uses these scores for both of Hughes's terms on the bench.
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B. Control Variables
As noted in Part II, the study includes several control variables.
These variables reflect alternative explanations for variation in Justices'
agreements. The sections below describe control variables used in the
study.
1. Fixed Effects Variables Control for Varied Norms of Consensus
The study uses fixed effects dummy variables to control for general-
ly inflated rates of agreement due to norms of consensus. Justices are
thought to have publicly suppressed private disagreements, and joined
unanimous opinions with which they did not personally agree, more fre-
quently in part of the period covered by this study.254
Although Justices originally issued their opinions seriatim, Chief
Justice John Marshall used his leadership skills to convince Justices to
abandon this practice and join a single opinion of the Court.2 55 This pat-
tern of unanimity held during the remainder of the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth century.256 High levels of unanimity continued
through the 1920s, eroded somewhat after the Judiciary Act of 1925, and
gave way to sharply increased rates of dissent by the 1940s.2 57
Thus, it is possible that high rates of agreement between some Jus-
tices in the study relate to historical norms of consensus, which operate
independently of Justices' educational backgrounds.25 8 This study side-
steps much of the concern by excluding unanimous decisions. The non-
unanimous cases studied here are those in which at least one Justice vio-
lated consensual norms by dissenting.
254. See Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note 147, at 362-63; Post, supra note 171, at 1335
fig. 18; see generally Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of
Consensus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781 (2011) (developing "a consensus voting model for estimat-
ing preferences of federal circuit court judges").
255. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-
1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 166 (1999); M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and
Back Again: A Theory of Dissent 21 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 186, 2008) (citing 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919) and
William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court "The First Hundred Years Were the Hardest," 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 475, 480-81 (1988)), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-id=1019074.
256. Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note 147, at 362.
257. Id. at 365; Post, supra note 171, at 1310 & fig.10. The Court's ability to hear a greater
percentage of politically salient cases under the 1925 Judiciary Act may have also contributed to
increased rates of dissent. Halpern & Vines, supra note 147, at 480 (discussing how, in addition to
wider discretionary jurisdiction, the Act eliminated appeals as of right in many "uncontroversial
cases" and "freed the [C]ourt to concentrate in obligatory appeals on only those cases raising salient
national issues"). See generally Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936-42. To the extent
this change in jurisdiction was followed by stronger patterns of politically predictable voting, it is
accounted for in the interaction variable comparing changes in political voting before and after 1925.
See infra Appendix A at Part C.
258. Alternatively, it may be that Justices who share the same background in formal legal
education adhere to norms of consensus more strongly.
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Still, pressure to agree with one's colleagues could influence voting
patterns in non-unanimous cases. Even when one Justice dissented, other
Justices may have still felt pressure to join a majority decision. A 5-4
decision sends a different message than an 8-1 decision, and may have
been perceived as less legitimate in at least part of the period studied
here.2 59 Thus, it is possible that some Justices in the study had generally
inflated agreement rates and suppressed political voting due to historical
norms of consensus.
This study controls for inflated agreement rates by including Jus-
tice-level fixed effects dummy variables.260 The fixed effects measure
variation in each Justice's rates of agreement by calculating a unique
starting point (or intercept) for each Justice. The unique starting point
adjusts for generally inflated agreement rates. It allows analysis to focus
on whether intra-Justice variation in agreement rates is significantly ex-
plained by differences in proximity of political inclinations, educational
backgrounds, or other control variables. Because these variables calcu-
late a unique starting point for each Justice in the study, they are not re-
ported in graphical depictions of results above.
2. Professional Experience
a. Same Judicial Experience (JUEX)
Scholars have frequently hypothesized "how [prior] judicial experi-
ence may influence attitudes about case outcomes."2 61 Although prior
judicial experience has not been consistently associated with judges'
voting patterns, Tate and Handberg's historical study finds that it has
some explanatory power over Supreme Court decisions in economics
cases. 262 Thus this study will also account for its possible explanatory
power.
This study uses "JUEX" as a dummy variable identifying differ-
ences or similarities in Justices' prior experience as judges. Pairs of Jus-
tices who both had prior experience as judges at the federal or state level
received a 1, all other pairs received a 0.263
259. See Post, supra note 171, at 1315-17 (discussing Brandeis' concern with dissent in light
of legislation proposed by Senator Borah, which would have required at least 7 members of the
Court to agree to "any decision invalidating an Act of Congress").
260. The study included the fixed effects specification by hand coding binary fixed effects
dummy variables for each Justice and adding them to data used in the regression.
261. See George, supra note 1, at 1354-55, 1362-63 (describing past studies and hypothesizing
how prior experience may influence decision making on the Roberts's Court).
262. Tate & Handberg,supra note 16, 474 tbl.l.
263. See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variables 81-96 describe place
and dates a Justice served on a state trial or appellate court, or federal district court or court of ap-
peals.
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b. Same Prosecutorial Experience (PROEX)
Many studies hypothesize that prosecutorial experience "will influ-
ence the ideological direction of judges' decisions"2 6 These judges may
tend to favor government interests in cases against criminal defendants,
265as well as other types of cases. Or their experience prosecuting under-
dogs or have-nots may make them generally more conservative than
266
judges without prosecutorial experience. Prosecutorial experience has
been found to predict Justices' rulings in historical civil rights and liber-
ties and economics cases,267 so it is important to consider its explanatory
power here.
This study uses "PROEX" as a dummy variable identifying differ-
ences or similarities in Justices' experience as prosecutors or government
attorneys. Pairs of Justices who both had this experience received a 1, all
other pairs received a 0.268 Although some studies measuring outcomes
in criminal cases have focused narrowly on judges with experience as a
criminal prosecutor,269 this study looks to all types of cases. Thus it con-
siders experience in both criminal and civil cases where a Justice has past
270
experience representing the government.
3. Personal Attributes
a. Same High Economic Status (ECON)
Familial economic status has not been generally thought or found to
explain Justices' voting patterns in historical or other cases. 271 Still, it
seems a possible alternative explanation for higher rates of agreement.
Perhaps Justices who grew up in a more affluent environment, with
greater amounts of property to protect, valued property rights more than
Justices from less wealthy backgrounds.
This study uses "ECON" as a dummy variable identifying differ-
ences or similarities in Justices' family economic status. Pairs of Justices
264. George, supra note 1, at 1353.
265. Id. at 1354; Nagel, supra note 17, at 266 tbl. 1.
266. George, supra note 1, at 1354; Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 474 tbl. I (prosecutorial
service was negatively correlated with liberal votes in civil rights and economics cases, but the effect
was mitigated for prosecutors who also had judicial experience).
267. Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 474 tbl. 1, 474-76.
268. Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variables 145-159 record place and
dates of experience representing local or state government interests: deputy or city attorney, assistant
district or county attorney, district or county attorney, state assistant attorney general or state attor-
ney general. Variables 97-110 record place and dates of experience representing federal government
interests: Assistant U.S. Attorney or U.S. Attorney, work in the office of or as Solicitor General, and
work in the office of or as Attorney General.
269. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 1473.
270. See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19.
271. Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 476; Tate, supra note 14, at 358.
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whose families were both upper to upper-middle class received a 1, all
other pairs received a 0.272
b. Same Non-Urban Origins (NON-URBAN)
Justices from rural and urban origins may also vote differently. Tate
and Handberg's historical study measured whether Justices from non-
urban, agricultural backgrounds voted more conservatively in both civil
rights and economics cases.273 They identified a significant negative rela-
tionship between this background variable and liberal votes in both civil
rights and liberties and economics cases.274
This study uses "NONURBAN" as a dummy variable identifying
differences or similarities in Justices' childhood surroundings. Pairs of
Justices whose childhood surroundings were non-urban received a 1, all
other pairs received a 0.275
c. Originated From Same Geographic Region (REG)
A final factor that may explain Justices' agreements is common re-
gional origin. Tate and Handberg found Justices from the South voted
considerably more conservatively in civil rights and liberties cases but
276not in economics cases.
This study incorporates "REG" as a dummy variable identifying dif-'
ferences or similarities in Justices' regional origins. Pairs of Justices who
were both from Northern states or both from Southern states received a
1, all other pairs received a 0. 277
C. Interaction Variables
As noted in Part II, supra, the study interacts political inclinations
with the FORMALED dummy and with a dummy identifying Justices
appointed after 1925. This interaction identifies whether Justices who
both went to law school or Justices appointed after 1925 vote more or
less politically than other Justices. The sections below provide more de-
tail on these interactions.
272. Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variable 18, Family economic status.
For this variable, scores 5 and 4 represent upper to upper-middle class family status. Justices who
both had scores of 4 or 5 received a 1. Any pair with a Justice from a middle to lower class family
status (scores 3-1) received a zero.
273. Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 468. Their study identifies agricultural background
according to whether the Justice had a father who was a farmer. Id.
274. Id. at 474 tbl. 1.
275. Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variable 17. For this variable Justices
with urban childhood surroundings were coded as 5s. Justices in more rural childhood surroundings
were coded as Is through 4s. Thus, both Justices had to have a score of 4 or less to receive a "l"
dummy for this variable.
276. Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 474 tbl. I.
277. Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19 (variable 16, nominee's childhood
location). The study uses a strict definition of Southern states and did not count border states, such as
Maryland, as the South.
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1. Political Inclinations and Justices Who Both Attended Law
School
The second regression interacts proximity of political inclinations
and educational backgrounds. The regression multiplies the
FORMAL ED dummy by the variable for proximity of Justices' political
inclinations, POLDIST.278 The interaction between these variables
measures whether there is a significant difference between predictive
power of political inclinations for two groups of Justices:
(1) pairs of Justices with one or more Justice who did not attend law
school; and
(2) pairs of Justices who both attended law school.279
The interaction coefficient reported by the regression allows calcu-
lation of the total predictive power of political inclinations for Justices
who both attended law school.280
2. Political Inclinations for Justices Appointed Before and After
1925
The first regression uses an interaction to account for the fact that
later appointed Justices may have had greater opportunities to hear polit-
ically salient cases than earlier appointed Justices. The Judiciary Act of
1925 gave the Court greater discretion to decide politically salient cases
than before.281 Discretionary review by writ of certiorari replaced much
of the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction and "essentially recog-
nized the Court as the supervisor of the system of federal law." 282
278. See supra text accompanying note 179.
279. If the effect of distance between political inclinations changes for Justices who both
attended law school, it will show up in the data as a significant coefficient on the interaction varia-
ble. To see this, note the expected change in agreement rate for a change in political distance is the
general POLDIST coefficient for pairs where the dummy variable is equal to zero and the
POLDIST coefficient plus the POLDIST*FORMAL ED interaction coefficient during the time
periods the dummy variable is equal to one. A formal test of the null hypothesis that the predictive
power of political inclinations did not change is therefore equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis
that the POL DIST coefficient = POLDIST coefficient + POLDIST*FORMALED interaction
coefficient, or that the POL DIST interaction coefficient = 0.
280. To accomplish this I add the coefficient for group (1) to the interaction coefficient for
group (2). Thus, total predictive power of political inclinations for Justices who both attended law
school equals the sum of group I plus group 2. 1 also needed to calculate new confidence intervals
for sum of two coefficients. This involved a multi-step process. First, Variance(Pn + Ob) = Vari-
ance(P,) + Variance(pb) + 2*Co-variance(p. + Pb). See generally JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE,
INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 140-41 (5th ed. 2008). The standard
error is the square root of this estimated variance, and the t-stat is (03 + Ob) - 0/standard error. The t-
stat can then be converted into a p-value, which reflects confidence intervals reported in this study.
281. See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936-42.
282. Post, supra note 171, at 1273; see also Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein & William J.
Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J.
POLS. 361, 385 (1988) (concluding that multiple factors including Chief Justice Stone's ineffectual
leadership and change to discretionary jurisdiction contributed to decline of consensual norms on the
Court).
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Changes in mandatory appellate jurisdiction are also thought to have
freed the Court from "uncontroversial" appeals and allowed it to focus
on appeals "raising salient national issues."2 83 Thus, different opportuni-
ties to resolve politically divisive cases before and after 1925, rather than
common educational background, may explain voting by some Justices
in the study. To account for this possibility, the study adds a time dummy
variable to identify the distinct explanatory power attributable to political
inclinations in the post-1925 time period.
The post-1925 time dummy accounts for voting records of Justices
appointed after 1925. The time dummy allows consideration of two dif-
ferent groups of Justices: Justices appointed through 1925 (Justice
Swayne through Justice Stone) and Justices appointed after 1925 (Justice
Black through Justice Jackson). This dummy controls for politically pre-
dictable voting limited to a set of later-appointed Justices.
It codes each dummy variable according to a single Justice's paired
agreements with all other Justices with whom he sits. For example, the
data includes agreement rates for Justice Sutherland and all other Justices
with whom he sits, then agreement rates for Justice Reed and all other
Justices with whom he sits, etc. I assign a 1 or 0 according to the first
Justice in the pair, so that the pairs for Justice Reed, who was appointed
after 1925, receive a 1, and the pairs for Justice Sutherland, who was
appointed before 1925, receive a 0.
The regression multiplies the POST 1925 time dummy by the vari-
able representing proximity of Justices' political inclinations
(POLDIST).284 Again, the interaction between these variables measures
whether there is a significant difference between predictive power of
political inclinations over agreement rates for Justices appointed in dis-
tinct time periods. The interaction coefficient reported by the regression
is used to calculate the total predictive power of political inclinations for
Justices appointed in the post-1925 time period.
283. Halpern & Vines, supra note 147, at 480.
284. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS
Explanatory Variable
Proximate Political Inclinations (All
Justices)
Proximate Political Inclinations, one
or more Justices Did Not Attend
Law School
Difference in Prox. Pol. Inclinations
for Justices Appointed Post-1925
Total Level Prox. Pol. Inclinations
for Justices Appointed Post-1925
Both Justices=Formal Legal Ed
Difference in Proximate Political
Inclinations For Justices Who Both
Attended Law School
Total Level Proximate Political


















































Column I reports results depicted in Figure 1,285 Column II reports
results depicted in Figure 2.286 ** denotes p<0.05; p-values are estimated
with clustered standard errors, which are reported in brackets.
285. See supra note 184.
286. See supra note 185.
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The United States has long nourished a vibrant and extensive non-
profit sector. It accomplishes this in part by providing a subsidy through
exemptions from tax at the federal, state, and local levels. The subsidy is
provided to charitable organizations, social welfare organizations, labor
unions, business leagues, and many other nonprofit organizations. I argue
that we should end the subsidy for the nonprofit groups that represent
business interests. Some argue that we should subsidize nonprofit groups
that provide goods or services that would not otherwise be sufficiently
supplied by the market (market failure theory). Additionally some argue
that we subsidize to promote pluralism and a robust civic sector. Neither
theory supports the provision of this subsidy to business interests. There
is little evidence of market failure in this sector. Interest group literature
has long shown business interests dominate the interest group sector. We
can thus expect the subsidy to enhance that bias rather than reduce it.
Furthermore, because of significant collective action problems suffered
by large latent groups, the policy of subsidizing business interests likely
enhances the voice of the politically strong business interests, and deval-
ues the voice of the politically weak. We should end or at the least weak-
en policies subsidizing business interests.
t James E. & Betty M. Phillips Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law
Center. I dedicate this Article to the good people that manage and have managed the exempt organi-
zations sector at the IRS. I was proud to work with all of you and learned much from each of you. I
also thank a number of people who have provided feedback on earlier iterations of this Article in-
cluding Ellen Aprill, Amy Blackwell, Samuel Brunson, Frances R. Hill, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, David
Miller, Shu Yi Oei, James Puckett, Sussanah Tahk, and Donald Tobin. I thank the members of the
2013 and 2014 Junior Tax Conference and the 2014 Tulane Tax Law Roundtable. Finally, a big
thanks to the LSU Law Center for a grant making this work possible. I especially thank my research
assistants Amelia Hurt, Joseph Ellison, Randall Thomas, and Jeff Butler for their dedicated work on
this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.
-Adam Smith'
The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper-class accent.
-E.E. Schattschneider2
1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 232 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Classics
1999) (1776).
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Many were recently surprised and outraged when they found out
that the National Football League (NFL) is exempt from federal income
tax.3 While the NFL has indicated it now plans to switch to taxable sta-
tus,4 it has long avoided paying income tax because it is considered a tax-
exempt business league just like a chamber of commerce or the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA). 5 Barbers, or lawyers, or doctors, or football
team owners, to name some, can join forces as tax-exempt business
leagues, pool their money, invest their money, provide business services,
share information, and generally promote and lobby legislators regarding
their common business interest, all without owing any income tax.6
Many U.S. representatives and senators have recently called for the re-
moval of this tax exemption for all sports leagues including the NFL.
This Article agrees that ending the tax exemption of these sports-related
business leagues is a good idea; however, denying exemption to sports
business leagues does not go far enough. Business leagues as a category
fail to satisfy any theory justifying income tax exemption. Furthermore,
providing exemption to these organizations likely even causes some
harm. This Article calls for Congress to end tax exemption for these or-
ganizations.
In the nonprofit world, business leagues are considered mutual-
benefit organizations because they work primarily to benefit the mem-
bers of the organization, such as the aforementioned barbers, lawyers and
doctors. Tax exemption for mutual-benefit organizations such as busi-
2. E.E. SCHATTrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012). Congress added "professional football leagues" to the
statute in 1966. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(a), 80 Stat. 1508, 1515 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012)).
4. See Richard Rubin, NFL Will End Its Tax-Exempt Status, Goodell Tells Owners,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2015 10:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-
28/nfl-will-end-its-tax-exempt-status-goodell-tells-team-owners.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(6) exempts from income tax "[b]usiness leagues, chambers of com-
merce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not adminis-
tering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." § 501(c)(6).
6. Id. § 501(a).
7. Senator Coburn has introduced the PRO Sports Act, S. 1524, that excludes all professional
sports leagues from qualifying as tax-exempt organizations. PRO Sports Act, S. Res. 1524, 113th
Cong. (2013). Representative Dave Camp's Tax Reform Act of 2014 called for the removal of
exemption for sports leagues in § 5301 of that proposal. DAVE CAMP, TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014
DISCUSSION DRAFT § 5301, at 162 (2014), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/waysand-meanssection bysectionsummary final
022614.pdf. Senators Maria Cantwell and Harry Reid introduced a bill that would pull the exemp-
tion of the NFL to put pressure on the NFL for maintaining the mascot name of the Washington
Redskins. S. 2884, 113th Cong. (2014); Press Release, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell, Cantwell, Reid,




333e39b0ae57. Senator Cory Booker has also introduced legislation calling for the end of the NFL's
exemption. Securing Assistance for Victims' Empowerment (SAVE) Act, S. 2816, 113th Cong.
(2014). His proposal would send the tax paid to support domestic violence victims. Bernie Becker,
Senators Throw Hail Mary at NFL, THE HILL (Sept. 21, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/218398-senators-throw-hail-mary-at-nfl.
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ness leagues is generally accepted to be the provision of a subsidy.' The
subsidy for business leagues occurs because three forms of income are
not taxed: (1) investment income; (2) commercial income from the sale
of goods and services to members and nonmembers; and (3) member
income from member dues. Because much of the activities conducted by
business leagues would be deductible at some point, the subsidy is most-
ly a matter of tax deferral rather than full exemption.9 The subsidy likely
amounts to a relatively small amount compared to the tax system on the
whole. Nevertheless, it does establish an opportunity for a significant
sector of the business community to save in a tax-free manner to enhance
the opportunities of a business league's members. Furthermore, federal
tax-exempt status is so often used as a signal for worthiness of other im-
portant subsidies and benefits such as state and local property tax exemp-
tion that getting tax exemption right at the federal level has many im-
portant spillover effects.'0
Some argue we should subsidize nonprofits that provide goods or
services that would not otherwise be sufficiently supplied (market failure
theory)." Additionally some argue that we should subsidize nonprofits to
promote pluralism and a robust civic sector (pluralism theory).12 This
Article argues that neither theory applies to support exemption for busi-
ness leagues. It demonstrates that the goods and services supplied by
business leagues are generally not undersupplied. This undermines sup-
port for the market failure theory. Additionally, business interests suffer
relatively little collective action problems as compared to large, latent
interests, such as the poor. This undermines the support for the pluralism
theory. Interests that can never organize will never be able to access the
subsidy of tax exemption. Business interests, on the other hand, as will
8. See Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA.
TAX REV. 115, 151-52 (2013).
9. See Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REv. 133, 155-56
(2006).
10. BAZIL FACCHINA, EVAN SHOWELL & JAN E. STONE, TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY:
PRIVILEGES & EXEMPTIONS ENJOYED BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: A CATALOG AND SOME
THOUGHTS ON NONPROFIT POLICYMAKING 44-46 (1993) (cataloging some of the different rights
nonprofit organizations are entitled to beyond federal income tax exemption such as exemption from
state sales and property taxes). The state of Louisiana for instance provides exemption from ad
valorem taxation to business leagues under article 7, section 21 of its state Constitution. LA. CONST.
art. VII, § 21(B)(3). It provides the exemption to "a nonprofit corporation devoted to promoting
trade, travel, and commerce, and also property of a trade, business, industry or professional society
or association, if that property is owned by a nonprofit corporation or association organized under
the laws of this state for such purposes." Id.
I1. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67-68 (1981); see Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the
Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTITUTIONS 21, 22-24 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
12. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609-10 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (describing the "role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints"); see also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999); John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in
AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT, at ix, xiii-xv (Brian O'Connell ed., 1983).
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be demonstrated in the Article, seem to have relatively easy access to this
subsidy. Thus, instead of promoting pluralism by promoting all diverse
interests that wish to organize and lobby government, the subsidy for
business interests enhances the voice of the politically strong and deval-
ues the voice of the politically weak. Thus, the subsidy worsens pluralist
interests rather than enhancing them.
Although not particularly numerous (approximately 67,000 regis-
tered as tax-exempt in 2013), 13 nor awash in national assets or revenue
($71 billion in total assets and $41 billion in total revenue in the sector in
2013), 14 these organizations are often considered some of the most politi-
cally influential organizations in the country.'5 Post Citizens United,'6
many who closely observe our political system have called for new regu-
lation of business leagues and social welfare organizations through the
Code focusing primarily on disclosure rules related to political campaign
activity.17 This Article adds to the tax legal literature on tax-exempt or-
ganizations by viewing them through the lens of interest-group literature.
13. Internal Revenue Service, Data Book, 2013, IRS PUBLICATION 55B, 56 tbl.25 (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13databk.pdf.
14. Number of Non-501(c)(3) Exempt Organizations in the United States, 2013, NAT'L CTR.
FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS,
http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt-CO (last visited June 23,
2015) (information derived from the IRS Business Master File 10/2013).
15. Business leagues, such as the National Federation of Independent Business, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and the American Association for Justice, regularly made up the majority of
the organizations listed in Fortune magazine's Power 25, a list of the most influential lobbying
organizations on the federal level based on a polling of insiders. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE 224 (2009). Fortune maintained the list from 1997 to 2001. Alt-
hough the list is not based on any scientific principles in assessing actual influence, it does correlate
with amount of resources placed towards influencing national policy. Id. at 223-24. In the first
quarter of 2013, Roll Call published a list of the twenty-five largest lobbying spending firms--eight
of the twenty-five were comprised of business leagues, with the top three being business leagues.
Kent Cooper, Top 25 Organizations Lobbying in First Quarter, ROLL CALL (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:40
AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/moneyline/top-25-organizations-lobbying-in-first-quarter/. Of the list
of the biggest lobbying spenders of 2013, OpenSecrets. org indicates that five business leagues were
included in the top ten. Organization Profiles, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/
(last visited June 23, 2015) (crediting the Center for Responsive Politics). The other five are business
corporations. Id.
16. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
17. The DISCLOSE Act of 2012 sponsored by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse would have
amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for additional disclosure from
corporations, labor unions, and other organizations when they make "independent expenditure[s]"
effectively advocating for a candidate. Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act of 2012, S. 3369, 112th (2d Sess. 2012); see also Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclo-
sure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427,
440 (2011) (calling for disclosure of contributions to certain tax-exempt organizations for political
action on a rapid basis); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of
2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclo-
sure Laws, 16 NEXUS 59, 92-93 (2010-2011) (calling for requiring tax-exempt organizations to
disclose substantial donors when such organizations advertise for political causes); Greg Colvin, A
Silver Bullet that Would End Secret Tax-Exempt Money in Elections, CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICA'S
FUTURE (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://blog.ourfuture.org/2012041 /ASilver Bullet That Would End Secret Tax-
Exempt Moneyin Elections (proposing a cap on political intervention spending by any organiza-
tion organized under § 501(c) of the lesser of$100,000 or 10% of expenditures).
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The primary contribution of this Article is to highlight the dominant pur-
pose of these organizations, describe their activities, and demonstrate
why they do not fit well into the tax exemption rubric.
There are many interest groups in addition to business leagues in-
cluding for-profit corporations and other tax-exempt organizations, such
as labor unions'8 and social welfare organizations.9 This Article focuses
on business leagues in an attempt to get a greater understanding of the
interest group role played by one small facet of the exempt organization
sector. There is a dearth of scholarly legal literature on social welfare
organizations, labor unions, and business leagues as part of the nonprofit
sector or part of the tax-exempt sector. Given the challenges the IRS has
lately faced in regulating this sector,20 it seems an opportune time to
begin a careful examination of the roles of these important organizations
to our society.
Legal scholars who examine the role of interest groups often exam-
ine ways to justify the regulation of lobbying2' or the limits on campaign
finance spending.22 They view these intrusions of money into the politi-
cal process as harmful to the country because of either corruption or
harm to national economic interests because such activities engage in
harmful rent-seeking.2 3 They see the logic of imposing such regulation to
be common sense. They view the First Amendment as the primary reason
we might be circumspect in imposing regulation on the political activities
24of these groups. However, instead of focusing on the regulation of lob-
bying or political campaign activity, this Article focuses on whether we
should subsidize organizations whose primary purpose is to lobby and
engage in some political campaign activity.
Many scholars of the tax-exempt sector espouse the political science
theory of pluralism as a reason to strongly support exemption for a broad
25
range of nonprofit organizations. However, political scientists and
18. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2012).
19. Id. § 501(c)(4).
20. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE
USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW, No. 2013-10-053, at 3-5 (2013),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf ( escribing
how tax-exempt status is reviewed and determining that the IRS inappropriately reviewed some tax-
exempt applications).
21. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 191-92 (2012) (examining current lobbying regulations and proposing and justifying a
new national economic welfare rational for lobbying regulation).
22. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban,
VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2475908 (exploring the constitutional status of
the corporate campaign contribution ban and effects of recent Supreme Court cases).
23. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 22; Hasen, supra note 21, at 226-35.
24. Hasen, supra note 21, at 234-40.
25. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609-10 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (describing the "role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often
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economists long ago found that pluralism as a description of the political
universe misses significant factors in interest group formation. Mancur
Olson demonstrated that there are some groups and interests, such as the
poor, that are so large and latent that it is very difficult if not impossible
for them to organize even with a subsidy.26 A close study of business
leagues shows that they form with relative ease and appear to dominate
the interest group sector. Large, latent interests like the poor are rarely
able to organize. The subsidy is easily accessed by most business inter-
ests but rarely accessed by less powerful organized interests. Thus, in-
stead of tax exemption operating as a neutral, democracy-enhancing law,
it likely does just the opposite by protecting and enhancing the status quo
of powerful interests.
A possible implication of this finding is that tax exemption may
generally harm democracy rather than improve it. If true, we should re-
think the exemption of exempt organizations that represent the political
voice of various interests, such as social-welfare organizations, labor
unions, and business leagues. I do not take a position on this issue in this
Article. I plan to look in greater depth at the activities of these organiza-
tions in future articles. It might be that there are some interests that are
substantially underrepresented in our democracy, such that exemption
may be the right policy option. In this Article I simply maintain that the
exemption for business leagues is not needed as a market response. Addi-
tionally, the subsidy causes harm to our democracy by enhancing the
voice of an already powerful group.
Arguably, if we eliminated tax exemption for business leagues
many of them might be able to reorganize as social welfare organizations
and maintain exempt status. This seems highly likely, and for that reason
if there were an elimination of exemption for business leagues there
would need to be a similar closing of access to tax exemption under other
sections of the Code such as § 501(c)(4). Peak organizations such as the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce may still qualify. As will be discussed in the
Article in Part III.A, in many cases peak organizations actually do suffer
collective-action problems. So perhaps a move from one tax-exempt sec-
tion to another makes sense. I argue, however, that the business-league
sector as a whole should be eliminated because, as will be seen below,
business interests are already well represented in our democracy and
providing these organizations extra money for greater voice is a bad idea.
Finally, business leagues are powerful. Removing exemption may
be politically impossible. As a second-best move, I recommend applying
a net-investment income tax on business leagues as is already applied on
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints"); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 14; Gardner,
supra note 12, at xiii-xv.
26. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 57-59 (2d prtg. 1971).
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tax-exempt social clubs.2 7 The Clinton administration unsuccessfully
attempted to do just this in 1999.28 While this would not entirely limit the
subsidy to business leagues, it would modestly improve the status quo.29
As an important side benefit, eliminating exemption for business leagues
would reduce the need for the IRS to make a determination as to whether
a business league had engaged in too much political campaign interven-
tion, a notoriously challenging problem for the IRS.30
Part I of this Article considers the scholarly literature regarding col-
lective action as it relates to the formation of interest groups. Part II de-
scribes the requirements of qualifying as a tax-exempt business league
and the rationales justifying these organizations' exemption. It then eval-
uates the implications of collective action theory for the exemption ra-
tionales. It additionally reviews taxing regimes that might apply to busi-
ness leagues instead of a policy of tax exemption to provide a suitable
comparison. Part III provides a more detailed look at the activities of
business leagues by providing case studies regarding the three general
types of business leagues: peak organizations, trade associations, and
professional associations. Someone unfamiliar with business leagues
might choose to start first with Part III. The concrete examples of the
formation, maintenance, and activities of these organizations can help in
understanding the first two Parts of this Article. Part IV concludes that
ending exemption for business leagues is the right policy choice.
I. INTEREST GROUP MOBILIZATION AND THE COLLECTIVE-ACTION
PROBLEM
Ever since James Madison's Federalist No. 10, we have been con-
cerned in the United States about the ability of groups to unfairly influ-
ence our democracy. Madison referred to this problem as rule by faction.
By faction he meant a situation where either a minority or a majority of
citizens "are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community."3' However, Madison recognized
27. 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3) (2012). 1 made this argument regarding applying the net investment
income tax to the whole of the mutual-benefit organizations of the tax-exempt sector. See Hackney,
supra note 8, at 120-24.
28. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 278-82 (Comm. Print
1999), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2888; see also Jacob
M. Schlesinger, Clinton Plan to Tax Lobbyists' Investment Gains Hits Home in a Fury of Faxes,
Letters, Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A24 (describing the lobbyist efforts opposing the
proposed tax increase).
29. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 135-37 (discussing the deferral effect granted if only a net
investment tax is applied to such organizations).
30. Cf Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next "Loop-
hole"?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41, 54-56 (2007) (considering whether the 26 U.S.C. § 527 rules
are mandatory for organizations that carry on as a political party but choose to operate as a taxable
entity).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2005).
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the absolute need for citizens to express their voice. Thus, instead of rec-
ommending the elimination of factions, Madison recommended a repub-
lican form of government along with the separation of powers.32 These
institutions he believed would limit the ability of any one particular
group to establish tyranny. To Madison, tyranny meant total control
over the government and the people by one group.34 Today, scholars con-
tinue to examine the problem of faction through the study of interest
groups.
All business leagues are interest groups. An interest group is "a col-
lection of individuals or a group of individuals linked together by profes-
sional circumstance, or by common political, economic, or social inter-
ests" that satisfies three requirements: (1) the organization is not a politi-
cal party, i.e., the name of the organization does not appear on a ballot;
(2) it uses some of its resources to try to influence legislative, judicial, or
executive decisions at any level of government; and (3) it is organized
outside of the government it intends to influence.35 Business leagues are
not political parties, they use significant resources to influence govern-
mental decisions at all levels, and they are organized outside of govern-
ment. Finally, although business leagues perform functions in addition to
acting as a governmental mouthpiece, "[i]nterest groups' service organi-
zations quite ironically are by-products of their lobbying organizations,
not the other way around."36
Thus, studies regarding the interest group sector are relevant to a
study of business leagues. However, interest group literature is vast and
conflicting. For instance, research considering the effectiveness of inter-
est groups in lobbying and electoral efforts is still relatively undevel-
oped. A researcher studying interest groups faces substantial problems
of proof given the vast complexity of the sector and its interaction with
the government.38 The researcher must often be able to measure actions
that are dynamic rather than static.39 Nevertheless, there is an area of
interest group research that has achieved great success: questions of col-
32. See id at 51-53.
33. See id. at 51.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 261 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., Hackett Publ'g Co.
2005) ("The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands ...
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.").
35. JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND
INFLUENCE 22-23 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted).
36. John Mark Hansen, The Political Economy of Group Membership, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
79, 94 (1985).
37. For a review of the state of the literature from a number of years ago, see FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS
AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 13-17, 128-29 (1998).
38. Seeid. at 18.
39. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 169-70. The authors conducted a longitudi-
nal study providing new knowledge on the effectiveness of lobbying over a period of time and across
a wide range of organizations and interests. Id. at 1-2.
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lective action.40 This happens to be fortunate for this inquiry because the
question of collective action is the question of how well certain interest
group services fare in the marketplace. When are people and organiza-
tions able to organize in order to provide the interest group services they
desire?
Part I demonstrates that of all the interest group sectors, business in-
terests face the least collective-action problem. In other words, business
interests as compared to labor, environmentalists, the poor, etc., face the
smallest amount of market failure in organizing to represent their inter-
ests before government. Instead of the business league subsidy working
to ensure our society has the right level of needed goods and services, it
may lead to an oversupply of business-league services. In turn, this could
lead to a democracy that is over reflective of business interests.
A. Pluralism Problems
When the study of interest groups and their impact on politics began
in earnest in the early to mid part of the twentieth century, there was a
belief that individuals who had an interest could and would express that
interest through a group if they had the desire.41 In the 1940s andl950s
pluralism reigned as the prevailing theory of group politics. 4 2 Pluralism
holds that groups express the interests of the people to their govern-
ment.43 Furthermore, interest groups provide the ideal vehicle to ensure
that our democracy most closely represents the interests of its people."
To some theorists, "[t]here is no group without its interest. An interest . .
. is the equivalent of a group."4 5 In this purist conception of pluralism, no
obstacles stand in the way of individuals who want to form an interest
group.46 Based on these principles, the pluralist asserted that in order to
know what a government is going to do, all you need do is study interest
group interaction and negotiation with each other and the government.47
There are two main strains of pluralism. In one version, the gov-
ernment acts as referee ensuring that a reasonable bargain is negotiated
among the interest groups of society.48 This is pluralism in a descriptive
40. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 8.
41. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at ix-x (1986).
42. SCOTT H. AINSWORTH, ANALYZING INTEREST GROUPS 5 (2002).
43. Id.; BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 48.
44. Id.
45. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES
211 (The Principia Press of Ill., Inc. 1949) (1908); see also Charles B. Hagan, The Group in a Politi-
cal Science, in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICS 38, 40 (Roland Young ed., 1958) (discuss-
ing the "group concept").
46. See, e.g., Kay Lehman Schlozman, What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality
and the American Pressure System, 46 J. POL. 1006, 1007 & n.1 (1984) (discussing the pluralist
history).
47. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 5.
48. DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC
OPINION 104-06 (1951).
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sense. Another version of pluralism, however, argues for the values of
pluralism in a prescriptive sense.49 The prescriptive pluralist believed we
should encourage the formation of groups to enhance our representation-
al democracies' closer reflection of the interest of its people.50 Some tax-
exempt scholars argue in favor of tax exemption from this prescriptive
approach. For example, some argue that providing exemption to nonprof-
it organizations is a part of the solution to ensuring a more representative
democracy.5 1 By providing a subsidy for the formation of groups, we
encourage everyone to form groups to represent their interests to the
government and the government will thereby be more reflective of all the
people's interests.
In what is known as the disturbance theory of interest group for-
mation, David Truman, a pluralist, said that interest groups form in
waves.52 For Truman, a political interest group is made up of individuals
with shared interests and claims upon others that the group attempts to
satisfy through the governmental process. When individuals determine
they have a need that can only be delivered by government, i.e., a need
where "rights are not well established and negotiation costs are high,"
those individuals will organize a group to ask the government to fulfill
that need. This simple act of organization disturbs the status quo.ss That
disturbance sends waves through the political system because another set
of individuals will organize in reaction to offset the demands of the first
56
group. In Truman's theory, groups form in greatest numbers during
times of change, such as technological, social, economic, or political.5 7
E. E. Schattschneider criticized the pluralist claim famously stating
that "[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper-class accent."5 Although there are plenty of interest
groups that form, he said, the groups that form overwhelmingly represent
the interests of the wealthy rather than the average citizen.59 For
Schattschneider, there are those groups that work for public interest and
49. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 6; JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST
GROUP SOCIETY 11 (5th ed. 2009).
50. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 6; BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 49, at 11.
51. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (describing the "role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply
conflicting, activities and viewpoints"); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 15-17 (explaining that
nonprofit organizations are essential to the sense of community which is required to uphold a demo-
cratic polity); Gardner, supra note 12, at xiii-xv (stating that nonprofit organizations foster creativity
and nurture our "national life").
52. TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 59.
53. Id. at 33.
54. AINSWORTH, supra note 41, at 13.
55. TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 59-62.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 57; see also AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 13.
58. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 35.
59. Id. at 31-34.
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those that work for private, or special, interests.60 The distinction be-
tween the two groups is the exclusive character of one over the other.61
Thus, a group that works for world peace or child welfare is not exclu-
sive, but the National Association of Manufacturers is exclusive-only
62manufacturers can belong. These exclusive organizations are "special
interests."63 Additionally, there are those that are organized and those
that are not organized. Only the organized can impact the rights of the
community and the political process.64 To Schattschneider, to understand
65politics you should study small groups. As Schattschneider said, "It has
been assumed that only legal barriers inhibited the disfranchised. We
know better now. The exclusion of people by extralegal processes, by
social processes, by the way the political system is organized and struc-
tured may be far more effective than the law." 66
In 1965, Mancur Olson offered a theoretical basis for why the inter-
est-group system is biased in favor of the "upperclass" and business in-
terests as Schattschneider contended. This theory also supported the
claim that not all groups with an interest can or will organize. He demon-
strated through his economic model that small homogenous groups can
form with relative ease while large latent groups form with great chal-
lenge, if at all.68 The difference between a small homogenous group and
a large latent group is at once self-explanatory, but also a matter of basic
economic principles. Groups form to provide collective goods that can-
not be provided through individual action.6 9 However, interest groups
face significant free-rider problems because of the collective nature of
the goods interest groups necessarily primarily provide.7 0 With the free-
rider problem, public goods that cost less than the return one person will
receive in return will be provided; public goods that cost more than the
return to one person will be provided at inefficient levels, or will not be
provided at all. And, this is the economic defining characteristic of a
large latent group: "in a large group in which no single individual's con-
tribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole . . . it is
certain that a collective good will not be provided unless there is coer-
cion or some outside inducements."7'
Olson evaluated whether his theory explained specific group con-
texts that he could observe. He noted that within the trade association
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id. at 23-24.
62. Id. at 25-26.
63. Id. at 29.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 35.
66. Id. at 111.
67. OLSON, supra note 26, at 142-45.
68. Id. at 48-58.
69. Id. at 15-16.
70. Id.
71, Id. at 44.
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context, the collective-action problem will typically hinder the formation
72of all except small groups of narrow interests. Larger groups will be
forced to either use outside inducements by selling what Olson referred
to as "selective incentives," such as insurance or information, or obtain
coercion from a source like the state. Olson defined selective incentives
as private goods, such as insurance, or administrative operations, or dis-
counts on other goods, and services that are sold by a group to induce
members to join.74 Groups provide selective incentives because the pub-
lic good is by its own terms available whether the individual joins or not.
With respect to trade associations, Olson provided anecdotal evi-
dence as to the size of the trade association pressure community. A
lobbying index from the late 1940s provided evidence that trade associa-
tions made up about two-thirds of the interest group community.76 That
type of representation dwarfed any other type of interest at that time.
Olson asserts that business dominance of the interest group sector "must
be due in large part to the fact that the business community is divided
into a series of (generally oligopolistic) 'industries,' each of which con-
tains only a fairly small number of firms."78 Olson suggests that in most
instances the trade associations involved in the pressure community have
a relatively small number of members.7 9 At the time of his writing, the
median number of members of a trade association was somewhere be-
tween 24 and 50.80 Today, membership of trade associations still tends to
be small-the median number of memberships of American business
associations in 2002-2003 was 353.81
In spite of the numerical superiority, there are latent interests in the
business community that face collective action problems.8 2 For instance,
the business community as an interest in its own right is represented by
peak organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. This broad
business interest is not made up of small homogenous interests and thus
faces problems with organizing consistent with other large latent inter-
72. Russell Hardin provides a useful definition here suggesting that the idea of a small group
may include hundreds of organizations, each of whom would benefit, or lose, so significantly from a
change that it is worthwhile for each one of the organizations to spend on the collective benefit.
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 12 (1982). Hardin suggests that the oil industry, for in-
stance, has hundreds of organizations involved, but would still be a small group under this definition.
Id.
73. OLSON, supra note 26, at 133-35.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 141.
76. Id. (citing to Lobby Index 1946-1949, H.R. REP. NO. 3197 (1950)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 143 (emphasis omitted).
79. Id. at 144-45.
80. Id. at 144.
81. LYN SPILLMAN, SOLIDARITY IN STRATEGY 83 (2012). In 2002-2003, the median member-
ship of American business associations was 353, and 45% of American business associations are
made up of memberships between 100 and 1000. Id. Only 7% have more than 10,000 members. Id.
at 84.
82. OLSON, supra note 26, at 143-45.
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ests. Professional associations, too, represent a large group of people
whose interests are not entirely homogenous; such groups face collec-
tive-action problems too. While professionals often manage to form into
groups, the individuals with such professional interests need to find
means other than the collective good, consisting of promoting and lobby-
ing for the particular professional interest, to entice people to join the
group. Thus, organizations like the medical societies and the American
Medical Association (AMA), discussed in more detail in Part III below,
and the bar associations and the American Bar Association (ABA), pri-
marily overcome the collective-action problem by obtaining government-
related coercion.8 3 These associations establish licensing systems at the
state level and require significant educational requirements to force
membership via coercion.4 Thus, professional associations manage to
operate "closed shop[s]," so desired by labor unions.85
Professional associations do not rely on coercive efforts alone to
solve the collective action problem; they also use selective incentives
that often have a strong compulsory nature. For instance, legal malprac-
tice insurance is often hard to find outside of the bar association. They
sell publications too that strongly connect the professional community
87and provide opportunities to network. Of course, as we will see in Part
III below in the case of the AMA, and in part in the case of the Cotton
Trade Institute, these associations may also control a code that industry
players must purchase from the association in order to operate in the in-
dustry. These codes can provide the business group substantial monetary
support, particularly where it has the imprimatur of the state.
B. Research on the Collective-Action Problem
Although many criticize Olson's theory, the central instinct that
small, economic special-interest groups possess a significant advantage
over other groups in organizing has not been contradicted by later re-
search. The critiques of Olson's theory focus on the fact that under his
theory there should be few to no broad-based public interest groups.
Thus, consumer and environmental groups should not form with any
great regularity.90 However, after Olson wrote, these two types of inter-
ests proliferated. Modelers of Olson's theory predict that less than 5% of
a latent population should mobilize, but in many instances some strongly
83. Id. at 137.
84. Id. at 138.
85. Id.
86. OLSON, supra note 26, at 137-39.
87. Id. at 140.
88. JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA 76 (1991).
89. See, e.g., id. at 45-48 (discussing the irony of a focus on the problems of collective action
at the time when there were so many social movements managing to overcome this very problem);
Grant Jordan & William A. Maloney, How Bumble-bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Partici-
pation, 44 POL. STUD. 668, 668-70 (1996).
90. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 90, at 45-48.
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public-oriented interests have obtained population slices that are much
greater than that.91 Some research thus takes a look at why and how these
interests are able to overcome the collective-action problem.92 This re-
search considers how selective incentives work in solving the collective-
action problem and whether other incentives may play a role.93
Nevertheless, the evidence discussed in the next three sections be-
low shows business interests maintain an overwhelming advantage in
interest group formation.94 Not surprisingly, individuals and entities with
the resources to organize-i.e., money, facilities, and skilled professional
individuals-organize to represent their interests with greater ease than
other individuals and entities. Finally, research demonstrates that interest
groups (1) obtain a large share of their resources from a few large well-
financed members, and (2) the organizations tend to follow the lead of
those members.9 5
1. Bias in the Interest Group System Leans Heavily Towards Busi-
ness Interests
Empirical evidence confirms that there is a bias in the interest group
system towards business interests. In a simple review of interest groups
that lobbied in Washington in 1981, Schlozman found that business
leagues comprised 24.8% of the total interests.97 Corporations them-
selves comprised 45.7% of that interest group community engaged in
federal lobbying.98 Foreign commerce and corporations made up another
6.5% of those represented.99 All other identified groups amounted to only
13% of the total Washington D.C. interest group community.o This
small portion was composed of labor unions, public interest groups, civil
rights groups and minority organizations, social welfare and the poor, the
elderly, gays, women, handicapped, and governmental units.o'0 Schloz-
man showed that compared to the interests of the U.S. population as a
91. Scott Sigmund Gartner & Gary M. Segura, Appearances Can Be Deceptive: Self-
Selection, Social Group Identification, and Political Mobilization, 9 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 131,
134 (1997).
92. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 90, at 60-61; Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of
Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SC. 1, 21-22 (1969).
93. See infra Part 1.D.
94. See, e.g., SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 3 1; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 41,
at 49-50; WALKER, supra note 90, at 58-59; Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Representation: The
Dominance ofinstitutions, 78 AM. POL. SC. REV. 64, 70 (1984).
95. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 74-75.
96. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 31-33; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 41, at
49-50; WALKER, supra note 90, at 61; Salisbury, supra note 94, at 70.
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whole, this interest group system is skewed away from the actual inter-
ests of all the people of the country.102
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady updated this same work in a recent
book The Unheavenly Chorus.'o0 In their review the authors emphasize a
point that cannot be understated: business has a significant organizational
advantage in that it already has the skills, power, and resources to organ-
ize.'" We should thus not find it surprising that business interests would
be so adept at organizing. In a strict counting of groups within the entire
interest group system in 2001, the authors find that business interests
continue to dominate.'05 Business leagues, including trade associations
and professional associations, altogether make up a full 20% of repre-
sented interests.'06 Individual corporations still are the predominant lob-
byist group at approximately 35%. 107 The next closest in representation
are state and local governments with 10.4%.108 Labor unions are only 1%
of the interest group population, education 4.2%, health 3.5%, and social
welfare and poor make up 0.8%.109 Public interest consists of 4.6% while
identity groups 3.8%.110
How do these numbers compare to the 1981 numbers?"' Intriguing-
ly, while the nominal business interests have grown they have not kept
pace with the growth of some other sectors. The sectors that have grown
significantly are health (883%), education (612%) and state and local
governments (382%).112 Realistically though this growth is likely directly
related to business interests associated with healthcare and education, as
health and education have both boomed as industries in this period.
While this reflects real growth, part of the sizable growth is because
there were almost no groups lobbying in these fields in 1981. For in-
stance, there were eleven public educational institutions and nineteen
private educational institutions lobbying in 1981."' Thus, while business
interests may have grown, their relative growth turns out to make them a
smaller set of the interest community. Corporations decreased relatively
almost a full 10%, while trade associations decreased by almost 5%.114
This does not mean that business interests as a total amount are less than
in 1981. Business interests did increase, but business interest growth did
102. Id. at l011-13.
103. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY
CHORUS 312 (2012).
104. Id. at 316.







112. Id. at 353 tbl.12.1.
113. Id.at359.
114. Id. at 356 tbl.12.2.
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not keep pace with some other significant interests. However, as noted, it
could be that some of that significant growth in the health and education
sector should be associated with the business interests that we are con-
sidering here.
Schlozman et. al. primarily approach the question of interest group
representation from the question of political voice inequality. They find
that "[c]onsistent with Schattschneider's analysis . . . the economically
disadvantaged are underrepresented in pressure politics."' 15 Notably in
the case of unions, the authors observe that because labor unions are so
small comparatively, they are forced to spread their limited capacity
across a wide spectrum of issues.116 Not inconsistent with the point above
that business interests have the skills, power and resources to organize,
as demonstrated by the numbers reported above, professional associa-
tions alone outnumber unions by a far shot."7
Lowery and Gray criticize these interest group studies that rely on a
simple count of the number of interest groups that lobby because the
studies, they say, fail to use a baseline upon which to judge bias in the
interest system."8 They claim that the authors have no method of judging
what an interest group ecosystem should be expected to look like.119 De-
spite the critique, Lowery and Gray in a recent book with co-author Benz
consider the question of the count of organizations at the state level and
find that the representation bias at the state level is even more severe.20
For instance, business interests made up 73.8% of the lobbying commu-
nity in 1997 as compared to 62% at the federal level one year prior in
1996.121 In other work, Gray and Lowery along with other authors pro-
vide strong support for the Olson claim that the smaller the set of persons
to organize within an interest the greater likelihood that group will or-
ganize.122 They show there is a direct correlation between a larger num-
ber of business firms in a state and a lower number of such firms inde-
pendently lobbying.12 3 Despite the baseline critique, Lowery and Gray
recognize that none of their objections disproves the high degree of like-
115. Id. at 321.
116. Id. at 326.
117. Id. at 327 tbl.11.4.
118. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in Society and
Before Government, 16 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 9 (2004).
119. Id.at6.
120. VIRGINIA GRAY, DAVID LOWERY & JENNIFER K. BENZ, INTEREST GROUPS AND HEALTH
CARE REFORM ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 23-25 (2013).
121. Id. at 23.
122. David Lowery et al., Collective Action and the Mobilization ofInstitutions, 66 J. POL. 684,
685 (2004).
123. Id. at 686; see also Sally Conway Kilbane & John H. Beck, Professional Associations and
the Free Rider Problem: The Case ofOptometry, 65 PUB. CHOICE 181, 185 (1990) (finding similar
results regarding the organizing efforts of optometrists being more challenged in larger states with a
larger population).
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lihood that business interests are relatively over represented in our politi-
cal system.'24
Gray and Lowery have also added to interest group organizational
knowledge by providing evidence that only a finite number of groups can
exist in an interest group system.1 25 Their model demonstrates that the
number of interest groups in any interest group system is not infinite, as
the pluralists seemed to suggest, and as tax-exemption literature often
seems to accept.126 Under their approach, a certain population density
supports a limited number of groups as a result of population resources
and ability of the government to interact with a certain number of
groups. 12 Once that saturation level is reached, it is much harder for
more interests to form. Tax exemption of business leagues may very well
help to crowd out other interests that never organize because they are
crowded out. This is consistent with the findings that the status quo is
incredibly powerful in the interest group system.128
2. Use of Selective and Purposive Incentives to Organize
After Olson's seminal collective action work, many interest group
scholars focused on how latent organizations, such as environmental
interests, form despite the significant collective action challenge such
groups should face. The research has focused on the sale of selective
incentives and purposive incentives. This area of research still needs
significant work, but the quest to determine the level of difficulty some
groups may experience in organizing has had some success.
Olson did not initially consider the possibility of selling member-
ship to interest groups through purposive incentives; purposive incen-
tives refer to the sale of the promotion of ideas that people strongly sup-
port from a moral or emotional basis.12 9 Olson had argued that the prima-
ry way of solving the collective-action problem would be to sell selective
incentives such as insurance and magazines.1 30 However, contrary to
Olson's suggestion, research demonstrates that many organizations are
able to sell membership on a cause-related basis. For instance, people
will pay for membership in the Sierra Club to be associated with the
cause of environmentalism. Cause-related incentives are typically re-
ferred to in the literature as "purposive incentives."'3 1 Still, citizen
124. Lowery & Gray, supra note 120, at 23.
125. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural
Regulation ofInterest Group Numbers in the American States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCL 1, 25 (1995).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 233, 244.
129. Salisbury, supra note 96, at 16.
130. HARDIN, supra note 72, at 31.
131. See, e.g., Salisbury, supra note 96, at 15-16.
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groups and other interests also sell selective incentives to overcome the
collective-action problem identified by Olson.132
Robert Salisbury introduced a model to explain group formation
that he called the exchange theory of formation.'33 His model provides
support for a conclusion that business groups should be in a much better
position to form than cause-related groups. Consistent with Olson's as-
sumption that people join groups for selfish reasons, he viewed group
formation as taking place within the context of a marketplace.134 Under
the exchange theory, entrepreneurs form groups to sell material, solidary,
or expressive benefits to members for a price.135 In other words, rather
than these nonprofits being "voluntary" associations, they sell goods and
services in the market just like for-profit firms. An entrepreneur will not
form a group nor maintain it unless he is able to make the profit that he
desires.
Salisbury focuses two major factors of interest group formation: (1)
groups tend to form when the economy is on the upswing, and (2) groups
most commonly rely upon material benefits to form.'3 6 Because material
benefits are likely less elastic than purposive benefits we should expect
that groups that rely on purposive benefits, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union, will experience greater difficulty forming and maintain-
ing status than those that rely on material benefits.'37 In other words, in
the case of purposive-based groups, member contributions will be a func-
tion of member income; if member income goes down, membership for
an organization that sells purposive incentives should fall at a greater rate
than for an organization that offers material incentives.'38
James Q. Wilson studied the ways certain groups overcome the col-
lective-action problem by offering purposive incentives.'3 9 Contrary to
the claim that individuals are purely rational economic actors, Wilson
found that some people have a stronger sense of duty than others and join
groups to support a particular cause.4 0 Typically joining these groups is
low cost and low involvement,141 and these cause-related groups have
developed effective means of persuading individuals to join; they em-
phasize the threat of loss rather than gain because psychologically, the
132. Peter B. Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations, 6
ADMIN. SCL Q. 129, 130-31 (1961); Hansen, supra note 36, at 79-82; Lowery & Gray, supra note
120, at 15.
133. Salisbury, supra note 96, at 2.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 17-19.
136. Id. at 8, 17-18.
137. Id. at 19-20.
138. Id.
139. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, at viii-xii (Princeton Univ. Press 1995)
(1974).
140. Id. at viii-ix. But cf WALKER, supra note 90, at 47 (criticizing arguments about the ra-
tionality of purposive benefits).
141. See WILSON, supra note 141, at ix.
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threat of loss appears to remain a stronger force in our minds. 142 Finally,
cause-related groups often rely on a wealthy sponsor; their contributions
make the cost of membership much lower.14 3 This last detail is discussed
in more detail in Section 3 below.
Terry M. Moe demonstrates that there are individuals who system-
atically overestimate their importance to the accomplishment of a cause.
These individuals join to support an effort that they cannot really aid to
the extent they believe.'" In other words, members join out of self-
interest, but they make a mistake in believing that their contributions
"make a difference." 45 Moe concludes from this that the collective-
action problem is solved more often than Olson's theory would have
predicted because individuals make mistakes about the return they will
receive from the investment of time or money they make in a large or-
ganization.146 However, it does not mean that such groups form with
greater ease than those with the proper resources and material incentives
to sell.
John Hansen's work provides further support for the claim that
while larger, latent interests can form by selling purposive incentives,
once formed, these groups often need to sell selective incentives in order
to maintain status. Furthermore, business groups are in a far better posi-
tion to generate incentives to sell. Hansen found that a group forms first
in response to a threat as suggested by the pluralist disturbance theo-
ries.147 The newly formed group generates political benefits by respond-
ing to the threat in a political sense. However, in order to maintain or
increase its membership, the group often must sell selective incentives
such as insurance.14 8 This work supports the claim that small groups have
little trouble forming without selective incentives. For instance, industry
groups dominated in the early twentieth century because of their small
size and easy access to resources to organize.149
The importance of all this work is that cause-related groups can
form, but they face much greater challenge than do business groups.
Even though cause-related groups might be able to find selective incen-
tives to sell, the business community naturally tends to possess the right
material incentives to sell, and the right human and capital resources to
organize.
142. Id. at x.
143. Id. at xii.
144. TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL
DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 205-07 (1980).
145. Id. at 205-06.
146. Id. at 222.
147. Hansen, supra note 36, at 81.
148. Id. at 93-94.
149. Id. at 94.
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Business groups, though, appear to have an additional advantage.
They tend to be able to coopt the government to support their efforts.50
During war time, Hansen points out, industry groups are boosted dramat-
ically by government efforts to co-opt producers into the war efforts.
These periods tend to be highly profitable, and long lasting for building
and maintaining organizational structure, for industry groups.
The work on incentives demonstrates that some latent interests can
overcome the collective-action problem. However, none of this work
suggests that latent interests are able to overcome the natural ability of
business interests to organize. Furthermore, as will be discussed in more
detail in the next section, even where the collective-action problem is
solved, evidence shows that group managers often do not reflect the ma-
jority interest of the members. Different interest distortions occur in dif-
ferent types of groups. The general finding is that wealthy donors often
set the agenda of an interest group. This finding holds even in the case of
business interests. This next section looks at this important matter.
3. Wealthy Interests Tend to Aid in the Formation of Many Groups
Many interest groups solve the collective-action problem through
the contributions of wealthy individuals or entities. These high-wealth
individuals or entities provide significantly larger sums than the average
member.152 Although this solution to the collective-action problem is
more prevalent among citizen groups, business interests often solve the
collective-action problem through wealthy interests as well. 53 These
wealthy contributors tend to substantially influence the direction of the
group. Fundraisers often live by a rule that 80% to 90% of support of an
organization will come from 10% to 20% of the contributors.5 4 This
appears true for business leagues as well. These organizations tend to
rely on a few loyalists for their support.'55 In the trade association con-
text, for instance, member dues are often paid on a sliding-scale basis
such that large corporations pay the predominant portion of member
dues. 156
Jack Walker found that that sale of selective incentives simply
could not explain the explosion of citizen interest groups in the 1970s.'57
While some of that growth could be explained by the selective-incentives
150. Hansen, supra note 36, at 93-94.
151. Id.; see also AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 27 (stating that government involvement with
trade associations in the early twentieth century was often associated with getting a more technocrat-
ic result instead of following the politics of spoils).
152. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 32.
153. See Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives Trade
Association Activity, 52 Bus. & SoC'Y 213, 219 (2012).
154. L. PETER EDLES, FUNDRAISING: HANDS-ON TACTICS FOR NONPROFIT GROUPS 11 (1993).
155. BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 32.
156. WALKER, supra note 90, at 83-84.
157. Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 390, 396 (1983).
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theory of Olson,158 Walker found that many groups located important
new sources of funds outside their membership.159 In fact, 89% of the
citizen groups received outside sources of funds, while only 34% of
business associations did.1 60 Walker found that the citizen groups over-
whelmingly received their funds from wealthy patrons.6'1 However, his
data showed that they are an important source for all of the interest group
sectors including business interests.162 Additionally, the citizen group
beliefs overwhelmingly tracked the political beliefs of the wealthy pa-
trons.163 Others have found highly similar results with respect to trade
associations as well.16
Recent research has confirmed the large influence of wealth also on
our country's policy choices. While no one has been able to conclusively
prove that interest groups controlled by wealthy interests have caused
this state of affairs, several authors marshal evidence demonstrating the
dominating role that business elites play in shaping public policy and the
agendas of our two major political parties.'6 5 Other authors claim that the
process works to make the rich richer.'66 Martin Gilens recently demon-
strated that our government policy choices are "strongly tilted toward the
,,167most affluent citizens. While in his recent book he did not attribute
the cause of that tilt to any substantial interest group role,168 a more re-
cent article seems to support the biased pluralism model described
above.169 We should not be surprised at this. Recent research shows that
wealthier individuals are much more likely to vote, contribute to cam-
paigns, and engage in the political process than all other less-wealthy
cohorts.170 Nevertheless, it is a cause for concern regarding the health of
our democracy.
This Section challenged the pluralist argument that subsidizing any
and all groups is a good thing. Not all groups face the same challenges in
organizing and maintaining status. Some groups find the challenge to
organize much harder than others. The evidence shows that business
interests have had the least difficulty in organizing. Furthermore, evi-
158. For instance, the AARP succeeds in part by selling a lot of insurance. Id.
159. Id. at 398.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. WALKER, supra note 90, at 79.
163. Walker, supra note 159, at 401-02.
164. Barnett, supra note 155, at 219.
165. See, e.g., G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? CHALLENGES TO CORPORATE
AND CLASS DOMINANCE 153 (6th ed. 2010); Fred Block, Understanding the Diverging Trajectories
of the United States and Western Europe: A Neo-Polanyian Analysis, 35 POL. & Soc'Y 3, 18-19
(2007).
166. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 19 (2010).
167. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE 1 (2012).
168. Id at 161.
169. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573-74 (2014).
170. See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 105, at 21-22.
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dence that organizations form at a greater rate than Olson predicted does
not undermine the central instinct that many latent public interests face
much greater challenges to organize than do business interests. Finally,
even when organized, we can expect that the views expressed by the
group will not mimic the majority interests of members, but will instead
mimic the interests of the wealthy few.
C. Importance of Groups
None of this is to say that the joining of groups is a bad thing. Nor
does this Article make the claim that business leagues serve no useful or
important purpose. Comparative studies have shown that a significant
sector of publically available organizations is essential to a healthy de-
mocracy.171 Voluntary organizations have been shown to be a great edu-
cator of Americans in how the democratic process works.172 Voluntary
173
organizations tend to promote a greater participation in that process.
Additionally, these organizations, including those supporting business
interests bring important information to legislators and agency officials.
For instance, as Schlozman, Verba, and Brady note, "Organizations are
particularly likely to be in a position to provide expert information that is
useful in the formulation of policy." 74 In the 1920s and 30s for instance,
before our country had built a substantial bureaucracy, the U.S. looked to
trade associations and professional associations over governmental
agents for technocratic expertise.175 Many thought more highly of the
technical expertise of the trade associations than the often highly partisan
government officials. 76
These last ideas are consistent with the "informational theory" of in-
terest groups, which suggests that you typically find interest groups on
both sides of an issue.77 Additionally, interest groups are more effective
when they provide useful reliable information to legislators.178 Under the
informational theory, interest groups that provide bad information will
not succeed.179 Thus, under the informational theory, we should expect
most interest groups to provide useful information to legislators without
imposing any particular restrictions on their actions. This work supports
a claim that interest groups play a real and useful role in government.
171. See GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 300-01 (1963).
172. See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY 98-107 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Be-
yond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1572-73 (1988).
173. Jan Leighley, Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation, 58 J.
POL. 447, 447 (1996).
174. SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 105, at 4.
175. See, e.g., MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 5 (1993).
176. See id
177. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 174.
178. Id. at 174-75.
179. See id
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This Article does not question the informational theory of interest
groups. It accepts that interest groups, including business leagues, fulfill
this important informational role. This Article contends instead that be-
cause of the significant bias in favor of business interests in the interest
group sector, a subsidy should not be provided to the business interest
group sector.
D. Conclusion
As Schattschneider said, the interest group system appears to sing
with a distinctly "upper-class bias."'8 0 The evidence to date demonstrates
that business interest groups overwhelmingly dominate the voices that
are heard on Capital Hill. Tax exemption provides a subsidy to these
business interests through § 501(c)(6). Based on the evidence of such a
significant bias towards business, a subsidy is entirely unjustified.
II. QUALIFYING AS A TAX-EXEMPT BUSINESS LEAGUE AND THE
RATIONALES FOR SUCH EXEMPTION
Although there is no legislative history, the exemption for business
leagues appears in the Income Tax Act of 1913.181 It seems to originate
from a Chamber of Commerce request to exempt "civic and commercial"
organizations.182 "Commercial" organizations, the Chamber told Con-
gress, are not "selfish," perform "civic functions," and work to improve
commerce in the interest of all citizens.'83 To tax these organizations
would be to limit their public usefulness. The Chamber argued that civic
and commercial organizations should not be taxed for the same "com-
mon sense" reason many argue charities should not be taxed-they pro-
vide a public benefit in return for the subsidy of exemption.184 Contem-
poraneous documents suggest that the government was very open to the
idea that these trade organizations played an important public role at the
time. 181
180. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 31.
181. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § Il(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
182. See Hearings on Tariff Schedules of the Revenue Act of 1913 Before the Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong. 2001 (1913) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of U.S. Chamber of
Commerce); see also Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 478 (1979) (dis-
cussing the Chamber of Commerce written testimony and finding it persuasive as to the legislative
intent of Congress).
183. Hearings, supra note 184, at 2002.
184. Id.
185. E.A. BRAND, BUREAU OF MANUFACTURES, DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, SPECIAL
AGENTS SERIES-NO. 60, COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS: RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
PROMOTIVE ACTIVITIES OF SEVENTY ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (1912). Issued by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, the report suggests that while these trade organizations had
existed for some time, it was only after the tum of the century that these organizations came to
fruition; chambers of commerce, the report notes, were just beginning to wield significant influence
within communities. Id. at 7. The monograph discusses the ways chambers of commerce, boards of
trade, commercial associations, manufacturers associations, etc. engage in the development of for-
eign trade, wholesale trade and retail trade, the promotion of transportation and industrial expansion,
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A. Qualifying for Exemption as a Business League
The statute exempts from federal income tax "[b]usiness leagues,
chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or profes-
sional football leagues."'86 To qualify as a business league, the Treasury
regulations provide that an organization must be formed to promote a
common business interest and must direct its activities towards the im-
provement of business conditions in one or more lines of business as
distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual
persons.'8 For instance, a business league cannot promote one product
among a lot of products that are operating in one line of business, such as
a particular brand of auto-part.i" To maintain tax exemption, a business
league may neither perform specific services for its members as a prima-
ry activity nor "engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily car-
ried on for profit."l 90 Consistent with the rest of the tax-exempt sector,
the Code explicitly prohibits business leagues from organizing for profit
and from allowing earnings to inure to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual.191
Unlike a charitable organization, whose political campaign activity
is absolutely prohibited and lobbying limited,192 a business league may
lobby as a primary purpose and may advocate for a candidate as long as
it is not the organization's primary purpose.193 In fact, lobbying and in-
fluencing politics is generally a primary function of a business league.
Under the law of tax-exempt organizations, to intervene in a campaign
means to advocate for or against a candidate for public office directly or
indirectly.194 Lobbying, on the other hand, refers to either directly con-
the establishment of conventions, and efforts to bring about civic improvements. Id. at 3-4. The
publication evinces a sense that these organizations provide huge benefits to the country.
186. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012). Congress added "professional football leagues" to the
statute in 1966. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, sec. 6(a), § 501(c)(6), 80 Stat. 1508, 1515
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012)) (ensuring the National Football League is a
tax exempt organization). Senator Coburn recently made efforts to end exemption for sports leagues
such as the NFL. PRO Sports Act, S. 1524, 113th Cong. (2013).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-l (1960).
188. See id
189. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-65, 1956-1 C.B. 199, clarified by Rev. Rul. 65-164, 1965-1 C.B.
238 and Rev. Rul. 72-211, 1972-1 C.B. 150 (providing information solely to members of the indus-
try is a specific service for members and does not qualify as the exempt purpose of operating a
business league).
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1; see also Credit Bureau of Greater N.Y., Inc. v. Comm'r, 162
F.2d 7, 7-9 (2d Cir. 1947) (selling credit information and collection services is not a business league
exempt purpose); Underwriters' Labs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 371, 372-74 (7th Cir. 1943) (test-
ing electronic equipment for safety does not qualify as a business league exempt purpose).
191. Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(6)-.
192. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
193. Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117; Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of
Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 passim (2011)
(discussing the constitutionality of limiting the speech of nonprofits by limiting their ability to inter-
vene in a political campaign).
194. John Francis Reilly and Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activi-
ty of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING
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tacting, or encouraging people to contact, legislators to vote for or
against certain legislation.'95
Courts interpret the term "business" in § 501(c)(6) broadly. For in-
stance, the Tax Court has stated that the term business "embraces every-
thing about which a person can be employed."196 Thus, industry, manu-
facturing, and retail are included within the term business, as is any pro-
fession, such as the medical profession.'9 7 Although non-professional
workers could have been included within the term business as well, as
could have farm-related business interests, these groups have a separate
section dedicated to them under the Code.'98 The IRS has accepted that
even students of a particular profession can form an organization devoted
to promoting business.199 A hobby, however, rather than a strict business
does not qualify.2 00
The IRS and courts also interpret "promote" in § 501 (c)(6) liberally.
For instance, hosting lunch meetings to discuss business-related issues
qualifies,201 although simply providing facilities for members for lunch
202does not. Networking to exchange business prospect information does
not promote common business interests either.203 Publishing a newspaper
related to the interests of fisherman,2 0 establishing a trust for the purpose
of collecting, administering and disbursing funds to business leagues,205
and holding semi-annual meetings to discuss technical problems with
information data sharing20 6 all qualify as valid activities to promote a
common business interest. A business league that issues a "seal of ac-
ceptance" highlighting that the league approves of member products
qualifies.20 7 Similarly, an organization that creates a model building and
construction code, and tests products, is considered to be conducting a
suitable activity.2 08 Negotiating with labor on behalf of industry is a valid
PROGRAM EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, at L-4
(2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopickO3.pdf.
195. Id.
196. Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 1.
197. Rev. Rul. 73-567, 1973-2 C.B. 178.
198. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5).
199. Rev. Rul. 77-112, 1977-1 C.B. 149.
200. See Am. Kennel Club, Inc. v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1945).
201. Rev. Rul. 67-295, 1967-2 C.B. 197.
202. Rev. Rul. 70-244, 1970-1 C.B. 132.
203. Rev. Rul. 59-391, 1959-2 C.B. 151.
204. Rev. Rul. 75-287, 1975-2 C.B. 211.
205. Rev. Rul. 82-138, 1982-2 C.B. 106.
206. Rev. Rul. 74-147, 1974-1 C.B. 136.
207. Rev. Rul. 70-187, 1970-1 C.B. 131 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-17-004 (Jan. 1, 1981); cf Am. Plywood Ass'n v. United
States, 267 F. Supp. 830, 831-33, 836 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that plywood association that
only sold a trademark to its members qualified because over 90% of the industry belonged to the
association and, even if it was a service for members alone, the trademark issue would not be more
than an incidental amount of activity of the association leaving the organization operating primarily
for its exempt purpose).
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activity to promote a common business interest.209 Finally, "working for
the enactment of legislation designed to improve their competitive stand-
ing in the various lines of business, industry, etc., in which they are en-
gaged" is a perfectly fine activity for a business league.210
There are limitations placed on a business league's ability to sell se-
lective services to its members. As mentioned above, a business league
may not provide goods and services exclusively to members. For in-
stance, the American Automobile Association, an association of individ-
ual car owners, failed to qualify as a business league because its activity
was to provide services solely to members.211 However, there are some
seemingly contradictory rulings in this area. In the seal of acceptance
ruling above, the IRS ruled that this service to members was a legitimate
business-league activity because the vast majority of the industry (over
90%) participated in the particular business league at issue.2 12 That said,
there seems to be an ambiguous requirement that member income be at a
"meaningful level."213 This is probably to ensure that the organization is
broadly acting on behalf of the particular business or industry rather than
running a for-profit business. In a General Counsel Memorandum
(GCM) the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS (Chief Counsel)
opined that an organization that received a significant source of its in-
come from the sale of insurance could not qualify as a business league
because it lacked enough member support.214 An organization that pro-
vides rebates to members but not non-members also fails to qualify as a
215
business league.
Operating for private businesses alone is prohibited. The Supreme
Court has found that Treasury regulations establishing a line of business
requirement are valid.2 16 This means a business league cannot be estab-
lished for a particular brand name product or service. The business
league must be formed to support the general product or the service. The
seminal case is National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States.217
There, a business league established to support the Midas brand of muf-
fler failed to satisfy the line-of-business requirement as established by
long-held Treasury regulations because it supported one brand rather
than the line of business involved.2 18 The Court relied substantially on
209. Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 1.
210. Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117.
211. Am. Auto. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 1146, 1157-61 (1953).
212. See Rev. Rul. 70-187, 1970-1 C.B. 131.
213. John Francis Reilly et al., IRC 501(c)(6) Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROGRAM EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003, at K-12 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf.
214. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,723 (Apr. 8, 1988).
215. Mich. Mobile Home & Recreational Vehicle Inst. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 770, 777-78
(1976).
216. Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477, 483-84, 488-89 (1979).
217. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
218. Id. at 473, 483-84, 488-89.
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the submitted testimony of the U.S. Chamber regarding why business
leagues should be considered exempt from taxation on the enactment of
the original exemption for business leagues in 1913.219 A line of business
in most cases according to the Court involves "either an entire industry
or all components of an industry within a geographic area."220 The IRS
recently won a case against Bluetooth Sig, Inc., the maker of a remote
technology, because it was formed to support the Bluetooth product ra-
ther than the product in general.221 The Bluetooth court found that the
difference between the trademark involved in American Plywood and the
trademark involved in Bluetooth was that Bluetooth expressly created
this new business opportunity rather than coming upon a business that
was actively engaged by numerous organizations already.222
Finally, and seemingly redundantly, a business league can go astray
by engaging in a business for profit or performing particular services for
its members. While these two requirements seem to collapse into the
other factors already discussed, they are independent requirements iden-
tified by courts and the regulations. For instance, advertising on behalf of
members will generally be considered to be the performance of a particu-
lar service for members and not support that the organization is orga-
223nized for exempt purposes. However, where an organization advertises
broadly on behalf of the industry, there is no particular service being
provided to a member. A commodity and stock exchange created for
members22 4 and the creation of a laundry business for members are both
examples of prohibited particular services as well as the operation of a
business for profit.2 25 The IRS has stated that the legal question is wheth-
er the activity or service "relieves the member of the necessity of secur-
ing the service commercially (or performing the service on an individual
basis) in order to properly conduct the member's business, resulting in a
convenience or economy to the member."226
B. Difference Between Tax Exemption/Taxable for Business Leagues?
A business league is generally an incorporated entity.22 7 Therefore
an exemption from income tax means that it does not have to pay the
corporate income tax.228 The amount of any subsidy provided is equal to
219. Id. at 478, 488.
220. Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted).
221. Bluetooth Sig, Inc. v. United States, No. C05-1778-JCC, 2008 WL 312712, at *7-9
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2008), affd, 611 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2010).
222. Id. at *5.
223. See Auto. Elec. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 168 F.2d 366, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1948); Rev. Rul. 65-14,
1965-1 C.B. 236; Rev. Rul. 64-315, 1964-2 C.B. 147.
224. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960).
225. A-1 Cleaners & Dyers Co. v. Comm'r, 14 B.T.A. 1314, 1314, 1316 (1929).
226. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,411 (Sept. 18, 1985).
227. See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 8, at 115 n.2.
228. Business leagues could simply pay tax as a corporation as Major League Baseball appears
to have done when it gave up its tax-exempt status. See Duff Wilson, N.F.L. Executives Hope to
Keep Salaries Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008),
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the tax the corporation would have owed. An exempt organization is
broadly responsible for the unrelated business income tax under §§ 511-
514, but it only owes that tax if it incurs unrelated business income.229
The corporate tax is a tax on an organization's income, i.e., generally
revenue less ordinary and necessary business expenses. In the absence of
tax exemption, there are three primary types of income upon which a
business league might pay tax: (1) net investment income (portfolio in-
come), (2) income from member dues, and (3) income from the sale of
goods and services to members and nonmembers. In each case, to deter-
mine income, expenses are offset against the revenue from these activi-
ties.
The first type of income and the tax owed is fairly straightforward.
A business league does not pay tax on income from gains from stocks
and bonds, rental income, royalties and other passive investments that are
excluded from Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT).230 Tax exemp-
tion for investment income works just like an individual's pension plan.
Earnings from capital held by the exempt organization are exempt from
tax.231 Such income would generally be taxed at the corporate rate.232 If,
after deductions, a business league earned $1,000 in investment income,
assuming a 36% rate, it would owe $360. Because, unlike most other
corporations, a business league is absolved from this tax, the government
can be seen to provide a subsidy to a business league equal to the tax rate
multiplied by investment income. Here that amount would be $360. The
benefits most likely accrue to the members who control the organization.
The research in Part I(B)(3) would suggest this means that the benefits
flow most to the highest paying members of the organization whose in-
terests the organization most typically follows.
The second type of income, membership income, lacks the clarity
found in net investment income. Many argue, as discussed in the para-
graph below, that member dues do not represent income at all, but only
the pooling of resources. Defining membership income requires us to
determine what it means to be a member of a nonprofit organization. A
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/sports/football/I 2nfltax.html ("Major League Baseball changed
its status last year to a for-profit corporation."). It could reorganize as a pass-through entity, such as
a partnership or limited liability company, and be taxed under the subchapter K pass-through regime.
Or, a business league could be seen as a cooperative that should be taxed under subchapter T of the
Code. See CHARLES T. AUTRY & ROLAND F. HALL, THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 91 (2009). A coop-
erative is an organization that is (1) owned and controlled by the persons who buy or sell its services
or goods, (2) engaged primarily in selling to or buying from those who own it, (3) is democratically
controlled by its members, and (4) works to maximize benefit to its owners rather than to maximize
profits. Id. at 1-2. Cooperatives offer a hybrid taxing regime where the organization is in effect taxed
both as an entity and treated as a conduit such that the members pay tax on the earnings of the entity.
See id. at 90-91, 101.
229. 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-514 (2012).
230. Id. § 512(b).
231. See id. § 501(a), (c)(6).
232. Generally, business leagues are organized as corporate entities. A corporation is taxed
under 26 U.S.C. § 11.
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member pays business league dues because the business league provides
some good or service that the member values at least as much as he paid
in dues. From this perspective, a member is a customer of an entity in
which the member has some part interest. And, if the business league is a
corporate entity separate from its members, which presumably it is, and
the membership dues are not the purchase of shares of stock but the ac-
quisition of goods or services, then any retained earnings from dues
payments at the end of a taxable year represent income from membership
dues. The dues represent the prepayment for goods or services to be re-
ceived throughout the year. If this is our perspective of a member, the
taxation is not very difficult for our income tax system. The subsidy here
would be the tax rate times the income exempted from tax.
Some conceive of membership dues as simply the pooling of capital
to do something the member could have done without the organiza-
23
tion.23 For example, a member might pool capital with other members to
cooperatively advertise their common interest. Thus, some argue that
there is no taxable activity involved in the membership dues situation.234
This view ignores the entity and views the relationship as nothing more
than a conduit. This is a plausible frame through which to view the rela-
tionship between member and organization. First, in almost all cases a
member of a business league is engaged in a trade or business and would
be able to deduct the amount of money that the business league ultimate-
ly expends.235 Thus, although paying the business league allows the
member an immediate deduction, this is the correct result for the vast
majority of membership dues payments. For those portions that it is the
incorrect result, i.e., the member gets a deduction associated with an
amount that would not have been deductible until some later year, this
aberration results in a tax deferral only rather than complete exemp-
236
tion. Likewise, the business league itself would also be able to deduct
most expenditures of the organization at the end of the day. Nevertheless,
this view takes an odd view of the normal view regarding an entity indi-
237vidual relationship. The two are normally treated as separate persons.
And, even in the case of cooperatives or partnerships, where the entity at
times is ignored, the business league exemption choice ignores both the
entity and the individual level of tax responsibility.
Finally, the third source of income, payments received from con-
ducting a trade or business, may be currently taxed under the Unrelated
Business Income Tax (UBIT) regime or may be exempt as a substantially
related trade or business.23 8 For instance, if an organization sells a seal of
233. For a discussion of this idea, see Halperin, supra note 9, at 134.
234. E.g., id. at 139, 155-56.
235. See, e.g., id. at 135.
236. Id.
237. Moline Props. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
238. 26 U.S.C. § 513.
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approval to members and nonmembers and the IRS determines the sale
of that seal is substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose,
the business league will not owe UBIT on the income from that service.
However, where the business league sells advertising to particular mem-
bers, the business league will owe the UBIT on this income for that tax
year.
Payments to a tax-exempt business league are not deductible as a
charitable contribution, as are donations to a charitable organization;239
however, most payments to a business league are deductible as a trade or
24
business expense.240 Membership dues are generally deductible, except to
the extent any amount is used to lobby or intervene in a political cam-
paign.241 From a casual perusal of business league Form 990s it appears
that business leagues do not indicate a large percentage of their expenses
go to either advocating for or against a candidate or for lobbying.242 This
seems odd given the research above suggesting that a primary driver for
the creation of business leagues is in order to lobby. Further research into
this matter might be fruitful.
To see the impact of taxing a business league, consider what would
happen if a business league, call it the American Barbell Association
(ABC), gives up its exemption from tax and chooses to be taxed as a
corporation.2 43 ABC speaks for the benefit of the barbell industry. It en-
gages in the following transactions. It receives $1,000,000 in dues annu-
ally from 1,000 members. It also eams $100,000 in revenue from the sale
of a seal of approval for well-made barbells. Finally, it holds a $500,000
endowment of stocks and bonds upon which it earns a 10% return or
$50,000. Thus, it receives a total of $1,150,000 in revenue. Its deductions
amount to $900,000 for speaking for the industry for the year, $50,000 of
239. Id. § 170(a)(1).
240. Id. § 162(a).
241. Id. § 162(e)(1)(A)-(D).
242. For instance, the US Chamber of Commerce indicates on its 2012 Form 990 that of its
$207 million of expenses, only $13 million was dedicated to lobbying. Chamber of Commerce 2012
Tax Form, I.R.S. Income Tax Form 990, pt. 1, 1. 18, pt. IX, 1. 11(d), [hereinafter 2012 Chamber of
Commerce Form 990], available at http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2012/530/045/2012-
530045720-09d301b9-90.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). The American Medical Association re-
ports $0 of lobbying expenses in 2012 when reporting $224 million in total expenses. American
Medical Association 2012 Tax Form, I.R.S. Income Tax Form 990, pt. I. 1. 18, pt. IX, 1. 11(d), [here-
inafter 2012 AMA Form 990], available at
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2012/360/727/2012-360727175-09d9349b-90.pdf (last
visited June 23, 2015).
243. In many instances, a business league could choose to be organized as a pass-through
entity or a cooperative and be taxed as such. Major League Baseball for instance chose to become an
LLC and taxed as a partnership when it gave up tax exemption recently. Under partnership taxation,
an organization is treated as an entity by the IRS mostly for accounting purposes but not for tax
purposes. Instead of taxing the entity, the Code imposes a tax on the partners under the Subchapter K
regime. A cooperative provides a hybrid regime. It is incorporated and owes a corporate tax. How-
ever, it is allowed to deduct patronage dividends such that any earnings that are distributed to mem-
bers are not taxed at the corporate level. Subchapter T of the Code would likely apply to most busi-
ness leagues that chose to be taxed as a cooperative. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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which it reports as lobbying. It spends $90,000 in administering its seal
of approval program. Finally, it incurs $10,000 in deductible expenses in
managing its portfolio. Thus it incurs $1,000,000 in total expenses.
ABC earned $40,000 in our first type of identified income, invest-
ment income. If it were tax exempt, it would not owe tax on this money.
ABC's member income would equal $100,000.244 If it were tax-exempt,
the Association would not owe tax on that amount. Finally, with respect
to our third type of income, ABC earned $10,000 from the sale of the
seal of approval. Assuming an even corporate tax rate of 30%, ABC
would owe $12,000 on its investment income, $30,000 in taxes on mem-
ber income, and $3,000 in taxes on its trade or business income. It is
possible that even as a tax-exempt entity the Association might owe tax
on trade or business amount. It would depend on how the Association
structured the seal of approval.245 Thus, as a taxable entity, ABC would
pay $45,000 in taxes on $150,000 of income, while as tax exempt it
would pay nothing or $3,000 on that same income.
As a taxable entity, ABC could choose to spend all of its member
dues on expenses and keep its total tax burden to the $15,000 owed on
investment income and sales of services. It could also possibly treat the
excess $100,000 in member dues as a rebate. In other words, ABC could
determine that it charged its members too much and return that money. It
would still pay tax on the remaining $50,000 of investment income and
trade or business income.
The incentive effect therefore of granting tax-exempt status, is to
encourage the tax-exempt organization to not spend its earnings current-
ly; this is because it gets an advantage over others by having retained
earnings that do not face a tax. If the organization is taxable it will be
encouraged to either return money to its members or spend it all current-
ly. Thus, if we have reason to believe that it would be better for business
leagues to spend its income currently we might choose instead to make
them taxable rather than tax exempt.
C. Propriety of Tax Exemption for Business Leagues
Few argue business leagues deserve tax exemption. Those who have
opined from a scholarly perspective describe exemption for these organi-
zations as "rickety."246 Even though considered rickety, Boris Bittker and
George Rahdert state that it might be self-defeating to tax business
244. 1 assume the IRS will treat a for-profit business league as if it is in the trade or business of
providing lobbying. Thus, the $50,000 of lobbying expense, while not deductible at the member
level because of 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(1), would be deductible to the business league under 26 U.S.C. §
162(e)(5).
245. See supra Part II.A.
246. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 357 (1976). See also, David S. Miller, Reforming the
Taxation ofExempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 474 (2014).
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leagues.247 They point out that a business league could either be operated
at a break-even point, incurring no taxable obligation, or could pass
along the extra tax charge to its members who would deduct this charge
and substantially lower their total tax obligation.24 8 Halperin concludes
that tax exemption for business leagues is a subsidy but believes there is
little harm in the subsidy to the extent it is associated with member ser-
24925vices.29 Its primary benefit is deferral.250
Thus, the primary arguments for exempting business leagues from
income tax seem to be that taxing them would be a waste of time and an
administrative burden. This Section investigates whether there might be
positive arguments for tax exemption for business leagues. It finds that
there are positive arguments, but ones that are not ultimately satisfactory.
It also concludes that the suggestion that taxing business leagues would
be a waste of time and an administrative burden are incorrect today.
I have argued that mutual-benefit organizations, such as business
251
leagues, should generally be subject to taxation. I argued that under the
shareholder theory of corporate taxation, mutual-benefit organizations
should pay a tax to represent the private gain provided through the opera-
tion of the organization. Under corporate tax theories, the most accepted
theory of taxation is that we tax corporate entities to tax the sharehold-
ers.252 Because the members of mutual-benefit organizations closely re-
semble the shareholders of a for-profit corporation-they control the
organization through voting and are the primary beneficiaries of the ac-
tions of the organization-a corporate tax should apply to business
leagues and other mutual benefits unless a strong positive case can be
made for their exemption. Public benefit corporations, on the other hand,
such as charitable organizations are structured to have no members who
resemble shareholders. Thus, it is more difficult to make a positive case
for taxation of charitable organizations under the shareholder theory of
corporate taxation.
Consistent with economic theory for government subsidies, and
with the market failure theory, it arguably makes sense to provide ex-
253
emption to an organization that fulfills an important public purpose.
The most common argument made for providing an organization exemp-
tion from tax is that the organization provides some public benefit that is
at least equal to the amount of tax the organization would have paid (the
"quid pro quo theory").254 The dominant argument within the quid pro
247. Bittker & Rabdert, supra note 246, at 357.
248. Id.
249. Halperin, supra note 9, at 135-36.
250. Id. at 135.
251. Hackney, supra note 8, at 118.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 125-26, 155.
254. See, e.g., id at 125.
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quo theory holds that we provide a subsidy to nonprofit organizations
that solve a market failure.2 55 Typically, the type of market failure in-
volved is either (1) a good or service that has positive externalities or (2)
a public good. No one has explicitly argued that a business league solves
a market failure. Nevertheless, there are three market failures, or perhaps
government failures, that subsidizing business leagues might solve: (1) it
might foster a pluralist society, (2) it might ensure that needed, useful,
truthful information is delivered to the government, and (3) it might pro-
vide a private regulatory authority (think bar association).
Some make a positive argument for tax exemption.2 56 They argue
tax exemption fosters a pluralist society. By subsidizing the formation of
groups that will advocate for societal interests we enhance our democra-
cy. Encouraging the formation of groups can help to ensure all interests
of our nation are represented before our government, and can bring us
closer to an ideal representative democracy.
This pluralism theory must be based on the assumption that there is
a market failure associated with the collective good of governmental
interest representation. As discussed in Part I above, this is the collective
action problem; although there are many needs of individuals and organ-
izations that could be fulfilled by government, the cost involved in seek-
ing the fulfillment of that need by government is more costly than the
return to any one individual. While it would be in the collective interest
to organize to spread the cost of speaking to the government, the cost of
such organization is often so great compared to the return that some indi-
viduals and groups might never organize. Other collective interests might
organize, but might never get the optimal amount of this service because
many individuals and organizations will free ride on the efforts of others.
Thus the basis for this positive case: the subsidy of tax exemption can
encourage the development of organizations that represent diverse im-
portant views before the government.25 7 This can enhance the democratic
nature of government. We might further enhance the power of this claim
by noting that this subsidy is best suited to nonprofit organizations. The
absence of owners who might act opportunistically in a nonprofit means
nonprofits are more trustworthy than a for-profit organization and thus
worthy of the government subsidy.2 58
255. See, e.g., id. at 126.
256. See, e.g., SALAMON, supra note 12, at 14; Gardner, supra note 12, at xiii-xv.
257. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (describing the "role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply
conflicting, activities and viewpoints"); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 14; Gardner, supra
note 12, at xiii-xv.
258. Cf Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV.
2017, 2066-67 (2007) (who argued that we had no reason to believe that nonprofit charitable organi-
zations were more deserving of a subsidy for carrying out charitable works than any other organiza-
tions).
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This represents a prescriptive pluralism. It recommends that the
government give aid to organizations that will represent group interests
before the government. The positive externality presumably from such
activity is that the government will be more democratic because it is
more inclusive of the diverse opinions of society.
A related positive case, which I refer to as the information theory, is
also based on the problem of collective action. Under this theory the sub-
sidy encourages the collective action of organizations to provide the gov-
ernment with important, necessary information.259 Neither legislators nor
government employees can know all the information they need to man-
age the complex regulatory world. In the early 1900s, in fact, there was a
sense that our government should seek out substantial help from these
associational groups to scientifically govern commerce.2 60 Furthermore,
interest groups possess valuable electoral information for those running
261 i hoeifor election. It is theoretically possible that interest groups could help
align a politician's position more closely with the electorate. Thus, busi-
ness leagues deserve xemption because they fill this important public
role of bringing important, necessary information to the government.
Again, the case for this claim could be augmented if it could be shown
that nonprofits provide better and more truthful information.
Finally, in some cases, some business leagues may serve an im-
portant regulatory function. This might be particularly helpful in a cir-
cumstance where that function is one that the state might have otherwise
operated. These organizations might provide a lower cost, less intrusive
means of regulating and ensuring the smooth operation of important pro-
fessional and industry functions. For instance, bar associations regulate
lawyers and many industry associations may regulate the quality of
products provided by a particular industry. As will be seen in the case
studies below, the Cotton Trade Institute tried to serve as the arbiter of
quality products by helping to implement a federal code governing these
products. Also, the AMA has served a regulatory role at times by over-
seeing the quality of drugs, and is today involved in regulating payment
structures associated with medical procedures.262
In assessing these three related positive cases, the first step is to as-
sess whether there is a market failure that business leagues are solving.
Arguably, the current set of requirements for business leagues that pro-
259. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 174; see also RAYMOND A. BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL &
LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 324-25 (1963) (establishing a
case from the time that the main way that many business interest groups worked in pressuring Con-
gress was really an informational sharing role). A couple authors in fact make an argument that is
consistent with the informational theory; they claim lobbying is a subsidy to the government. Rich-
ard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 69
(2006).
260. EISNER, supra note 177, at 5.
261. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 199.
262. See infra Part III.F.
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hibit an exempt business league from operating for a particular business
aids the case that business leagues provide a collective good that might
be subject to market failure. Instead of helping just Midas Mufflers, any
business league formed around mufflers must help all organizations in
that line of business. However, as developed above in Part I, much of the
business-league community is made up of small homogenous interests
that appear to have little difficulty organizing.263 Thus, even though they
provide a collective good, the type of collective good they provide does
not appear to have the substantial market failure that is imagined in the
theory supporting exemption from income tax.
Nevertheless, collective action theory and the empirical evidence
demonstrates that some business leagues face real collective-action prob-
lems. Professional associations and peak associations arguably face some
real challenges. Mancur Olson notes the challenges that professional
associations face in organizing because they typically represent a large
latent interest.264 For instance, a review of the history of the American
Medical Association seems to demonstrate that the AMA experienced
substantial challenges in organizing prior to the turn of the twentieth
century.265 Peak associations too, such as the Chamber of Commerce,
face greater challenges in organizing than the small trade associations.
Peak associations and professional associations perceive that they must
sell selective incentives such as insurance and discounts and offer oppor-
266tunities to network to attract members. Thus, certain sectors of busi-
ness leagues face market failure. Could this mean that there might be a
partial positive case to be made on this market failure?
Maybe, but we might question the extent of that market failure.
Many professional associations, for instance, work with their states to
establish closed shops that all but eliminate any collective-action prob-
lem.267 In order to practice law, for example, you must be a member of
your state bar.268 If individuals are forced to join the organization by state
compulsion, the collective-action problem is solved. This solves the col-
lective-action problem for many of the most powerful professional asso-
ciations. Thus, despite the objective challenges that professional associa-
tions face, the closed shop generally solves the market failure problem
and there is no need for an additional subsidy to solve that problem. Ad-
ditionally, while peak associations may experience collective action chal-
lenges, those challenges are arguably not as intense as some other non-
business public interests. Business organizations typically have members
with the skills and resources to organize. And, as demonstrated in Part I
263. See supra Part I.A.
264. See OLSON, supra note 26, at 144 (1965).
265. See infra Part IIF.
266. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 26, at 133-35.
267. See supra Part I.A.
268. See supra Part 1.A.
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above, business interests are well represented before our government
already; under this analysis, the market failure case for these organiza-
tions that face a collective action problem becomes suspect as well.
This assessment of the relative level of market failure faced by dif-
ferent types of business leagues suggests that examining the exemption
worthiness of organizational types is not a hard and fast science. Differ-
ent organizational interests experience market failure over a continuum.
On the side of extreme market failure we might place large and latent
organizational interests, such as the poor, that experience a high degree
of market failure. On the other end where organizational interests face
almost no market failure, we might place trade associations representing
an industry with few members. This continuum suggests that within the
business-league organizational sector, some organizational types might
be identified that are more deserving than others. For example, peak as-
sociations appear to face a greater level of market failure than industry
trade associations and may thus be more worthy of exemption.
If we conclude some organizational types within the business-
league sector are more deserving of exemption than others, then we need
to know what baseline to use in measuring whether a class of organiza-
tions on the whole should be entitled to exemption from tax. Should all
the organizations that fit within the class suffer significant, severe market
failure? Should you compare organizations within a class, or is the rele-
vant question the degree of severity of market failure as compared to all
other tax-exempt organizations including charitable organizations? Un-
der the current exemption structure for business leagues there are many
trade associations that represent small interests that objectively do not
appear to face any market failure.269 Furthermore when business interests
are compared to the interests of the poor, the collective-action challenge
difference is profound.
It is hard to make an exact judgment, but if we looked at a continu-
um of nonprofit organizations that face market failure and it went from
only a little failure to a lot of failure, we could expect that the vast major-
ity of business leagues fall on the little failure side. The overwhelming
empirical evidence discussed above that business interests dominate the
270
interest group field supports this conclusion.
We could stop the analysis there. If we can conclude that the vast
majority of business leagues do not face market failure in a relative sense
it becomes hard to suggest they need a subsidy to provide the goods or
services we think are helpful. However, to complete the analysis we
should assess whether, if properly targeted to the organizations within
the business league class that does experience market failure, such as
269. See supra Part LA & B.
270. See supra Part LA & B.
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peak organizations, one of the positive cases for business leagues sug-
gested above could carry the day for exemption. In the following para-
graphs I consider the positive cases as they might apply to the organiza-
tions in the business league class that are on the more severe side of mar-
ket failure.
The first case is an argument that the subsidy fosters a more plural-
istic society. Could the subsidy for peak business associations be sup-
ported on the premise that offering peak associations a subsidy will in-
crease the diversity of opinion brought to our government actors? Given
the overwhelming evidence that business interests dominate the interest
group field, such a claim seems far-fetched. As a result of the existing
substantial bias towards business interests, providing a subsidy to busi-
ness interests likely distorts the democratic community more towards
these powerful business interests. Thus, even if exemption were provided
solely to peak associations, the objective of pluralism is probably harmed
rather than enhanced. Taking into consideration the evidence that here
are only so many interest groups that can make up an interest group sec-
tor,2 71 we should be doubly concerned about filling the field with inter-
ests that already dominate.
The second case, the informational theory, is usually offered as a
reason to not impose restrictions on lobbying generally.272 Interest groups
bring forth important information to legislators and agency decision
makers and we should be inclined to support those activities. Information
from the regulated is an important good in and of itself. However, this
rationale to be used to support exemption depends on finding market
failure. If most business interests organize anyway, it is hard to under-
stand why we need increase the amount of information provided by this
community. Pushing the informational theory to support subsidization of
lobbying seems a push one step too far.
The third positive case to support business-league exemption pre-
sents perhaps the best case because it focuses on a very public function.
Under this case, we subsidize the business leagues that perform a public
regulatory function by enacting and enforcing rules to govern a profes-
sion or industry's relationship with the public and with one another. Pro-
fessional associations like bar associations enforce professional stand-
ards; likewise, some trade associations enforce building codes that may
ensure better products for the public. The activity of regulating an im-
portant professional or industrial field fulfills a traditional governmental
role, and we as a society generally accept that we should not tax the gov-
ernment itself. In a sense this could fit the lessening the burdens of chari-
table organizations. Thus, this exemption need not rely on market failure.
271. See Lowery & Gray, supra note 127.
272. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 174.
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One could justify this case on the basis of the organization fulfilling a
governmental role alone.
The third case does not broadly support business-league xemption.
A small set of business leagues fulfills this public regulatory role. The
strongest objection to this case is the evidence that this type of activity is
really a byproduct of the primary activity of acting as an interest group
on behalf of the industry.27 3 Thus, these private associations will continue
to pressure government actors to provide a better environment for their
industry as a whole. The fact that these organizations get the state's im-
primatur to regulate the industry or profession simply makes the voice of
these organizations even more powerful. This is seen quite clearly in the
case study below on the development of the AMA and to a certain extent
the Cotton Textile Institute as well. Given that the regulatory function is
a byproduct of business interests, this case should thus fail as well.
Although no positive case supports tax exemption, might we still
choose to exempt the business league from the income tax because (1) it
does not matter whether we tax these organizations or not, and (2) it
would be an administrative burden anyway? Taxing business leagues
would not likely lead to substantial revenue, and it is true that a part of
the subsidy consists of accelerated deductions for members. However,
the casual acceptance of exempting an organization because it will not
likely lead to much revenue seems misguided. It is important that in our
income tax system we keep a narrow list of organizational types entitled
to exemption, as the greater the number of organizations that do not have
to pay tax, the higher the tax rate must be for everyone else. Furthermore,
the federal tax-exempt status is a signal good that provides to its owner
many other valuable benefits. Many states and local authorities grant tax
exemptions to organizations simply because the federal government pro-
vides exemption. After a while this can add up to significant money. A
change at he federal level might encourage some states and local gov-
ernments to lessen other subsidies provided to these undeserving organi-
zations.
Today, it is hard to imagine that it is administratively more conven-
ient to place business leagues into the tax-exempt category rather than
the taxable category. For the organizations, the regulatory environment
has become deeply complex and costly. The Form 990, the informational
return for tax-exempt organizations, demands significant attention and
the organization must manage to steer clear through an increasingly more
complex tax-exempt regulatory landscape.
As for the administrative burden of the IRS, the resources of the
IRS in its exempt organization division are inadequate to accomplish its
273. Hansen, supra note 36 ("Interest groups' service organizations quite ironically are by-
products of their lobbying organizations, not the other way around.").
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current level of work.274 Also, recent experience at the IRS suggests that
the IRS is not a good agency to task with making political decisions.27 5
The IRS faced serious political trouble for examining whether certain
conservative organizations applying to be exempt as § 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations were engaged in too much politics.2 76 Business
leagues, like social welfare organizations, may similarly not primarily
advocate for candidates.2 77 Thus, the rules regarding these organizations
put the IRS in a bad position politically. If they enforce the requirement,
the IRS can do damage to its reputation. If the IRS does not enforce the
requirement, it can do damage to its reputation as well. Eliminating busi-
ness-league tax exemption would reduce the number of situations in
which the IRS is in significant political danger. Eliminating the necessity
of the IRS in making that political call would remove one problematic
law that it must enforce.
Finally, as noted above, there are some who contend that business
leagues simply pool assets.278 Members of a business league are simply
collectively providing services each member could provide on their own;
business leagues should therefore not be subject to extra tax on individu-
al activity. 279 This argument seems to be based on a claim that the trade
associations are nothing more than a conduit. The argument assumes that
the organization should bear no tax because there is no realization event
when a member pays dues and a business league provides a service. A
member is simply putting his money in another pocket.
The first difficulty with this assertion is that it would only apply to
the charge for member dues. Investment income and income from the
sale of services to nonmembers would not be sheltered under this idea.
No member could avoid a tax on that income. However, tax exemption
for business leagues treats both these forms of income as exempt.
As to the question of member dues, a review of the collective action
literature establishes the importance and political usefulness of the col-
lective activity in and of itself. The importance of carrying out business-
league activity in a collective sense makes it hard to conclude that busi-
ness leagues are simply engaging in activities that the members could
perform on their own. The very purpose of collective action is to accom-
plish goals that individual members could not accomplish on their own.
Some scholars following a similar thread to the pooling claim note
that if the organization had to pay tax on its retained earnings it might
274. See Philip T. Hackney, Should the IRS Never "Target" Taxpayers: A Review of the IRS
Tea Party Affair, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 134.
279. Id. at 134-36; see also Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 248, at 357.
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simply zero out its income every year.280 A business league could for
instance issue a refund to its members on the premise that it charged too
much earlier in the year. Effectively, this is the argument that it is admin-
istratively convenient to treat business-league activity as tax-exempt. The
administratively efficient claim has already been handled above. Howev-
er, I believe there would be no harm in encouraging these organizations
to spend currently. It would ensure that the organization was not building
up a war chest to fight future battles aided in part from a subsidy from
the government.
D. Concluding Thoughts
Ending tax exemption for these powerful organizations may be po-
litically impossible. A second best option would be to maintain tax ex-
emption but to impose a net investment income tax as is already imposed
on other mutual-benefit nonprofit organizations, such as the social club
under § 501(c)(7) and the political organization under § 527. This would
mean that of the three types of income, only net investment income
would be taxed. Thus, while not perfect, it would be a move to slightly
reduce the subsidy to business leagues. The Clinton administration pro-
posed this move in the late 1990s, but it was unsuccessful.28 1 One addi-
tional positive aspect of this move would be that it would maintain a
right to public disclosure of business-league activities.282 We as a society
might value that public disclosure via the Form 990 more than the taxes
derived from member income or commercial income. Additionally, this
move could even one day support a right to obtain disclosure regarding
donors for political purposes based on the provision of a subsidy. This
could aid in ensuring that the information provided by business leagues
is more truthful and thus helpful to legislators and agencies.283 Thus, the
strongest argument for maintaining exempt status might be to use that
grant as a means to obtain greater information from these organizations.
What implications might this review have for other tax-exempt or-
ganizations beyond business leagues? It has little implication for the
charitable sector because charitable organizations are expressly prohibit-
ed from intervening in political campaigns and may only do modest
amounts of lobbying.28 In other words, while charitable organizations
may act as interest groups at times, their ability to do so is quite limited.
280. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 248, at 357.
281. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL, at 278-81
(Comm. Print 1999); see also Jacob M. Schlesinger, Clinton Plan to Tax Lobbyists' Investment
Gains Hits Home in a Fury of Faxes, Letters, Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A24.
282. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2) (2012).
283. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal
Revenue Code's Treatment ofLegislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (1993) (arguing for
improving the lobbying regulatory regime to encourage "educational advocacy").
284. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
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This analysis in fact could support these lobbying and electoral limita-
tions in part. The analysis should be quite relevant to other mutual-
benefit organizations that participate substantially in the political pro-
cess. Namely, the analysis has ramifications for both social welfare or-
ganizations,285 and labor and agricultural organizations,286 both of which
typically act in a primary capacity as interest groups. The analysis calls
exemption for these organizations into question as well on a presumption
that the law gives a subsidy to many of the wrong groups that would
have organized whether tax exemption existed or not. One could consid-
er whether exemption is warranted where a certain segment of society,
such as the poor, or labor interests, face more severe collective action
problems, and suffer significant political voice inequality as a result.2 87
This question is beyond the scope of this Article, but I plan to turn to
these questions in a later article.
III. THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS LEAGUES: THREE CASE STUDIES
This Part describes the three main types of business leagues and us-
es three case studies to illustrate their activities. This is offered to pro-
vide more context regarding business leagues and to promote a larger
understanding of their activities within the legal literature as it relates to
taxation. Additionally, it provides an opportunity to test some of the ide-
as expressed above.
There are no groups that are more engaged in the pressure group
business than business interests.2 88 However, in addition to lobbying,
business leagues collect statistics, standardize processes, institute uni-
form cost accounting, settle trade disputes, and establish codes of eth-
ics.289 Business leagues also work to "stabilize" the market, including
sometimes engaging in price fixing.290 Typically, the most significant
activity of a business league is as a liaison for the particular business
interest to Congress or state and local governments.291
Business leagues fall into three main categories: (1) peak organiza-
tions (think highly generalized business organizations such as the United
States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), and the National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB)); (2) specific industry trade associations
(think the National Beer Wholesalers Association, the Motion Picture
Association of America, and the National Council of Textile Organiza-
tions); and, (3) professional associations (think bar associations and med-
285. Id. § 501(c)(4).
286. Id. § 501(c)(5).
287. SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 105, at 312-27, 344-46.
288. See, e.g., E. PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 78
(1929).
289. Id. at 98.
290. See, e.g., Louis GALAMBOS, COMPETITION & COOPERATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A
NATIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATION 3-10 (1966).
291. HERRING, supra note 291, at 98.
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ical associations that implement and monitor state-backed licensing sys-
tems and establish minimum education requirements). Each of these dif-
ferent types of business leagues provides some other service in addition
to political influence, but all share the commonality of attempts to influ-
ence governmental policy, i.e., they are interest groups.
A. Peak Organizations
Peak organizations are made up of diverse interests from every
spectrum and size of business. Their primary function tends to be to pro-
tect and enhance their members' interests before the federal govern-
292ment. In addition to representation, peak organizations provide some
other selective and purposive incentives to their members, such as dis-
counts on products, subscriptions to publications, and opportunities to
network. The Chamber, founded in 1912 at the behest of President
Taft,293 is probably the best known peak organization. In its early itera-
tion, the leaders of the Chamber saw that its most important function was
to obtain "the matured judgment of business on national questions and to
present and interpret these views to the agencies of government and to
the public."29 4 Its members include both individuals and entities. It in-
cludes for-profit and nonprofit businesses in its membership.
The Chamber, like most peak organizations, only takes a position
on an issue when it has a supermajority of its membership interested in
and agreed upon that issue.29 5 It cautiously avoids particularistic issues
that are of interest to only parts of its membership and lets corporations
and trade associations fight these battles instead.296 The Chamber says its
members "count on the Chamber to be their voice in Washington,
D.C." 297 Of all the different types of business leagues, the peak organiza-
tions appear to suffer the greatest collective-action problems likely be-
cause of the lack of homogeneity of interest-the prime commonality of
the peak organization is the interest in business in general.
1. National Federation of Independent Business
The formation and operation of the NFIB is an excellent example of
the purposes and activities of a peak organization.29 8 Its formation story
292. See supra Part I.
293. TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 85.
294. HERRING, supra note 291, at 86 (internal quotation mark omitted).
295. MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION,
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 41 (2000).
296. Id.
297. About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
https://www.uschamber.com/about-us-chamber-commerce (last visited June 23, 2015).
298. McGee Young, Advocacy Innovation and Political Opportunity: Assessing the Rise of the
NFIB, Address Prepared for the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, 2-3 (Aug. 28-31, 2003), available at
http://citation.allacademic.com//rneta/pmlaapa-researchcitation/0/6/3/4/5/pages63453/p63453-
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fits Salisbury's exchange theory of interest group formation well.2 99
Founded by an entrepreneur, its salesmen hawked memberships to small
businesses around the country.300 It primarily sold purposive incentives.
Consistent with the suggestion of Olson, we see that the NFIB as a peak
association appeared to face a real collective-action problem.
The NFIB is today an organization of approximately 350,000 mem-
bers.30 1 It reported revenue of $103 million and expenses of $100 million
in 2012.302 Its mission is "to organize the independent or small business
men into an association to the end that his voice may be heard effectively
in local, state, and national affairs affecting small business."303 It vigor-
ously engages with the political process. For example, it helped Republi-
cans to victory in the mid 1990s and helped to stymie Bill Clinton's
health reform. 304 Most recently, it tried to stop the Barack Obama's Af-
fordable Care Act.
C. Wilson Harder founded the NFIB in 1943 in the San Francisco
306Bay area. Harder, a small business owner active in the Chamber,
formed the NFIB in response to frustration that the Chamber represented
the interests of large businessmen rather than small businessmen.30 7
World War II imposed challenges on businesses by increasing demand
for their services while also depleting the labor force. During the war,
after prodding by the Chamber, the government implemented rules that
Harder believed helped large businesses at the expense of the small busi-
nesses.308 Harder took umbrage at unfair trade practices and issues of
distribution that he believed these rules protected and encouraged. Hard-
er believed the government implemented these rules because the small
businessman lacked a sufficient voice in Congress.309
To make the NFIB work, Harder believed he needed a strong sales
model; but he made a decision to only seek members from independent
1.php. Much of the information for this case study on the NFIB comes from McGee Young's exami-
nation of the NFIB.
299. See Part I.B.2.
300. See id at 7.
301. Members of Congress Honored as Guardians of Small Business by NFIB, NAT'L FED'N
OF INDEP. Bus. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.nfib.com/article/?cmsid=60967.
302. National Federation on Independent Business 2012 Tax Form, I.R.S. Income Tax Form
990, pt. 1, 11. 12, 18, [hereinafter 2012 NFIB Form 990], available at
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2012/940/707/2012-940707299-097ff0c2-90.pdf (last
visited June 23, 2015).
303. National Federation of Independent Business Inc. Mission Statement, GUIDESTAR,
http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/94-0707299/national-federation-independent-business.aspx
(last visited June 23, 2015).
304. Young, supra note 301, at 3.
305. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
306. Young, supra note 301, at 3.
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businesses that did not dominate a field. 310 He sold small businessmen
the right to effective representation in Washington D.C. In addition to
representation before Congress, the NFIB provided a newsletter to its
members called the Mandate. " With one lobbyist in Washington, Hard-
er kept a lean policy staff but employed a large sales force that extended
over 200 districts across the country.312 Entitled to a 50% commission on
first year dues, the sales force, not unsurprisingly, aggressively recruited
members.3 13
The sales force recruited members using the anger harbored by
many smaller businessmen toward the government from post-New Deal
programs that privileged large firms over small.3 14 In the opinion of
many small businessmen, the large firms set all industry-wide codes and
those codes were set intentionally to assist large industry to the detriment
of independent business.3 15 To sell NFIB membership, salesmen would
bring a copy of the newsletter Mandate to the small businessmen they
visited.1 The Mandate conducted a monthly poll of its members on an
issue important to small businessmen.317 In the poll it provided the mem-
bers the pros and cons on the issue that it was polling.3 18 The organiza-
tion would then share the results of these polls with congressmen to at-
tempt to sway them.3 19 While this model was successful at enrolling
members, the NFIB experienced a high membership turnover rate. 320
Harder focused on sales, while the NFIB lobbyist represented the
organization in Washington D.C. 32 1 The lobbyist, George Burger, had a
strong connection to the National Association of Independent Tire Deal-
ers.322 Burger pushed the NFIB to advocate the issues that concerned
independent tire dealers-namely issues surrounding an anti-monopoly
position.323 Burger ignored opportunities for war contracts for small
businessmen, and problems with the consolidation of small manufactur-
ers.324
The NFIB developed a model of influence based on providing ef-
fective polling of constituents.325 The evidence, however, does not show
310. Id
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that the effort had tremendous impact on legislation. Even the small
business legislation that was passed, the Small Business Act of 1953
(SBA), did not have the backing of NFIB.3 26 Although the SBA did spec-
ify a pro-small-businessman policy, the NFIB strongly preferred that
small businessmen be able to appeal directly to Congress rather than
have to work through a governmental agency to influence policy. Never-
theless, Congress established the Small Business Administration any-
way.32 7 This happened in spite of some opposition from the small busi-
ness lobby.32 8 Because the NFIB had little interest in the bill, the bill
ended up being drafted to satisfy the interests of members of Congress
rather than the interests of the members of the NFIB.329 In the 1980s the
NFIB helped to dismantle the program.330
With the death of Harder in 1968, the organization changed its lob-
bying efforts.3 3 1 It instituted systems to keep track of congress members'
votes and conspicuously recognized those members who supported the
332organization's positions3. The NFIB showed its strength in the early
1990s in the battle over President Clinton's planned health care over-
haul.333 Knowing that they had most Republican's on board, the NFIB
went after Democrats in their districts. They hosted meetings in the dis-
tricts of the targeted Democrats to put them on the spot regarding how
they would vote on healthcare.334 The NFIB quickly won the support of
Max Baucus, an influential Democratic senator from Montana.33 5 They
managed to be one of the main groups to have stopped the Clinton health
plan momentum.3 36 They did this by applying local pressure to targeted
congressmen.
The NFIB quickly became, and appears to continue to be, closely
aligned with the Republican Party. The NFIB recruits candidates, funds
candidates, and encourages its members to vote for these candidates on
an election day.337 It continues to rely on a strong sales effort to attract
members but also sells some selective incentives, such as insurance, fi-
nancial services deals, and human resources support.338 It appears,
though, to rely heavily on the sale of purposive incentives. Judging from
its continued partisan stance, such as being the primary plaintiff in the
326. Id. at I1.
327. Id. at il-13.
328. Id at I1.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 15.
331. Id. at 16.
332. Id at 17.
333. Id at 24-28.
334. Id. at 25-26.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 27.
337. Id. at 29.
338. See Member Vantage, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. Bus., http://www.nfib.com/member-
vantage/ (last visited June 23, 2015).
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major case against Obamacare,3 39 its members appear to join because of
the strong free-market stance they see the organization take.
The NFIB raised $86 million of its $103 million in revenue in 2012
from membership fees.34 0 It has historically earned most of its money
through these membership fees.341 Until 2010 its largest single donation
from a group outside its membership was $21,000.342 In 2010, though,
and the years following, it received larger contributions such as a $3.7
million contribution from Karl Rove's Crossroads GPS.343 The NFIB
also earned about $2 million in investment income and around $5 million
from a combination of advertising, affiliate management income, and
sponsorship income. 3  Presumably some of these amounts are from the
various products and services, i.e., selective incentives, the NFIB makes
available on its website such as discounts on business and financial ser-
vices, insurance, and HR support for its members.345 In 2012 the NFIB
acknowledged $65,000 in political expenditures to support candidates,
and spent $44 million of its $100 million to lobby Congress and other
legislative bodies.346
The following is an extremely rough, non-scientific, attempt at de-
termining whether the NFIB has solved its collective-action problem.
The Small Business Administration estimates that there are 23 million
small businesses in the United States347 and the NFIB counts around
350,000 members. If we made a likely incorrect assumption that none of
those 350,000 members represented double counting for any business,
then NFIB enrolled about 1.5% of its potential audience.3 48 This could
suggest that the NFIB faces a real collective-action problem. Perhaps
though, it is possible to view the NFIB's audience differently than all
small businesses. Unlike the Chamber, the NFIB adopts a strident politi-
cal stance; thus, the NFIB's potential members are drawn from a much
smaller set. Given the strident stance, it is possible that the total possible
audience that the NFIB appeals to is some smaller fraction of those 23
million small businesses. Some estimate that obtaining more than 5% of
a relevant group suggests the collective-action problem has been
339. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
340. 2012 NFIB Form 990, supra note 305, at pt. 1, 1. 9.
341. Josh Harkinson, Meet the Front Group Leading the Fight Against Taxing the Rich,
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(last visited June 23, 2015).
346. See 2012 NFlB Form 990, supra note 305, at pt. 1, 1. 18, pt. IX, 1. 25, sched. C, pt. I-A, 1.
1, sched. C, pt. Ill-B, 1. 1.
347. See Small Business Trends, SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/small-
business-trends (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
348. See About NFIB, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. BUS., http://www.nfib.com/about-nfib (last
visited June 23, 2015).
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solved.34 9 If it turned out that the NFIB only appealed to 25% of the
small business audience, this would represent 6% of the desired audi-
ence. Determining whether an organization has solved a collective-action
problem depends on the group you determine it is trying to appeal to. In
any case, it has been quite successful as a peak association at raising
money and accomplishing some real results with its 350,000 members.
B. Trade Associations
Trade associations represent the interests of the owners and manag-
ers of industries like car manufacturers or textile mills. In addition to
organizing to minimize competition in their line of business, industry
players form trade associations to lobby government for beneficial laws
and to stop the government from harming industry interests. Just like
peak associations, trade associations formed in greatest numbers during
times of legislative change and during war. In the case study below you
will see the cotton trade organizing to fight labor laws it found harmful
to industry interests. Additionally they formed to obtain government as-
sistance to scientifically manage the output of the industry to reduce
what they perceived as harmful competition.
In 1921 Emmett Naylor reported that there were about 1,000 trade
associations in the United States.35 0 They have grown significantly since
that time, although an exact number is hard to obtain. We have IRS data
on the total number of business leagues, but we do not have a breakdown
of how many trade associations there are within that group. In 2012 the
IRS indicated that there were around 64,000 total business leagues regis-
tered with the IRS.351
1. Cotton Textile Institute
Louis Galambos provides a case study on the formation, activity,
and maintenance of a national trade association by tracing the origins of
the Cotton Textile Institute.352 The overwhelming message is that trade
associations form to stabilize the business of the current industry players.
Northern and southern cotton firms competed mightily in the late 1800s
and the industry players saw this competition as disastrous to the indus-
try. While the industry appears never to have been successful in stabiliz-
ing, its organizing effort led to some fairly significant lobbying success.
The Cotton Textile Institute began with loose associations at a re-
gional level. Three organizations, two in the northeast and one in the
349. MARK IRVING LICHBACH, THE COOPERATOR'S DILEMMA 7-13 (1996).
350. EMMETT HAY NAYLOR, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 13 (1921).
351. There were around 63,000 business leagues registered with the IRS in 2012 according to
the Nonprofit Almanac 2012 based on data from the IRS. KATIE L. ROEGER, AMY S. BLACKWOOD &
SARAH L. PETTIJOHN, THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2012, at 4 tbl. 1.1 (2012).
352. GALAMBOS, supra note 293, at viii, 3-7, 10.
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south, stand out: the New England Cotton Manufacturers Association
and the Arkwright Club in the northeast, and the Southern Cotton Spin-
ners Association in the south.353
The New England Cotton Manufacturers Association was the first
to form in 1865 in the wake of the Civil War as the cotton industry faced
significant technological change and increase in demand.354 Mill agents
sought an opportunity to commune with other agents to stay on top of
rapidly changing technological developments. 355 Starting with forty
agents in 1865, the organization grew to almost 500 individual members
in twenty different states, including the north and the south.3 s6 It con-
tained almost all of the mills in New England.357 Until the late 1800s it
operated with almost no staff and little money.358 For those forty years it
primarily operated as a gathering place of cotton mill operators seeking
to share technological information at formally arranged dinners and con-
ferences.359 In the 1890s, some members sought to use the Association as
the political voice of the mills, but this effort was shot down.3 60
Only the leading mill manufacturers formed the Arkwright Club in
1880.361 These manufacturers intended to engage in "concerted action" to
protect the interests of the mills.36 2 The leading cause of the formation of
the Club appears to be legislation in Massachusetts limiting the work
hours of women and children.363 The Arkwright started with a limit of
fifty members who had to be officers; it grew to 114 members by
1 9 0 0 .36 The Arkwright was well financed by members who came pri-
marily from the older, larger, more established mills.36 5 It imposed a
charge on the payroll amount of member mills, which allowed the Ark-
wright to develop a professional staff by the 1890s.3 6 6 Its primary pur-
pose was to lobby.367
Over dinner, Arkwright members would determine the position they
should take on state or federal legislation.68 Members themselves han-
dled most of the lobbying; the Arkwright at this time would only occa-
sionally hire an agent to lobby on its behalf.3 69 In addition to lobbying,
353. Id. at I1.
354. Id. at 20.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 21.
357. Id.
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359. Id. at 21-22.
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361. Id at 23.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 24.
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the members attempted to stabilize prices in the industry by establishing
"curtailment programs" and sharing price lists. 370
The southern organization was later to organize; the cotton textile
industry began in the northeast and only later moved to the south.371 Alt-
hough loose affiliations formed from time to time in the south, they typi-
cally folded quickly.372 In 1897, with anemic participation, forty cotton
manufacturers from the south formed the Southern Cotton Spinners As-
sociation.3 73 Made up of any officer of a mill, the organization accepted
individual members rather than corporate memberships and thus did not
have the money of an Arkwright. 3 74 The southern group focused on stabi-
lizing the industry through price control and product control.
Galambos refers to this period as the "dinner-club" period of trade
associations.376 The primary form of organization were loosely knit
groups that met over dinner to discuss shared issues and ideas that mem-
bers wanted to promote within the industry, and sometimes in a more
public sense.377 Trade associations did not become sophisticated profes-
sional, staff-operated associations until the next century. In the early
1900s this movement began as the northern mills began to experience the
intense competition from the southern mills. 378 Although World War I
stymied competition a little because of increased opportunity for the
trade, after the war the competition made the northern mill operations
look dire. In a new twentieth century vision of industry cooperation the
mills developed "stability, teamwork, and systematic controls" by work-
ing together through these associational structures
Cotton textile associations also worked to counter the success of the
progressive movement on the labor and regulatory front. In the early
1900s the progressive movement achieved some success in opening gov-
ernment to public pressure.380 New regulatory agencies such as the Food
and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission also made it
necessary for business to have a larger infrastructure with skilled indi-
viduals capable of communicating to a sophisticated bureaucratic struc-
ture.381 To respond to these new forces, the cotton textile industry created
a service association with the professional staff. The Arkwright Club and
the New England Association both expanded and created divisions to
370. Id. at 27-29.
371. Id. at 30.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 30-31.
374. Id. at 31.
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376. Id. at 33.
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378. Id. at 40.
379. Id. at 46.
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handle new needed functions; these included: dispute resolution, classifi-
cation of products, gathering of statistics, and legislative relations3 82 By
1913, the organizations were able to form an interregional group to rep-
resent the entire industry.
During the First World War the government worked hard to organ-
ize the mills. The government used the associations to coordinate the war
effort.38 Herbert Hoover, head of the Department of Commerce at the
time, strongly encouraged the efforts of trade associations to stabilize
industry through standardization of products, and to cooperate on cost
accounting methods, all in order to improve efficiency.38 5 However, even
with government help, the cotton textile mills could not cooperate to fix
prices or limit production.386 The southern mills had a significant labor
cost advantage and were unwilling to engage with the larger cotton tex-
tile mills. 387
In the mid 1920s the industry went into a depression; this financial
crisis led to the formation of the Cotton Textile Institute (CTI), a national
organization with substantial resources. The formation of this organiza-
tion was made possible by changes at the executive and judicial levels of
government. Many policymakers, such as Herbert Hoover, believed
strongly in the need to liberalize the US policy on antitrust.388 Addition-
ally, in the 1920s a couple decisions of the Court liberalized anti-trust
policy and finally provided industry leeway to coordinate action and
prices. 389 These changes in ideology regarding competition at the execu-
tive and judicial level allowed the cotton textile sector to feel freer to
seek cooperation from both the mills of the south and the north. In order
to get the backing of the federal government, the mill owners agreed that
this new national organization would not seek to influence legislation.390
The CTI was founded in October 1926 to establish an open price plan in
order to avoid producing excess capacity.391
While today many may harbor concerns regarding price fixing, or
even open price plans, it is interesting to consider the ingredients that the
CTI used to accomplish these goals. These ingredients are still a major
part of trade association work today. To accomplish the open price plan
382. Id. at 55-56.
383. Id. at 57.
384. Id. at 65-66.
385. Id. at 67.
386. Id. at 70-71.
387. Id. at 71.
388. Id. at 93.
389. GALAMBOS, supra note 293, at 89-112. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 563, 580-84 (1925) (citing Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921);
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the CTI had to standardize cost accounting techniques.392 They had to
normalize the sharing of information and the coordination of product
lines.393 These activities all helped to naturally ease the worst problems
of excess capacity because the members now were freely sharing infor-
mation using a common language. 394 A further implication though was
that "The association programs were created to preserve an existing in-
dustrial structure which included, most prominently, the organization's
members."395 In other words, this trade association worked to preserve in
place the members of the association, and to either maintain or increase
their respective market share. It is likely that most business leagues work
towards some similar effort.
Even with significant pressure from CTI and the government during
the Depression, the mills could not cooperate to fix prices.39 6 CTI did
achieve success, however, as the central mouthpiece of the cotton manu-
facturing trade. The Institute's leaders came to be respected voices of the
industry, particularly before the government.397 CTI was particularly
successful in persuading Congress to pass the constitutionally ill-fated
National Industrial Recovery Act. 398 As Galambos says, "voluntarism
was being replaced by majority control with coercion of the recalcitrant
minority." 399 CTI formed a committee under authority of the Recovery
Act to draft a code to govern the cotton textile industry. Cotton manufac-
turers took a command of their industry and became its main voice.40
However, the Court struck down the Recovery Act that had provided the
support for the development of an industry code with the backing of the
government, in 1935, and the industry had to go back to its normal asso-
ciative activity.401
CTI no longer exists. It appears that the modern day representative
of CTI is the National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO) through
a circuitous route of a somewhat dying US industry.402 In the 1940s, CTI
primarily represented the northern mills; it joined forces with the Cotton
Manufacturer's Association, representing mostly southern mills to form
the American Cotton Manufacturer's Institute (ACMI). 4 03  ACMI
changed its name in 1962 to the American Textile Manufacturer's Insti-
tute (ATMI) to recognize the reality of competing synthetic fabrics par-
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http://textilestand.blogspot.com/2013/03/textile-organizations.html.
403. D. CLAYTON BROWN, KING COTTON IN MODERN AMERICA 291 (2011).
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ticularly from foreign markets.404 The new organization worked to pro-
tect the American industry from foreign competitors, but it appears that
these efforts were generally unsuccessful.405
On April 1, 2013, the ATMI merged with two other trade associa-
tions from other parts of the textile industry to form the NCTO.406 The
NCTO is small, with a little less than $2 million in revenue. It describes
its current mission as being the representative of the textile industry.407
"From fibers to finished products, from machinery manufacturers to
power suppliers, NCTO is the voice of the U.S. textile industry," and
seeks "to advance the interests of the U.S. textile sector" on an interna-
tional stage.408
This history of CTI shows at once the challenges of forming and
maintaining a trade association, but also the incipient nature of such as-
sociations as a result of the availability of readily identifiable players, the
resources to organize, and a strong identification of goals. War efforts
tend to make the U.S. government feel dependent upon such organiza-
tions; this dependency provides trade associations extra force in their
organizing effort. The government will provide assistance to ensure these
organizations are able to form. The cotton trade associations were able to
regularly organize well over a majority of the industry and had particu-
larly easy success on the issue of organizing to speak for the industry in
front of government. Interestingly in comparison to the NFIB, the Cotton
Textile Institute mounted a strong effort against anti-trust policy, while
the NFIB, expressly created for small businessmen, pushed exactly the
other way.
C. Professional Associations
Professional associations represent groups such as lawyers, doctors,
scientists, architects, historians, engineers, and the specialty groups asso-
ciated with such professions.409 In general, the professions require a cer-
tain prescribed course of education that the association establishes; pro-
fessional associations typically require a college degree.4 10 Like business
leagues in general, professional associations come in the form of peak
associations as well as regional and specialty associations.
404. Id. at 295.
405. See PIETRA RIVOLI, THE TRAVELS OF A T-SHIRT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 145-47 (2d
ed. 2009).
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This section examines the American Medical Association (AMA). It
is one of the oldest professional associations in the United States and has
managed to amass a large percentage of the doctors of the United States
into its membership. Approximately 15% of all doctors belonged to the
AMA in 2011, down from 75% in the early 1950s.4 1 It has been studied
from many different angles, especially in Paul Starr's, The Social Trans-
formation ofAmerican Medicine.412 The AMA states that its mission is to
"promote the art and science of medicine and the betterment of public
health."4 13
1. American Medical Association
State-based medical societies began forming in the late 1700s con-
temporaneously with the formation of medical schools.414 State societies
worked to elevate their profession by instituting licensing mechanisms
and required education.415 Nathan Smith Davis, a leader in the New York
Medical Society, helped organize the AMA in 1847.416
The New York Medical Society felt the need for a national organi-
zation because it was considering adopting new standards to apply to
New York medical schools.417 The New York medical schools feared
that if national standards were not raised, their new standards would be
for naught.418 If New York were to put more stringent standards on its
students, but the rest of the country's medical societies failed to act in
this way, it was believed that students would largely leave the New York
medical education institutions.419 To further this motivation, in its first
acts, the AMA established standards for medical education and drafted a
medical code of ethics.4 20 In 1849 the AMA established a board to "ana-
lyze quack remedies" and to educate the public about such matters.421 It
founded the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1883, which
411. Roger Collier, American Medical Association Membership Woes Continue, 183
CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J., no. 1, 2011, at E713, available at
http://www.cmaj.ca/content/183/11 /E713.full.
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(1961).
415. Id.
416. See Our Founder, Nathan Smith Davis, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-
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for a long time was the AMA's chief moneymaker and perhaps chief
reason for joining the AMA. 422
The founders of medical societies in the nineteenth century were
neither the elite doctors, who had nothing to fear from "quacks," nor the
hacks at the very bottom of the medical profession, who rightly feared no
longer being able to practice their craft, but those folks in the middle who
wanted to establish some distinction between themselves and the quacks
and the hacks.423 Starr notes that while the AMA was successful in or-
ganizing, the AMA was generally unsuccessful in its first half century in
its primary goal of implementing a licensing regime to exclude certain
424
physicians from entry into the profession. Because the AMA was not
successful during this period in enacting these licensing schemes, it was
difficult to achieve significant membership.4 25 Additionally, the members
of the medical profession did not need capital or hospitals to practice
their craft so there were not significant pressure points the AMA could
use to force membership.426
As in the case of cotton interests, the AMA began achieving organ-
izing success at the turn of the twentieth century. By 1900, while the
AMA had persuaded states to adopt licensing regimes, it still only had
8,000 members, which amounted to about 8% of all doctors at that
427
time. By contrast, 33,000 doctors belonged to the state medical socie-
ties and another 77,000 belonged to no society.4 28
The AMA modified its membership and organizational structure at
the turn of the century from a member-driven organization to one con-
trolled by the state medical societies. In 1901, the AMA adopted new
rules creating its house of delegates that still exists today.429 The state
medical societies elect representatives to serve on this policy making
body of the AMA. 4 30 The move from direct democracy to representative
democracy allowed the state societies to exercise greater control of the
national organization.4 31 This change was tremendously effective for
both the state societies and the AMA. State societies experienced huge
increases in membership from 1902 to 1904.432
With these significant successes in hand, the AMA turned to medi-
cal education. The doctors of the AMA still believed there were too
422. GARCEAU, supra note 417, at 16.
423. STARR, supra note 415, at 90.
424. Id. at 91.
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many doctors.43 3 While medical education became more rigorous in the
late nineteenth century,4 34 medical schools continued to form and the
number of doctors practicing medicine increased at a rate faster than the
AMA desired.435 The AMA directly attacked this problem by reducing
the number of medical schools. In 1904, the AMA created a Council on
Medical Education which immediately imposed more rigorous require-
ments on medical schools.43 6 The AMA required that to enter medical
school, a student needed four years of high school.437 Further, to graduate
from medical school, a medical student needed four years of medical
education and was required to pass a licensing test.4 38 Finally, the AMA
began to inspect medical schools to ensure accord with these new re-
quirements.439
The changes altered the economics of medical education. The num-
ber of medical schools decreased from 162 to 131 in four years (i.e., by
1910) and decreased to 95 by 1915.440 Most fundamentally though, the
AMA made a cultural change in who trained new doctors. Instead of
practicing doctors training new doctors, scientists and researchers took
over this role."' These changes caused a tremendous homogenization in
the social makeup of doctors, and while women had been going to medi-
cal schools, it now pushed them away.442 The new requirements shut
down five of seven medical schools that trained black students.443 Final-
ly, these changes reduced access to doctors in rural and poor areas.44
Closing the ranks of the profession was not the sole goal of the
AMA. It also saw patent drug makers as a competitor as well." 5 By join-
ing forces with muckraking journalists, the AMA managed to significant-
ly alter the drug business to the benefit of doctors.46 After the turn of the
century, with political pressure, the AMA helped to pass the Pure Food
and Drug Act regulating acceptable food and drugs."7 The AMA estab-
lished the Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to test drugs in its own
laboratory to enforce the new law itself." 8 This began a shift in the sale
of drugs in the United States-instead of a drug company selling drugs
433. Id. at 112.
434. Id. at 115.
435. Id. at 12.
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directly to the public, the drug companies began to sell drugs through
physicians.449 "This strategic gatekeeping role permitted the AMA, in
effect, to levy an advertising toll on the producers."4 50
These legislative forays that generated power for the medical pro-
fession over matters related to the medical business were effective for
doctors. Doctor income grew twice as fast as the rest of the economy
from the turn of the century to about 1928.451 Additionally, the social
452status of doctors increased tremendously. Thus unlike the cotton trade
manufacturers, who perhaps had an easier time organizing, the doctors
appear to have achieved greater success in the price stabilization game,
and in fact, in the increasing price game.
Twenty trustees govern the AMA today.453 Its House of Delegates
still acts as its policy making body.454 The delegates come from medical
associations (state or territorial), national medical specialty organiza-
tions, professional interest medical associations, the five federal services,
and several of the AMA's member sections and groups.4 5 5 There are over
500 voting members of the governing body; many other members are
45
allowed to observe twice annually held meetings.456 The AMA also oper-
ates seven councils that develop and share expertise on issues of ethics,
science, and medical education.457
The AMA offers a variety of selective incentives to members, and
also some incentives that appear to have a compulsory nature. It sells
regulatory administrative help, insurance, legal assistance, education, and
458
information. More significantly, it controls an important code called
the Current Procedural Technology code (CPT Code) that determines
how any medical procedure is reimbursed by Medicare, and consequent-
ly other insurers.4 59 The AMA made about 28% of its revenue from the
449. Id. at 132.
450. Id. at 134.
451. Id. at 142.
452. Id. at 143.
453. Biographies of the Members of the AMA Board of Trustees, AM. MED. ASs'N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/about-ama/our-people/board-trustees/our-members.page? (last
visited June 25, 2015).
454. The Delegates, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/about-ama/our-
people/house-delegates/the-delegates.page (last visited June 23, 2015).
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Our People, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-
people.page? (last visited June 23, 2015).
458. AMA Resources, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources.page (last visited June 23, 2015).
459. See Avik Roy, Why the American Medical Association Had 72 Million Reasons to Shrink
Doctors' Pay, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2011/11/28/why-the-american-medical-association-had-
72-million-reasons-to-help-shrink-doctors-pay/; John Weeks, The AMA 's $70-Million Taxation
Without Representation: Is it Time for a "CPT Party" Revolt?, THE INTEGRATOR BLOG (Oct. 20,
2010), http://theintegratorblog.com/index.php?option=com-content&task-view&id=701&Itemid=1.
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CPT code in 2012.460 In order to practice in the health field today, a med-
ical practitioner or medical entity must purchase the rights to this Code.
The AMA makes almost twice as much off its operation of the CPT
Code as it does from membership revenue.46'
According to its 2012 Form 990 the AMA earned almost $250 mil-
462lion in revenue. Approximately $39 million came from membership
463 antefees4. It earned another $56 million from what it refers to as subscrip-
tions and also from items such as credentialing services, educational pro-
grams and graduate medical programs 46 It earned about $10 million
through investment income and another $70 million from royalty income
(the income from the CPT Code).465 The AMA earned another $8 million
from the sale of securities and earned a little over a million from rental of
466sa
property. Finally the sale of inventory brought the AMA $32 million,
while the advertising brought in $19 million.467
AMA revenue exceeded expenses by about $15 million in 2012.468
Its revenues exceeded expenses by $21 million in 2011.469 It reports that
at the end of 2012 it had net assets of $385 million.470 It reported to the
IRS that it spent about $16 million on lobbying.471 According to OpenSe-
crets.org the AMA was one of the largest lobbying spenders in 2013.472
In the 113th Congress, the AMA lobbied on over sixty different bills
including on matters such as the Medicare Patient Empowerment Act of
2013, Protecting Seniors' Access to Medicare Act of 2013, and the
SKILLS Visa Act.4 73
D. Case Study Conclusion
This section demonstrated the idiosyncratic and in part historical na-
ture of different types of business leagues that have formed, but also
Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, Medical Panel Uses Data that Distort Doctors' Pay, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2013, at AO1.
460. See 2012 AMA Form 990, supra note 244, at pt. VIII, 11. 5, 12; see also Roy, supra note
462.
461. See 2012 AMA Form 990, supra note 244, at pt. VIII, 11. 1b, 5.
462. See 2012 AMA Form 990, supra note 244, at pt. VIl, 1. 12.
463. See id at pt. VII1, 1. lb.
464. See id. at pt. VIl, 1. 2.
465. See Roy, supra note 462; Weeks, supra note 462.
466. See 2012 AMA Form 990, supra note 244, at pt. VIIl, 11. 6a, 6c.
467. See id at pt. VIIl, 11. 1Oc, I Ia.
468. See id. at pt. XI, 1. 3.
469. See American Medical Association 2011 Tax Form, I.R.S. Income Tax Form 990, pt. XI,
1. 3, available at http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2011/360/727/2011-360727175-
08d94e94-90.pdf (last visited June 23, 2015) (showing AMA's completed I.R.S. Form 990 for the
2011 tax year).
470. See 2012 AMA Form 990, supra note 244, at pt. XI, 1. 10.
471. See id. at sched. C, pt. Ill-B, I. 2a.
472. Organization Profiles, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/ (last visited June
23, 2015).
473. American Medical Assn. Bills Lobbied, OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/lobby.php?id=D000000068 (last visited June 23, 2015).
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demonstrates the incipient nature of the organizations of well-defined
business interests. Notably, each of the organizations studied is, at heart,
an interest group seeking to influence the governmental process. A
strong anti-market and protectionist flavor imbues both the trade associa-
tions and the professional associations. Some peak organizations, like
the NFIB oppose this big business perspective. Finally, we see the readi-
ly identifiable finite groups that business leagues represent. These busi-
ness interests possess the skilled individuals and well structured organi-
zations that allow business interest to organize efficiently and effectively.
Furthermore, the government often provides support and power to these
organizations and relies on them to support various government interests.
Most importantly perhaps for purposes of this Article each of these
organizations would have formed with or without the subsidy of exemp-
tion. We should thus expect as argued above that the subsidy of exemp-
tion brings more of these organizations into existence leading to some
oversupply of a good or service that is already provided in sufficient
quantity.
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrated that the organizations we exempt from
income tax under § 501(c)(6) are first and foremost interest groups.
Business leagues seek to obtain goods and services from the government
that can be helpful to their membership. Because tax exemption for these
mutual-benefit organizations is a subsidy, we should want to justify this
treatment. The predominant theory of tax exemption holds that tax ex-
emption provides a subsidy to aid the formation of groups that provide
public goods or goods subject to market failure. While business leagues
do provide certain public goods, and some business leagues face a collec-
tive action challenge, these organizations are not subject to the depth of a
collective-action problem as are other groups, such as the poor. Tax ex-
emption for business leagues thus subsidizes many organizations that
need no subsidy, and fails to subsidize a great number of interests, likely
even within the business community itself that under the traditional theo-
ry of tax exemption are presumably deserving of subsidy.
Because the subsidy is not structured to only help those organiza-
tions that truly need the help, we should expect that it leads to an over-
supply of business leagues and the goods and services they provide. As
the review of empirical literature shows, business leagues dominate the
interest group sector. Even if tax exemption only modestly enhances this
bias, it is unclear why we would want to enhance the bias at all. Addi-
tionally, because federal tax exemption is a signal good entitling certain
nonprofit organizations to additional rights and benefits, a removal of tax
exemption could have a greater impact beyond just the subsidy from tax
exemption.
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This Article also assessed three positive cases to be made for ex-
emption for business leagues including that they enhance pluralism, that
they serve an important informational function, and that they serve to
regulate professions and industries for public benefit. The pluralism case
is dismissed on the basis of theoretical and empirical work demonstrating
that business interests already dominate the interest group domain. Be-
cause we have reason to believe the interest group sector is finite, we
have reason to believe the subsidy to business leagues may very well
crowd out other interests that have a harder time organizing. The infor-
mation theory is also dismissed. Again, the evidence is that business in-
terests will largely provide information to legislators in any case, and that
we have no reason to believe that nonprofit organizations will provide
more truthful information. If it could be shown that nonprofit organiza-
tions might provide more truthful information, the case for business
leagues as constructed might become stronger. Finally, the claim that
these organizations help to regulate the industry and should therefore be
exempted on that basis is dismissed for two reasons: (1) the exemption is
built to be much more inclusive than this narrow justification, and (2)
even where these organizations regulate, they regulate primarily as a
means to greater power as an interest group.
The best choice, therefore, is to end tax exemption for business
leagues. Legislators would need to take care to make it clear that busi-
ness associations could not otherwise qualify under § 501(c)(4). On is-
sues of disclosure of donors, it would be best to fight such battles outside
of the Code in order to reduce the amount of attention the IRS needs to
give to issues of politics. Finally, a second best solution would be to im-
pose a net investment income tax on business leagues in order to lessen
the value of this ill-designed subsidy.
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The United States Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby held
that for-profit businesses may claim a statutory right to an exemption
from federal laws that burden their religious expression. The Court os-
tensibly limited the decision to its facts, but more commercial actors like-
ly will seek religious exemptions in the years ahead.
This Article offers a first look at steps government might take if this
occurs. It moves beyond the vigorous debate over whether to grant an
exemption, and explores alternatives that may mitigate third-party bur-
dens imposed by such exemptions when granted. It examines in particu-
lar an "exemption-subject-to-notice" option, under which commercial
actors either would be required to provide notice to adversely affected
third parties or would be subject to government-provided notice of their
noncompliance.
A notice condition on exit from generally applicable laws is not a
problem-free option. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring as a third way
for government to manage the inevitable liberty collisions of a pluralistic
democracy, and it is a superb vehicle for illuminating the relative costs of
emerging regulatory patchworks.
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INTRODUCTION
An intractable feature of liberalism in a plural society is that the lib-
erties of some conflict with the liberties of others. Government mandates
that are designed to protect women's reproductive autonomy trigger reli-
gious-based defiance. Nondiscrimination laws that apply to places of
public accommodation prompt refusal to serve objections. Professional
regulations designed to assure equal access to services give rise to com-
pelled speech and freedom of expressive association claims.
Whether the owners of the craft-store chain Hobby Lobby should be
required to cover birth control without a co-payment under its employer
health plan,' and whether a New Mexico commercial photographer can
be required to photograph a same-sex wedding ceremony,2 were two
recent examples of this clash of liberties. In the first case, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the craft store. In the latter case,
the New Mexico Supreme Court denied the photographer's request for an
exemption and the Court denied certiorari.4
There is no satisfactory to all outcome in such cases.
When the commercial actors prevail, arguments arise about sanc-
tioning private discrimination and imposing costs of religious convic-
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1787 (2014).
3. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
4. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 72, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
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tions on others. To the extent granting new exemptions undermines gov-
ernment regulatory power over commercial actors, doing so also gives
rise to patchwork concerns.
Exemptions also create catch-22s. Granting them to religious actors
and not others smacks of worrisome religious exceptionalism; yet apply-
ing them to every claimant with a liberty-based objection leads to worse
patchwork issues. This concern is especially visible if the religious actors
assert a right to an exemption based on freedom of speech or association
grounds rather than on religious freedom grounds per se, and the reli-
gious actors win. Nothing about speech or association arguments should
make them available only to commercial actors who seek to be excused
from regulation on religious grounds.5
Nor will courts find it easy to second-guess assertions of a substan-
tial burden on religious liberty. The Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
6Stores, Inc., stressed that courts should not be arbiters of the truth or
falsity of religious claims, and should not question sincere assertions that
compliance with government regulations will burden faith.7 Thus, such
claims could proliferate as new religions emerge, religious pluralism
expands, and riffs develop in older religions. Who are courts to deny
assertions about conflicts with one's faith, provided that the claims are
sincerely made?
Greater pressure, inevitably, then will be placed on government to
prove that accommodation of the exemption request is infeasible. The
practical administrative and normative consequences of expanded ex-
emptions may be significant. This is especially true if exemptions are
sought when the commercial entity engages in religious-based action that
imposes harms on third parties, such as depriving them of money, or
denying them services or benefits available to others. Although the Court
in Hobby Lobby stressed that the government could alleviate the third-
party burden of the requested exemption by itself paying for the denied
preventative health benefits, or demanding that third-party insurers do
so,9 not all exemption cases will be susceptible to such allegedly "win-
win" solutions.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 131-32. Preferring religion over non-religion also may
violate neutrality norms of the Establishment Clause, though these are more weakly policed under
modem doctrine. Free Exercise jurisprudence also contains a non-discrimination principle, captured
by the requirement that the lower standard of judicial review applies only to measures that are gen-
eral and neutrally applied. See infra text accompanying notes 113-15.
6. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
7. See id. at 2778. Although Hobby Lobby was based on statutory grounds, the Court has
made similar assertions in constitutional cases. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)
(stating that courts may not inquire into the veracity of religious beliefs).
8. Ballard involved a mail fraud prosecution against the founders of the "I Am" religious
movement. The religious leaders asked people to send in donations in exchange for religious cures
from disease. See 322 U.S. at 79-80.
9. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-82.
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When the religious commercial actors do not prevail, however, they
may cite this as evidence that they are civil rights victims, punished and
stigmatized by laws that are intolerant of, if not affirmatively hostile to,
religious actors. Others may insist that distinctions between for-profit
and not-for-profit businesses are a form of partisan hostility to profit-
making entities.'0 This is the chord that rang the corporations-have-
political-speech-rights bell in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission.1'
I agree courts should be wary of tests that compel them to distin-
guish between "religious" versus "commercial" activity or require them
to evaluate the rationality of religious expression-even in a commercial
context.12 Almost by definition, religious faith is not susceptible to secu-
lar reason scrutiny or analysis-which is no small part of the conundrum
religious autonomy poses for liberal democracy.
I also agree that an economic motive for religious expression or
conduct, by itself should not doom the liberty claim-even though the
more commercial and public any activity becomes, the more government
regulation it typically must and should endure. Likewise, the decision to
conduct business in a corporate form, by itself is an insufficient reason to
deny all basic individual liberties, including freedom of speech. '3
But the invocation of the corporate form should retain significance
in effecting the liberty balance. Adoption of a business organization form
has legal consequences that commercial actors assume knowingly and
voluntarily, and that do not apply to similar actions if engaged in without
the corporate cloak.14
The belief versus conduct distinction also matters. What we think in
public contexts is one thing, whether this springs from economic or non-
economic, religious or non-religious reasons. What we do in the secular
shared space is quite another. An important point about the current de-
bates about exemptions for commercial actors is that the exemptions are
for religious-based conduct, such as refusal to comply with mandates that
require employers to provide specific medical benefits,'5 not for pure
10. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
I1. 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 135-36; see also Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in
Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 887, 889 (2009) ("Although the Supreme Court opinions
demonstrate a willingness to treat apparently commercial activities as falling outside the purview of
the financial immunity accorded to religious activity under taxation and other regulatory schemes,
they tend not to separate out religious from commercial activity per se.").
13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342-43. The centerpiece of Hobby Lobby was whether reli-
gious freedoms likewise apply to for-profit businesses, and if so, what that means for exemptions
based on religious freedom. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
14. For a recent analysis of the intersection of corporate law and constitutional rights that
outlines the many limits on corporate action, see John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First
Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-256675.
15. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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speech or private convictions. Expanding these exemptions poses regula-
tory patchwork concerns that are potentially much graver than granting
exemptions that expand expressive autonomy.
Moreover, liberty-based objections to allegedly coercive govern-
ment regulations more generally have spiked in recent years, and have
led to victories by individuals,16 expressive associations,1 corporations,
and even mighty sovereigns.19 Courts have shifted toward greater sympa-
thy for parties who argue that laws impose unconstitutional burdens,
even in cases that involve conditions on funding-where the alternative
to compliance is to just turn down the money versus direct prohibitions
on conduct.20
This shift, to some, is a long overdue correction of the excesses of
the post-Lochner era of judicially unchecked government regulatory
power.2 1 Yet, it may have long legal legs. Judicial blessing of more liber-
ty-based exemptions, perhaps especially those with a religious patina,
could destabilize considerable doctrinal terra firma.
Some believe the shift is a worthy restoration of deeper liberty
foundations.22 This may well be, in some contexts; but an unthinking
easing of the coercion criterion in service of liberty also can mean a shift
toward liberty and equality losses for others. This paradox ought to be an
up-front part of the liberty calculus in decisions about whether to grant
an exemption.
In this Article, I proceed from four assumptions. First, I assume a
majority of the current Court will continue to be sympathetic to religious
for-profit and not-for-profit businesses' arguments for treatment compa-
rable to private individuals. Hobby Lobby supports this assumption,
though it hardly stands alone.23
16. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2014).
17. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643 (2000); see also ANDREW
KOPPLEMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? xii (2009) (de-
scribing some arguments for the asserted right to exclude as "only slightly modified versions of old,
discredited libertarian objections to the existence of any antidiscrimination law at all").
18. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364-65 ("No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits
on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.").
19. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578, 2608 (2012) (upholding
states' right to reject the "Medicare expansion").
20. See, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321,
2328 (2013).A related and ongoing debate concerns whether religious commercial actors should be
exempted from a planned Executive Order that would prohibit government contractors from discrim-
inating based on sexual orientation. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Erik Eckholm, Faith Groups Seek
Exclusion From Bias Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/faith-
groups-seek-exclusion-from-bias-rule.html.
21. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 5, 199-201 (2004).
22. Arguments for wider accommodation of dissent, including religious dissent, are not exclu-
sive to neo-libertarians: they ring bipartisan bells. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION
13-14 (2012); Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 67-69 (2012).
23. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). Wheaton College, a non-profit college argued that religious
objections to providing coverage for contraception services prevented it from signing a mandated
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Second, I assume more states may be emboldened to expand exist-
ing religious-based rights to include for-profit commercial religious ac-
tors, despite political headwinds.24 Third, I predict a majority of the cur-
rent Court will continue to hold that the Free Exercise Clause rarely
compels the government to excuse for-profit commercial religious actors
from general laws, but also that exemptions rarely are prohibited by the
eroding Establishment Clause.25 In other words, prior cases that construe
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses narrowly will be up-
held. If anything, the Establishment Clause barriers will become even
lower, which will offer government substantial "play in the joints"26 to
accommodate religion if it wishes.
One thing is certain: lawsuits and wider struggles over the conse-
quences of constitutional and statutory exemptions will continue. Hobby
Lobby's holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act applies to
religious individuals acting through a closely-held, for-profit, commer-
cial activity was simply a prelude-though a crucial one-to future cases
and debates.
Finally, I assume courts will protect some of these religious exemp-
tion claims on the independent ground that compliance is a form of com-
pelled affirmation or speech.27 This in turn will would lead to more ex-
emptions for non-religious individual and business entities, insofar as
freedom of expression and association rights are not religion-specific.
All of these projected and actual developments will at first be highly
context-specific. They will depend on the nature of the regulation, the
impact of the business practice on others, the degree to which public
boycotts erupt against the practices, and the extent to which the Court
views the applicable burden on religious or expressive autonomy as un-
government form that would transfer delivery of free contraception, including intrauterine devices
and "morning-after" pills, to others. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, No. 1:13-cv-08910, 2014 WL
2826336, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2014), rev'd 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). Wheaton College believed
that filling out the form impermissibly facilitated abortions. Id. The transfer form had three require-
ments: (1) that the college state that it has a religious objection to some or all of the forms of contra-
ception; (2) that it is non-profit; and (3) that it "holds itself out as [a] religious [organization]." 134
S. Ct. at 2807 (issuing an injunction temporarily exempting the College from that form requirement
over strenuous objection by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg). Cf Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (mem.).
24. See, e.g., H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013) (regarding "religious freedom"
related to marriage); S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (expanding the definition of
"exercise of religion"). Even when ultimately unsuccessful, such legislative steps undermine the
claim that hostility to religious freedom is widespread. See Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom
and "Accommodationist Neutrality": A Non-Neutral Critique, 84 OR. L. Rev. 935, 951-52, 964,
966-67 (2005).
25. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987).
26. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
27. For an example of this argument being used unsuccessfully, see Elane Photography, LLC
v. Willock, 309 P.3d. 53, 68-70 (N.M. 2013).
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reasonable given the availability of other means of mitigating third-party
harms.
I begin on the day after these projected and actual events. What
comes next?
How might government attempt to reconcile the competing inter-
ests? Can it mitigate the third-party and other harms of granting exemp-
tions with means that are less burdensome to religious actors?28
One option is for government itself to fund or provide the denied
service or benefit, or require intermediaries to do so. The Court in Hobby
Lobby endorsed such moves as less restrictive ways of advancing gov-
ernment goals that make third parties whole while lifting burdens on
religious actors.29 The provision of a government-funded or intermedi-
ary-provided alternative would work reasonably well in some contexts,
especially where the most powerful government argument in favor of a
mandate is economic-such as assuring wider access to adequate health
insurance by spreading the cost of insurance. These economic mandates
have gender and other equity reverberations, to be sure; but the principal
goal is to even the access to the economic playing field more generally,
not to promote reproductive or women's rights per se or to impose secu-
lar humanist conformity.30
Nevertheless, a government or third party pays alternative will not
work in many other cases. Government-provided comparable benefits for
those who are denied photographic services for wedding photos, 31em-
32 3
ployment, a room in a bed and breakfast,33 or other goods by observant
commercial actors would be far less feasible or politically acceptable.
Also, government reimbursement of significant costs that otherwise
28. Also likely, in this age of social media, will be stepped-up private efforts to bring notorie-
ty to the underlying regulatory policy issues and to the noncompliance involved.
29. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-80 (2014).
30. But see Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., Doesn't Eat, Doesn't Pray and Doesn't Love, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/1 l/28/opinion/greenhouse-doesnt-eat-doesnt-
pray-and-doesnt-love.html (arguing that resistance to the mandate is less about religion than revisit-
ing culture wars).
31. See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59-60.
32. For examples of pregnancy discrimination in the employment context, see Hamilton v.
Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (1lth Cir. 2012); Dias v. Archdiocese of
Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013). See also Evan
Allen, Gordon College Leader Joins Request for Exemption to Hiring Rule, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4,
2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/03/gordon-college-president-signs-letter-asking-
for-religious-exemption-from-order-banning-anti-gay-
discrimination/79cgrbFOuUg7lxH2rKXOgO/story.html (discussing Gordon College president's
request for an executive order allowing sexual orientation employment discrimination for religious
organizations).
33. Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11-1-3103-12 ECN, 2013 WL 1614105 (Haw.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013) (prohibiting a bed and breakfast from discriminating against a lesbian cou-
ple).
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would fall on religious actors could spike Establishment Clause anxie-
ties, if not successful constitutional objections.34
I propose a partial solution to the competing equity and liberty
claims where other avenues fail: notice of noncompliance. Specifically, I
explore two notice options that government might pursue in response to
requests for exemptions from generally applicable commercial regula-
tions. First, government might require that exempted commercial actors
provide adequate, targeted notice to affected individuals of their devia-
tion from baseline legal requirements, such as nondiscrimination man-
dates. Second, government might provide this notice to the public itself.
The first type of factual disclosure would be treated like other man-
datory disclosures that allow a commercial actor to engage in conduct
but condition that conduct on making factual disclosures or disclaim-
ers-such as the provision of warnings on products manufactured in fa-
cilities that use nuts and seeds, or advise consumers of the nutritional
content of products. For example, prospective Hobby Lobby employees,
as well as its current employees, would be given adequate workplace and
pre-employment notice that Hobby Lobby does not cover birth control
without a co-payment under its health insurance plan. Likewise, potential
clients of a commercial actor who will not provide goods or services that
conflict with her religious convictions might be alerted to this in the ac-
tor's commercial advertisements and in brochures or other materials
about her business available at the commercial establishment.
The second type of notice would be similar to government-
sponsored notice of commercial "best practices" or seals of approval
regarding compliance with government standards, e.g., "FDA approved."
The government would provide consumers with information about com-
pliant businesses and allow compliant businesses to bear an "approved"
message; it would not require that a noncompliant business itself post a
notice of its noncompliance.
To permit private discrimination subject to such notice is hardly a
perfect response to the dueling liberty objections, but it is a familiar legal
35
compromise that courts have upheld in other contexts. It also is a way
to test the provocative argument made decades ago that allowing dis-
34. Establishment Clause challenges to government funding that flows to religious institutions
are increasingly likely to fail, or be dismissed for lack of standing, though litigants continue to bring
them. See, e.g., Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (ruling plain-
tiffs lacked standing to challenge a tax credit program in Arizona that permitted support for scholar-
ships applied to private religious schools); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (reject-
ing Establishment Clause challenge of school voucher program).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
332 [Vol. 92:2
20151 NUTS AND SEEDS: MITIGATING THIRD-PARTY HARMS 333
crimination may actually deter it, if employees, customers, and others
simply vote with their feet in response to these practices.36
Finally, an exemption-conditioned-on-notice approach is a more
calibrated-more "nudge" than bludgeon3 7-response to resistance to
new forms of equal rights (e.g., nondiscrimination mandates that cover
sexual orientation) than is a "no exemptions" response. It is a speed
bump, not a stop sign. This may ease, but not fully vanquish, the "plural-
ism anxiety" that the newer civil rights may produce as they mature.38
Of course, this middle ground feature of a mandatory public notice
remedy also may ease, but not fully vanquish, the discrimination anxiety
that animates the newer mandates. It is sure to trigger its own round of
constitutional and policy objections, which I also outline here.
I conclude the exemption-subject-to-notice option is worthy of seri-
ous consideration, in at least some contexts, if liberty-based exemptions
from generally applicable commercial laws expand. Arguments for and
against a notice option usefully illuminate the enormous doctrinal and
practical complexities of extending individual constitutional rights to
religious commercial actors without substantial adjustments or caveats-
complexities that are relevant to several constitutional contexts.3 9 It is not
an overstatement o describe some modem constitutional developments
as a trend toward deregulation and weakening deference to some gov-
ernment regulatory policy decisions in the socio-economic realm.40 This
36. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 9-12 (1992). But see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop
Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 22, 24-31 (1991). See generally Symposium, Standing
Firm, On Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. I (1994) (debating whether market forces or
governmental regulations are more efficient in decreasing the amount of employment discrimina-
tion).
37. Focusing on private, free market solutions to economic, social, and political issues is often
associated with conservative values, but the approach has bipartisan appeal. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 38 (2013) (arguing that government measures should
preserve freedom of choice, if possible, and suggesting that expanded disclosures are one way to
promote desired behavior without imposing more coercive restrictions on the disfavored activity).
38. For a discussion on "pluralism anxiety," see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751-52 (2011).
39. Compare Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2673 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("The far stricter, specially 'heightened' First Amendment standards that the majority would apply to
this instance of commercial regulation are out of place here."), with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 484 n.3 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court appears to hold that
a compelled subsidy of speech does not implicate the First Amendment if the speech either is ger-
mane to an otherwise permissible regulatory scheme or is nonideological. . . .") (emphasis added).
See also KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 17, at 116 (comparing the libertarianism of Boy Scouts
ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), to that expressed in United States v. EC. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1 (1895)); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 18, 30 (1979) (noting the risk of commercial
speech law reviving Lochner-type judicial review of economic legislation); Robert Post, Transparent
and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in
United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 582-83 (2006).
40. See Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed, The Free Speech Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2012,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/the-free-speech-puzzle/?smid=pl-share (describing
the compelled-speech doctrine as "an arrow in the quiver of First Amendment doctrines available for
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shift might at least be tempered with measures aimed at mitigating its
potential third-party harms.
I. THREE VIGNETTES
To focus an analysis of a notice condition on exemption argument,
three vignettes, drawn from actual refusals to provide commercial or
professional services or benefits, are useful examples. Two involved
religion-based refusals, and one involved a politics-based refusal.
A. No Contraception Coverage
The United States Supreme Court in November of 2013 heard two
cases4 1 that challenged provisions of the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act of 2010 (the ACA) that compelled employers with more
than fifty full-time employees to provide health insurance coverage, and
required that most of the health insurance plans cover FDA-approved
42 4contraceptives. Among other exemptions,4 3 the ACA exempts religious
employers such as churches and their integrated auxiliaries from having
to provide coverage for contraceptives or sterilization.4
In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation v. Secretary of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services,45 Mennonite
Christians were the sole owners of a for-profit corporation and objected
to the ACA mandate on the ground that some of the FDA-approved con-
traceptives may inhibit he implantation of an embryo in the womb, and
therefore are abortifacients.46 They argued the mandate violated their
constitutional right to free exercise of religion and their statutory rights
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).47 In Hobby Lob-
by, two closely held, for-profit corporations, and the Protestant family
the courts to use as tools of deregulation" and noting that the deregulation trend is in tension with
other results that uphold compelled speech by health care professionals regarding abortion). For an
extended discussion of the trend and potential implications for substantive due process and equal
protection, see Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015).
41. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), consolidating on appeal
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc) and Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.
2013).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a), (a)(4) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2014); Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2012).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2014).
45. 724 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2013), revd and remandedsub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
46. Id at 382.
47. Id. at 380.
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members that owned or operated them, challenged the mandate on the
same grounds.48
The court of appeals in Conestoga denied a preliminary injunction
on the ground "for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious
exercise"49 and there is no "pass through" free exercise right of individu-
al owners of a corporation that flows to the corporation.50 It did not de-
cide whether a corporation is a "person" for purposes of RFRA.5 '
In Hobby Lobby, a divided eight-judge en banc panel of the appel-
late court held that the family-owned corporate businesses had demon-
strated a likelihood of success on their claim that their free exercise
rights were substantially burdened, in violation of their statutory rights
under RFRA. 52 In the majority's view, "as a matter of constitutional law,
Free Exercise rights may extend to some for-profit organizations."
In Hobby Lobby the United States Supreme Court reached only the
statutory claim.5 4 In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that Hob-
by Lobby and Conestoga were entitled to claim a federal statutory ex-
emption under RFRA, and the government could not deny the requested
exemption.55 For-profit corporations are "persons" within the meaning of
RFRA that can "exercise religion., 56 The government thus was obliged
to justify what the Court viewed as a substantial burden on the company
owners' sincere religious beliefs and conduct. This burden was not met
because a less restrictive alternative to requiring that the companies pro-
vide coverage for the challenged benefits was available.58 An administra-
tive system was already in place for other exempted employers, under
which third-party intermediaries would offer the benefits with no cost
sharing.59 Also, the Court noted, government itself might have provided
the benefits.60 The third parties would not suffer, and the religious actors'
substantial burden would be lifted. Win-win.
48. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 2013) (en
banc), affdsub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
49. Conestoga Wood Specialties, 724 F.3d at 38 1.
50. Id. at 389; see also Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1211
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that secular corporations were not persons entitled to challenge a burden of
exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
51. Conestoga Wood Specialties, 724 F.3d at 388.
52. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1141.
53. Id. at 1129. This was based on "the logic of Citizens United," which held that freedom of
political speech rights extend to corporations and unions no less than to individuals. Id. at 1135; see
also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a pharmacy had
standing to assert the free exercise rights of its owners).
54. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2769.
57. Id. at 2779.
58. Id. at 2780-82.
59. Id. at 2782.
60. Id. at 2780.
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B. No Wedding Photo Services
Elane Huguenin is a New Mexico-based commercial photographer
who co-owns the Elane Photography studio.61 Under New Mexico law,
her business is a "public accommodation" prohibited from discriminating
on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation.62 The studio "offers wed-
ding photography services to the general public and posts its photographs
on a password-protected website for its customers."63 When Vanessa
Willock contacted the studio via email to inquire about the studio's ser-
vices, she was informed the lead photographer and co-owner would not
photograph a commitment ceremony between two women because the
photographer is "personally opposed to same-sex marriage and will not
photograph any image or event that violates her religious beliefs."64
Willock filed a discrimination complaint against Elane Photography
with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission, which ruled in her
favor.65 The studio appealed to the New Mexico district court, where it
again lost.66 The case was reviewed by the New Mexico Supreme Court,
which affirmed the lower court grant of summary judgment for
Willock. The Court rejected the studio's arguments that it did not dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual orientation because it would have pro-
vided portrait photographs for Willock and her partner, so long as they
did not request photos that would appear to endorse same-sex wed-
d*68dings.
It likewise rejected the studio's claims that enforcement of the New
Mexico Human Rights Act constituted a violation of the studio's free-
dom of speech,69 was an impermissible form of compelled speech,70 and
violated Elane Photography LLC's right to free exercise of religion.7 1 As
to this last point, the Court stated "[i]t is an open question whether Elane
Photography, which is a limited liability company rather than a natural
person, has First Amendment free exercise rights."72 Even if the compa-
ny did possess such rights, however, they were not violated by enforce-
ment of the New Mexico law because it was a valid and neutral law of
general applicability.73
61. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013).
62. Id.; New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (2004).
63. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 58-59.
64. Id at 59-60.
65. Id at 60.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Id. at 61.
69. Id. at 63.
70. Id. at 63-64.
71. Id. at 72-73.
72. Id. at 72.
73. Id. at 73-74.
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The Court also was unpersuaded that "creative and expressive pro-
fessions" such as photography should be entitled to exemption from anti-
discrimination laws, on the ground that these laws may unduly interfere
with their constitutional rights of expression or association.74 In Justice
Bosson's view, the result in the case was "sobering" but the co-owners of
the studio were:
free to think, to say, to believe, as they wish; they may pray to the
God of their choice and follow those commandments in their person-
al lives wherever they lead. The Constitution protects [them] in that
respect and much more. But there is a price ....
In the smaller, more focused world of the marketplace, of com-
merce, of public accommodation, [they] have to channel their con-
duct, not their beliefs, so as to leave space for other Americans who
believe something different.75
The case divided free speech advocates, with the ACLU lining up in
support of Willock while the libertarian Cato Institute sided with the
studio.76 In November of 2013, the studio filed a petition for certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied the peti-
*77tion.
C. No Male Clients in Divorce Actions
The foregoing religious freedom cases can be contrasted with a case
from 1997 in which an attorney refused to represent male clients in di-
vorce actions.78 When a claim was filed against the attorney under the
Massachusetts public accommodation statute, the Hearing Commissioner
ruled that the lawyer could not refuse to represent male clients.79 He did
not reach the question of whether the lawyer had a First Amendment
right to do so.8 0
The lawyer in the case, Judith Nathanson, argued that she should be
able to control her expressive and associational autonomy by refusing to
represent or serve male clients in divorce actions. 8 Her professional
speech was not subject to unlimited government control, and the non-
74. Id. at 71-72 (relying on Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 71-73 (1984), which
rejected a law firm's argument that Title VII should not apply to selection of partners because this
would violate the freedom of association or expression).
75. Id at 79-80.(Bosson, J., concurring).
76. Adam Liptak, Weighing Free Speech in Refusal to Photograph Lesbian Couple's Cere-
mony, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ll/19/us/weighing-free-speech-
in-refusal-to-photograph-ceremony.html.
77. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (mem.).
78. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39, 1997 Mass. Comm. Discrim. LEXIS 12, at *1,
*3 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Feb. 25, 1997) (Walker, Comm'r.).
79. Id. at * 12-14.
80. Id. at *15-16 (concluding that the free speech issue was beyond the scope of the Commis-
sioner's authority).
81 Id.at*12-15.
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discrimination mandate, imposed on places of public accommodation
under Massachusetts law, thus did not trump her individual right to re-
fuse to serve clients where doing so would unduly burden her expressive
and associational autonomy.82
D. A Notice Condition on Exemption?
Can the government in each case grant the requested exemption
without violating the Constitution? Would government action in the first
two examples violate the Establishment Clause? In all three, would gov-
emnment action to permit, but not compel, the private discrimination in
question constitute entanglement with the private conduct sufficient to
make the private discrimination "state action" under applicable constitu-
tional law? These preliminary questions are tied to the question of
whether government must grant the exemptions, as a matter of statutory
or constitutional law.
In Hobby Lobby, the Court resolved the first two questions in favor
of closely-held, for-profit businesses eeking religious-based exemptions
from the ACA mandatory coverage for contraception provision, and nev-
er reached the third.83 But the case left open countless questions about its
scope and future applications in other contexts.
82. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech Rights of
Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 49, 54-56, 58-59, 61-72 (1998) (analyzing First Amendment
arguments and concluding they would justify an attorney's refusal to represent male clients in di-
vorce actions).
83. See Hobby Lobby., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767-68, 2775-76, 2778-82, 2784-85 (holding for-
profit businesses in that context were entitled to exemption from contraception mandate, on grounds
that the mandate violated their religious freedom rights under the RFRA); see also Gilardi v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1215-19, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the
federal health care law mandate that employers provide free coverage for contraception violated
individual religious liberty in a case involving a secular business whose owners had religious objec-
tions to contraception), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014) (mem.).
84. For example, the Court does not explain when a non-closely held corporation might
nevertheless satisfy the statutory criteria or whether incidental burdens on third parties matter. Short-
ly after the decision, the federal government issued new rules that expand accommodations for non-
profit religious organizations and proposed rules to solicit comments on how to expand accommoda-
tions to include for-profit entities. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable
Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51118-19, 51121-23, 51126-27 (proposed Aug. 20, 2014) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 54, 29 C.F.R. § 2590, 45 C.F.R. § 147); see also Women's Preventive Services Coverage
and Non-Profit Religious Organizations, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.htmi (last
visited Nov. 5, 2014) (discussing the proposal to expand accommodations to include closely held
for-profit entities that have a religious objection to covering contraceptives). Nor do we know how to
determine the sincerity of a religious-based request for exemption. Given the consequences of an
exemption for a regulated commercial actor, it also seems likely that government will need to moni-
tor the company to assure continued fidelity to the beliefs that animated the exemption, lest the
rationale disappear while the conduct continues. Yet monitoring may risk entanglement issues. It
also raises a serious concern that by demanding that a religious actor continue to observe religious
principles, as a condition of receiving a government benefit (the exemption), government may cross
the state action line and constitutionalize the ostensibly private actor's conduct. See Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972) (discussing concern about state action where govern-
ment granted a liquor license to a private social club in a private building that discriminated on the
basis of race, and noting that where the government compels a private club to follow its discrimina-
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The focus here is not on resolving these gnarly threshold debates; it
is on whether commercial actors who are granted exemptions from gen-
erally applicable regulations can be compelled to provide notice of the
exemption.
For example, might government demand the employers who offer
employee health insurance coverage, but deny it for contraception, so
advise an applicant as part of recruitment and hiring procedures? Might it
also provide this notice-visibly and boldly-in employee benefits pack-
age documents, and any annual renewal of benefits? Might government
also require the employer to post notice of this departure in the work-
place alongside other mandatory workplace notices?
In the case of the commercial photographer, might government re-
quire her to accompany any advertisements for wedding or engagement
photography services with notice of her refusal to offer her services to
same-sex partners? May the attorney be required to accompany any ad-
vertisement of her services with notice of her refusal to represent male
clients in divorce proceedings? May both be obliged to post notice of this
refusal in their respective offices or on the public door to the office? If
not, why not?
Even when the Court declares the applicable standard for measuring
government regulatory power that burdens religious liberties in a given
commercial context is elevated or strict scrutiny,85 it is likely to conclude
government can meet the standard in some cases. Again, the more
"commercial" and public the religious activity becomes, and the greater
the third-party costs of that activity become, the greater the government
desire and power to rein in the religious actor become. Regulation of
commercial religious actors thus is not likely to become a "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact"86 zone, unless the Court is prepared to displace
or superintend a vast swath of traditional state and federal business regu-
lations that have not previously been thought to pose serious constitu-
tional or statutory concerns.87
Also, to the extent commercial religious actors rely on free speech
or association, versus religious freedom grounds, nothing would confine
a judicially or legislatively granted exemption request to religious actors.
tory membership rules, the discriminatory action may become "state action"). Perhaps the biggest
question is to what extent the logic of Hobby Lobby, a statutory case, will migrate out to Free Exer-
cise Clause cases. Arguments that it should seem inevitable.
85. An applicable statute that grants the exemption may impose such a higher standard. See
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(3), (5), 2000bb-1(a)-
(b) (2012), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Or the Court may in
some contexts hold that the Constitution imposes this standard. See infra notes 102-08 and accom-
panying text.
86. Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
87. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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On the contrary, to grant statutory or constitutional exemptions solely to
religious actors may violate the subject and viewpoint neutrality princi-
ples of the First Amendment, especially given the current Court's anxiety
about "speaker-identity"-specific speech rules in the commercial con-
text. 8 It also would spike Establishment Clause concerns that could curb
government enthusiasm for statutory exemptions, no matter what stand-
ard of review applies.89
In any event, strict scrutiny is the statutory standard applied to fed-
eral government measures that substantially burden individual or institu-
tional religious freedom. This standard now applies equally to measures
that burden some for-profit, commercial religious actors.90 In the wake of
this determination, the number of religious exemption requests by com-
mercial actors almost certainly will rise-though to an unknown level.
State and local government also may elect to permit more such exemp-
tions, even where the Constitution or more general religious freedom
laws do not demand them. After all, Hobby Lobby was a statutory, not
constitutional, case.91 When these anticipated new exemptions for reli-
gious commercial actors are upheld, legal and social counter-moves sure-
ly follow, given the importance of many of the relevant government
mandates and the political salience of the underlying debate about corpo-
rate religious and speech rights.
II. TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES?
Mandatory disclosures by commercial actors are fairly routine re-
92quirements. In a recent analysis of the debate over mandatory graphic
tobacco warnings, Nathan Cortez offers the following examples:
[C]orporations have to disclose mountains of financial information.
Publicly traded firms must disclose any information "material" to in-
vestors. New vehicles must disclose their gas mileage and safety rat-
ings. Products containing certain poisonous chemicals must be la-
beled as poisonous. Food labels must include the food's ingredients
and nutritional content, including unflattering things like total fat,
cholesterol, and sodium. Drug labels must include the most salient
health risks, which also tend to be unflattering . . . . Hazardous mate-
88. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664-65, 2667-68, 2672 (2011).
89. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
90. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2761 (2014) (applying
strict scrutiny to the Affordable Care Act under a RFRA challenge).
91. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
92. For example, the Federal Trade Commission may require companies to modify privacy
policies to disclose to consumers that they are collecting personal data or correct deceptive adver-
tisements. See United States v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, No. 08 Civ. 10730 (LAK), slip op. at 1-3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (consent decree), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823071/0812llconsentp0823071.pdf; see also Michael J. Pelgro,
The Authority of the Federal Trade Commission to Order Corrective Advertising, 19 B.C. L. REV.
899, 924-26 (1978) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission's authority to compel affirmative
disclosure).
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rials must be labeled as such and specify their risks. Home appliances
must disclose how much energy they consume. Toy packaging must
recommend an appropriate age for use. Pesticides must list their in-
gredients and include instructions on how to use them properly. Res-
taurant chains will soon have to disclose the calories in their menu
offerings, which could be a frightening prospect to some. Health
warnings have been required for decades on alcohol products and, of
course, tobacco products.93
In addition to ubiquitous health and safety-type mandatory disclosures,
are the mandatory workplace postings designed to alert employees of
their rights under federal and state safety, wage, and non-discrimination
laws. These postings not only advise employees of their rights, but also
direct them to information about filing charges against an unlawfully
noncompliant employer.94
Mandatory disclosure of information relevant to employees of a
lawfully noncompliant commercial actor arguably would impose no
greater burden than these customary Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission postings or the health and safety notices affixed to many
products. Mandatory notices about exemptions also almost certainly
would impose a lesser burden on the noncompliant parties than would
mandatory compliance with the applicable laws.
The granting of a religious exemption only would occur in response
to the commercial actor's decision to invoke it in order to undertake spe-
cific actions that depart from general laws. The exemption would be de-
signed to relieve the direct burdens of good faith, conscientious noncom-
pliance with the government mandate itself. Thus, an exemption is not
best understood as an effort to protect a private religious act from the
burdens of government disclosure of the expressive or privacy dimen-
sions of that religious conduct. At some point, the noncompliant com-
93. Nathan Cortez, Do Graphic Tobacco Warnings Violate the First Amendment?, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 1467, 1496-97 (2013) (footnotes omitted); see also ARCHON FUNG, MARY
GRAHAM & DAVID WElL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY
2-6 (2007) (providing examples where the government required mandatory disclosures in areas such
as the car industry, manufacturing industry, hospitals, schools, and banks); Jennifer M. Keighley,
Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 539, 563-64 (2012) (providing additional examples of mandatory disclosures by com-
mercial actors such as disclosures regarding packaged food, hazardous substances, pesticides, alco-
holic beverages, and children's toys).
94. See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, "EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY IS THE LAW" POSTER (2009), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/upload/poster screenreader optimized.pdf (EEO mandatory
posting that directs employees to www.eeoc.gov). Cf Accommodation in Connection with Coverage
of Preventive Health Services, 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(d) (2012) (providing model language to
satisfy disclosure requirements under the Patient Protection and ACA); Coverage of Preventive
Health Services, 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(d) (2013) (requiring insurance companies to inform
female employees and students that those companies will be covering contraceptive costs for a non-
profit entity that has received an exemption to the ACA mandate); Preservation of Right to Maintain
Existing Coverage (Temporary), 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.9815-1251T(a)(2)(ii) (2010) (providing model
language to satisfy disclosure requirements under the ACA).
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mercial actor would have to disclose to the customer or employee the
fact of its noncompliance, by refusing to offer the benefit or service that
the law requires. The much-ballyhooed argument that filling out a gov-
ernment form and mailing it to others-who will pick up the compliance
burden for the religious actor-constitutes complicity with evil is beside
the point to the proposed notice mandate.9 5 Indeed, lawyers that advise
religious entities might be wise to counsel their clients to disclose their
noncompliance decisions without being required to do so, in order to
later defend a claim that their sincere religious convictions prevent them
from complying with the applicable law.
The proposed notice requirement would move up in time and space
the inevitable disclosure, in order to mitigate the harms of the noncom-
pliance to potentially affected third parties. In this way, the proposed
notice requirement is actually less burdensome than food labels or EEO
regulations, which involve disclosures the commercial actors might not
make at all, were they not required to do so.
Disclosure also would enable potential employees and customers to
vote with their feet on the basis of truthful and non-misleading infor-
mation that may be relevant to their employment and economic deci-
sions.96 Like the "contains nuts and seeds" warning signs on a food prod-
uct, the disclosure would allow individuals to avoid potential harms-
economic, dignity, health-that the commercial activity may cause them,
even if the commercial activity is lawful.
Disclosure might also be analogized to informed consent laws in the
medical arena, which have become especially controversial in the context
of abortion-related services.97 These cases underscore that a consumer of
medical care is entitled to make informed choices, and a demand that
doctors provide them with state-mandated information is permissible as
long as that information is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the
patient's decisions. If such a demand can be made of medical profession-
als without violating their independent professional autonomy or invad-
95. See cases cited supra note 23.
96. ILYA SoMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT Is SMARTER 119-54 (2013) (discussing foot voting's potential shortcomings and
relative advantages over ballot voting).
97. See Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 251 (2d Cir. 2014) (up-
holding in part, and striking down in part, compelled disclosures by pregnancy services providers);
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(upholding a South Dakota law which mandated that doctors recite an "increased risk" script to
women seeking abortions in order to apprise them of certain evidence suggesting a correlation be-
tween abortion and suicide ideation for some women); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587,
609-10 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (striking down North Carolina law that required doctors to perform an
ultrasound, display the images to the patient, and describe them to her); see also Greater Bait. Ctr.
for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 721 F.3d 264, 287-88 (4th Cir.
2013) (en banc) (holding strict scrutiny may not be an appropriate standard for Baltimore ordinance
requiring so-called "limited-service pregnancy centers" to disclose that they do not provide abortion
and contraceptive services).
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ing the doctor-patient relationship, then asking other commercial actors
to provide factual notice of an exemption from health insurance benefit
laws also should be permissible.
Finally, and importantly, if exemptions are granted for commercial
actors that have no other visible signs of their religious commitments-
the name Hobby Lobby, for example, signals no religious affiliation in
the way the name Little Sisters of the Poor plainly does9 8-then the no-
tice requirement seems all the more crucial to alerting employees and
potential customers they may be refused benefits or service on religious
grounds. It may also assist them in distinguishing accurately among reli-
gious commercial actors, not all of whom may opt for an exemption, and
in clarifying the scope of the exemption being invoked. In the case of
Elane Photography, the refusal to serve was narrowly confined to photo-
graphic services of weddings or other images that represented same-sex
commitments and relationships, not o photographing gays or lesbians in
other contexts or settings.99
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY DISCLOSURES
The religious businesses, of course, are likely to respond to an ex-
emption conditioned on mandatory disclosure with arguments that the
mandatory disclosure itself constitutes an impermissible burden on their
religious autonomy and is an impermissible form of compelled speech.
Simply because government-mandated disclosures are commonplace
does not mean these demands are constitutional, especially if they are not
aimed at consumer deception or fraud.100 That is, religious commercial
actors could challenge the notice r quirements on the same grounds they
have challenged the regulations themselves, with a compelled speech
kicker.
Non-religious commercial actors then could add their liberty objec-
tions to the mix, which should be especially forceful if the government
98. Though Hobby Lobby stores do close on Sundays, play religious music, and offer free
spiritual counseling to employees. See Adam Liptak, Court Confronts Religious Rights of Corpora-
tions, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/1 1/25/us/court-confronts-
religious-rights-of-corporations.html; Cf Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2806 (2014)
(mem.) (enjoining enforcement of ACA regulations requiring non-profit religious organizations to
file a form and send copies to health insurance issuers or third-party administrators, which would
trigger the third party's obligation under the ACA to provide the contraception overage without cost-
sharing), modifying, No. 1:13-cv-08910, 2014 WL 2826336 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2014); Little Sisters
of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2013) (mem.) (granting temporary
injunction in response to challenge of regulations requiring religious organizations to sign a certifi-
cation allowing insurance companies to provide contraception coverage, even though they need not
provide the coverage themselves under federal law, where the third-party administrator was a
"church plan" with no legal obligation to provide contraception services), modifying, 6 F. Supp. 3d
1225 (D. Colo. 2013).
99. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013).
100. Keighley, supra note 93, at 565-66 (discussing the importance of deception as a justifica-
tion for compelled commercial speech but arguing it is not the only legitimate basis for lower scruti-
ny of such demands).
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were to give religious-based refusals to serve or provide benefits greater
protection than non-religious based refusals.'01
Insofar as these objections to notice requirements would be based
on constitutional, versus statutory claims, they would proceed as de-
scribed in the following sections.
A. Free Exercise ofReligion Objections
Religious commercial actors could claim mandatory disclosures of
the decision to seek a religious exemption from otherwise applicable
government regulations constitute a constitutionally unlawful burden on
their free exercise of religion. Even if the exemption itself is not constitu-
tionally required as a matter of religious freedom,102 mandatory notice of
an exemption cannot be the price of pursuing one. The greater power-to
deny the exemption altogether-does not include the arguably lesser
power of granting it subject to a disclosure requirement. This arguably
would be an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of its statutory, if
not constitutional, rights.
Free exercise claims must satisfy Employment Division v. Smith,10'
in which the Court held exemptions from generally applicable valid and
neutral laws are not required simply because they impose burdens on
religious actors.'1 If the government is free to regulate the conduct itself,
then Smith holds religious objections are not sufficient to overcome the
government interest in enforcing the regulation as long as the measure is
reasonable.05 Cases that impose a higher standard either involve "hy-
brid" constitutional claims-such as free exercise coupled with freedom
101. They also may have a colorable but increasingly difficult to mount Establishment Clause
argument. See infra note 112; see also Massaro, supra note 24, at 964-66 (discussing the lowering
of Establishment Clause barriers to accommodation). Basically, they would argue that a carve-out of
religion-inflected refusals from a mandatory notice condition on exemptions would be an impermis-
sible form of religious preferentialism, rather than merely an effort to accommodate religious free-
dom. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1987).
102. Whether it is unconstitutional to require a religious commercial actor to comply with a
generally applicable law that is neutral in its application is its own complex question under Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79, 881-82 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(bb)-(bb)(4), as stated in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760-62 (2014). For one thing, the Court has not fully clarified
when laws satisfy the "general and neutral" requirements. For a discussion of the scope and content
of these demands, see Brief for Appellees at 43-45, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius,
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1144), 2013 WL 1752562, at *43-45, rev'dsub nom. Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Brief of Appellants at 38-44, Conestoga Wood
Specialties, 724 F.3d 377 (No. 13-1144), 2013 WL 1193682, at *38-44; see also Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579-80, 604 (1983) (upholding I.R.S. power to deny tax-exempt status
to a private Christian university that espoused the belief that the Bible prohibited interracial dating
and marriage, and denied admission to African-Americans); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179
(1976) (prohibiting racial exclusion from private schools). Moreover, if the administrative scheme
allows for some exemptions, it may fit within the Smith rule.
103. 494 U.S. 872.
104. Id. at 878-79.
105. Id. at 879.
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of speech or parental rights'0 6-or involve administrative schemes, such
as unemployment benefits regulatory measures, that anticipate individu-
alized government assessments of eligibility and grant them on bases
other than religion.107 In Justice Scalia's view, "we cannot afford the
luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious ob-
jector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the
highest order." 08 He then added an important caveat: religious actors
who seek exemptions should pursue the political process, rather than
pursuing judicial action based on constitutional objections.109
In the context analyzed here, the exemption-subject-to-notice pro-
posal assumes the religious exemption has been allowed, either by judi-
cial decree or via democratic processes.'"0 Also, it has been allowed only
after the religious commercial actors sought the excusal; the threshold
decision to do so was theirs and triggered by a desire to be excused from
otherwise applicable laws. Thus, the constitutional question is much nar-
rower than in Smith: what are the free exercise limits on government
power to grant an exemption where it has been requested and granted,
including in cases where no exemption is constitutionally required? Is the
compulsory notice condition itself a free exercise violation under Smith?
The commercial actors may insist it is. First, they would claim a
compulsory notice condition on exemption lifts the case from a rational
basis standard of review to strict scrutiny insofar as it involves both a
free exercise and a compelled speech dimension.
Second, at least some of the laws from which religious commercial
actors may seek exemption may be administrative schemes such as the
ACA,"' which already allow other exemptions. As such, the government
may handle a religion-based request for exemption as easily as it does
these other exemptions.''2
106. Id at 881-82.
107. Id. at 884.
108. Id. at 888.
109. Id. at 890.
110. This is the RFRA claim that was made in Hobby Lobby . Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), affd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In other contexts, the exemption may be granted based on state laws that
grant to religious freedom claims greater protection than the United States Constitution requires, or
ones that are built into a regulatory scheme, as occurs under Title VII. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presid-
ing Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339-40 (1987)
(upholding Title VII exemption for religious employers to discriminate on the basis of religion).
Ill. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780-82 (2014).
112. See Brief for Petitioners at 43-48, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-356), 2014 WL
173487, at *43-48 (arguing that the contraception mandate under the ACA is not generally applica-
ble or neutrally applied, given other exceptions to the mandate for secular businesses). Cf Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-82 (2014) (concluding under RFRA, that other exemptions indicated that
failure to provide a similar exemption for two for-profit, closely held corporations was not the least
restrictive alternative).
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A third, but ultimately non-persuasive, argument would be that the
exemption condition is a non-neutral law, rather than a generally appli-
cable one, because the condition would apply primarily if not solely to
religious commercial actors."1 3
A first response to these arguments is that a notice condition on an
exemption is hardly hostile to religion. If denying the exemptions is con-
stitutionally allowed, because of the importance of the secular interests at
stake and because the laws were written for all similarly situated com-
mercial actors, then government willingness to grant the exemptions
subject to notice is better characterized as exceptionally sensitive gov-
ernment accommodation of conflicting interests than as senseless hostili-
ty to religion. Yet, even if an exemption is constitutionally required for
religious actors only, then granting the exemption subject to the factual
notice still may be a way of reducing the inevitable third-party burdens
of this protection. Moreover, if part of the argument against denying the
exemptions is that some secular actors also receive exemptions, then all
actors-not just religious actors-would be facing the same requirement.
This is why the third argument fails so miserably. The notice re-
quirement is not government singling out of religious actors; it is condi-
tioning exit from the general rules by anyone on giving fair notice of the
exit to potentially affected others. The primary government purpose in
granting a conditional right to exit would be to balance liberty tensions
within a pluralistic order. If the notice burden falls disproportionately on
religious actors, this is because the underlying secular law has dispropor-
tionate but unintended effects on religious commercial actors-not be-
113. The more powerful the claim of targeting of religious actors, the more powerful the claim
that the law not only violates free exercise but also the Establishment Clause. The Court has indicat-
ed that religious-based accommodations that burden third parties can violate the Establishment
Clause. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (involving accommo-
dation of employee Sabbath observance); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 302 (1985) (involving the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage requirement); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (involving employer exemption from payroll taxes). In
comparison, consider the de minimis test for Title VII accommodations. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67, 69 (1986). Yet, it has also been recognized there is "play in the
joints" that allows accommodation without violating the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-14 (2005) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970)); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 334-35; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
723-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971). See
generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contra-
ception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343, 356-59 (2014). But see Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of
Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 47 (2014) (arguing religious exemptions have a secular
purpose); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 698, 711 (1992) (arguing the case-by-case consideration of
exemptions can account for potential third-party harms). The latter claim, though, is decidedly
weaker under current doctrine insofar as the government can justify the regulation on a neutral,
secular ground. See Massaro, supra note 24, at 964-65. They also may supplement he constitutional
claim with statutory claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(bb)(1)(a)-(b) (2012), or state laws that protect free exercise of religion.
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cause the law or the exemption-subject-to-notice option itself was de-
signed to punish them. If the breathing room between the Establishment
Clause prohibition and Free Exercise Clause allows government to grant
exemptions, then it should include this much room to modify them.114
Moreover, an argument that a condition on the exemptions is non-
neutral-even when exemptions are designed to lift burdens on religious
actors in particular-logically invigorates arguments that granting the
exemption in the first place represents unconstitutional religious favorit-
ism. Religious commercial actors should take care in cherry-picking
arguments or fracturing doctrinal logic in ways that favor religious actors
only.
Religious commercial actors also should consider that government
disincentives to granting exemptions may mount, not decline, if govern-
ment is put to an all-or-nothing choice. This is the problem with holding
it against the government that granting some exemptions, but not all,
leads to a retreat from exemptions altogether. Prohibiting the exemption-
subject-to-notice riff may force government to devise other, less efficient
or less generous means of mitigating this harm.
As for the argument that the notice condition makes this a hybrid
case, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, the standard of review anal-
ysis will depend on whether the free speech component to the argument
is a colorable claim." 6 I address that argument in the following section.
Finally, whether an exemption-subject-to-notice option would place
the regulation within the unemployment benefits set of Free Exercise
casesll7 would depend on a particular regulatory context. Government's
decision to grant an exemption in the first place presumably would entail
some administrative mechanism for filing and reviewing an exemption
request. That government should be subject to judicial strict scrutiny of
the exemption eligibility decisions-to police undue burdens on, or im-
permissible discrimination among, applicants-makes sense. This is es-
pecially so if exemptions are allowed for secular as well as religious rea-
SOS118sons.18
A much harder question is whether the part of the administrative
scheme that places a notice condition on all granted exemptions likewise
is subject to judicial strict scrutiny. The best view, I conclude, is "no."
114. See Locke v Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-20 (2004); see also Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006).
115 See Massaro, supra note 24, at 984-97 (discussing problems with "heads we win, tails you
lose" approaches to the religions clauses (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116. The hybrid right theory in Smith is an odd one. If the underlying free speech component is
one that does not trigger strict scrutiny (e.g. because it burdens commercial speech only) then it
seems odd to say that a rational basis free exercise claim, when coupled with an intermediate scruti-
ny free speech claim, somehow adds up to a strict scrutiny hybrid right claim.
117. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
118. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 112, at 32-33.
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The condition would be neutrally and generally applicable to all exempt-
ed actors, religious and non-religious, in order to promote a legitimate
government interest in promoting transparency and mitigating third-party
harms.
But this is debatable. Also, other arguments that the notice condi-
tion may trigger elevated, if not strict, scrutiny deserve respect. The legal
question may boil down in any event to three questions: whether gov-
ernment can show important or compelling reasons for the notice condi-
tion, whether a notice condition directly advances those government in-
terests, and whether there are other, less restrictive, means of achieving
government goals.
B. Freedom of Speech Objections
The free exercise claims outlined above rest in part on whether the
commercial actors can mount a colorable freedom of expression claim,
and whether the freedom of speech claim triggers elevated judicial scru-
tiny. The answer is surprisingly unclear, and involves difficult threshold
questions about how to characterize the mandate.
Is the mandatory notice a form of compelled non-commercial
speech that triggers strict scrutiny? Even if it is non-commercial speech,
is there a lower standard that applies to compelled factual disclosures by
commercial actors? Alternatively, is the mandatory notice a form of
compelled commercial speech? If so, is it subject to a lesser standard of
review under commercial speech case law? Finally, is the requirement
that a regulated business notify employees or customers of their exemp-
tion from a generally applicable regulatory measure best seen as a cus-
tomary limit on commercial activity that triggers mere rational basis
analysis?
1. Compelled Speech Objections
Compelled speech arguments often begin with the arresting-
though misleadingly absolute '9-language from Barnette v. West Vir-
ginia State Board of Educationl20 that states "no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."'21 Commercial actors will emphasize their equivalence to
private individuals, in terms of their freedom of speech liberties, 2 2 and
then characterize a mandatory notice of exemption as speech coerced by
119. See Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 407-15 (2014).
120. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
121. Id. at 642.
122. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (noting that "[fo]r corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes
within it the choice of what not to say" and applying strict scrutiny).
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the state.123 They also will invoke case law that treats the right to speak
and the right to refrain from speaking as "complementary components of
the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind"'l 24 and note that this
principle has not been restricted to matters of belief but also compulsory
utterance of statements of fact.125 To the extent the Court has deemed
expenditure of funds as equivalent to speech,126 the cases that limit gov-
ernment's power to mandate expenditures by commercial actors to pro-
mote the government's message offer support to a compelled speech
objection to mandatory notice requirements.127
Finally, the commercial actors will argue the root of this notice re-
quirement is not a purely factual disclosure comparable to labels that list
the nutritional content of food, but a viewpoint-inflected, controversial
mandate designed to discourage or burden the exercise of the underlying
religious beliefs that prompted the commercial actor to seek the exemp-
tion. As such, they are not about the "flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information."28 Rather, they are about an underlying politi-
cal controversy that pits religious commercial actors against government
orthodoxy as expressed through government regulatory schemes that
demand either compliance or exemption subject to compelled speech,129
both of which are constitutionally objectionable demands. The burden of
disclosure is hardly a minimal one for the religious commercial actor,
and there are two constitutional concerns at stake: the free speech-
centered interest in not compelling private parties to become billboards
for government messages, and the religious freedom-centered interest in
123. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("For at the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a
free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State."). Cf Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2014) (holding that partial-public employees
may refuse to pay union dues based on First Amendment grounds but declining to overrule Abood).
124. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637); see
also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573-74 (1995).
125. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (striking
down a state law that required professional fundraisers to disclose the percentage of charitable con-
tributions that went to the charities themselves).
126. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining that spending mon-
ey in a political campaign is a form of political speech protected by the First Amendment because
"virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of
money").
127. See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 410-11 (2001) (striking down assess-
ments on mushroom handlers that supported generic advertisements that these handlers regarded as
inconsistent with their belief that their mushrooms were superior to other mushrooms); cf Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562-63 (2005) (noting that where speech is the government's
own, it is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny).
128. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976).
129. In this respect, they might invoke similar arguments to those raised by healthcare profes-
sionals who object to the mandatory scripts imposed on doctors in abortion cases. See supra note 95
and accompanying text. Of course, "[t]he line between factual and normative disclosures may seem
somewhat arbitrary: after all, factual disclosures also serve the government's normative agenda."
Keighley, supra note 93, at 570. Also, the Court's apprehension about compelled commercial disclo-
sures reveals that its concerns are not limited to audience-centered information interests. See Post,
supra note 39, at 577.
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making sincere religious conduct as free from government interference
as possible. Surely, the argument would continue, the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses schoolchildren in Barnette would not have felt significantly less
coerced by the mandatory flag salute if they were excused, but required
to wear badges at school indicating they had done so. If protection from
compelled speech is about protecting individuals from a "crisis of con-
science,"'30 then the exemption-subject-to-notice proposal should trigger
the Barnette strict scrutiny test, which is exceedingly difficult to meet.
The aggressiveness of the argument, though, gives one pause. In the
freedom of speech context, religious speakers receive no more or less
protection than other actors who speak from other perspectives. The
great victory for religious freedom advocates in recent decades has been
pushing the "viewpoint neutrality" mandate of free speech cases to in-
clude religion, rather than allowing government to treat religion differ-
ently in contexts where it is allowed to regulate on the basis of subject-
matter versus viewpoint.' 3' A free speech victory for religious actors,
thus, is also a free speech victory for political dissidents, conscientious
objectors, and others who too may find the notice condition offensive or
unduly burdensome. A commercial actor's crisis of religious conscience
should stand on no higher ground than a commercial actor's crisis of
political conscience that might prompt the actor to deny services or bene-
fits.
Moreover, when a government regulation imposes an "undue bur-
den" on a religious actor's freedom of speech, courts should not weigh
the burden as categorically different from the freedom of speech burdens
imposed on other conscientious objectors.132 Some of the more creative
arguments currently being made by advocates about what constitutes a
substantial burden on religion seem to ignore this internal symmetry
point and its far-reaching implications.133 Government respect for reli-
gious freedom is a legitimate, even compelling, reason for granting an
exemption to religious speakers in some cases; but this should not teeter
130. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997) (concluding that the
compelled subsidy of speech in that case did not engender such a crisis).
131. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993); Massaro, supra
note 24, at 945-49.
132. Within this doctrinal channel, it surely does make sense to require a coherent theory of
burden, even if it may not be sensible across contexts. See infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
133. See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that merely participating in any process may be a substantial burden); see also Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-
Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 318, 336, 340, 359 n.258 (2010) (arguing for ac-
commodation of public employees, when staffing and other conditions permit, to exempt a religious
government employee from having to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple); cf Univ. of
Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d. 547, 558 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that the self-certification form
that asks an objecting organization to provide the name, title, address, and phone number of person
certifying that he or she opposes providing contraceptive coverage was not an undue burden on the
University of Notre Dame's freedom of religion).
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into a form of religious exceptionalism that undermines the neutrality
demands central to freedom of speech.134 A Jehovah's Witness has an
equal, not superior, right to excusal from a mandatory flag salute, even if
she explains that the requirement burdens both her religious freedom and
speech autonomy, and nothing in constitutional law supports a claim that
the former is a categorically heavier imposition on individual liberty than
is the latter.135
This concern about making invidious distinctions between religious
and non-religious speakers becomes even more critical when the reli-
gious speaker also is engaged in commercial activity. As Bernadette
Meyler has observed, the intersection of religion and commercial activity
puts courts in the uncomfortable position of having to distinguish be-
tween religious proselytizing that involves a monetary exchange and
"commercial speech."1 36
The natural inclination of courts is to side-step inquiries into reli-
gious truth, which may lead to greater deference to religious commercial
actors. As the Court stressed in Hobby Lobby, "it is not for us to say that
[the parties'] religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our
'narrow function . . . in this context is to determine' whether the line
drawn reflects 'an honest conviction."' 37
Yet, as religious commercial actors expand their claims of protected
religious expression to reach more of their for-profit, commercial activi-
ties, collisions with secular interests in commercial speech regulation
will become more visible, prevalent, and harder to avoid.'38 The higher
the standard of judicial review, the greater the disruption of government
policy determinations; and the more deference given to religious com-
mercial actors over non-religious commercial actors, the greater the con-
cerns become about regulatory patchworks and appearance of religious
favoritism.
In any event, a factual notice condition on exemption does not im-
pose the kind of direct and substantial burden a flat prohibition of the
134. Again, religious exceptionalism also may violate the Establishment Clause, according to
doctrine that insists on government neutrality, though the Establishment Clause barrier has been
lowered by recent doctrinal developments. See Massaro, supra note 24, at 956-67.
135. If anything, religious freedom claims may be given less constitutional solicitude when
they rest on religious-inspired conduct rather than on pure expression or expressive conduct. Respect
for religious belief is nigh on absolute; respect for religious conduct is not, per Smith. Emp't Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
136. Meyler, supra note 12, at 898-99. Meyler notes that the "Court will intervene in the
assessment of whether fraud has occurred in the religious sphere only under a very specific and
narrow range of circumstances." Id. at 899.
137. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (alteration in original)
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of nd. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
138. As one court has observed, "the bare fact hat the subject message contains a 'theological'
component is insufficient to transform it into noncommercial speech." Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000). But it does make it more difficult to select the proper
standard of review and to balance the relevant interests.
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religious conduct does. Courts have recognized this difference, even in
the context of core, political speech; mandatory factual disclosure re-
quirements often are given greater judicial deference than other forms of
compelled speech. For example, in the realm of campaign finance regula-
tion commercial actors enjoy robust free speech protection.139 Yet the
Court has treated disclosure laws that require them to make public their
campaign expenditures as consistent with the anti-corruption goals and
constitutionally permissible.140 Despite the right not to disclose one's
identity in some political speech contexts,141 the Court also has upheld
other disclosure requirements where necessary to protect the integrity of
the electoral processes.142 In doing so, it has applied a test that looks less
like strict than intermediate scrutiny-"exacting scrutiny" 43
demanding only that the disclosure requirement bear a "substantial rela-
tion" to a "sufficiently important" government interest, with a caveat for
cases in which the requirement exposes politically vulnerable individuals
or groups to intimidation or harassment.'" The Court has expressly noted
that disclosure is a "less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive
speech regulations" and promotes transparency that assists voters in
making informed decisions.14 5
Where there is a risk of consumer deception, such as in cases that
require peddlers of commercial goods to disclose their identities, the
Court has been even more willing to uphold disclosure regulations under
a lower standard of review.146 Compelled speech on matters of opinion is
treated differently. 147
139. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per curiam).
140. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
141. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 210-11 (1999) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (holding a requirement that initiative-petition circulators wear identification badges
unconstitutional); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995) (holding ban
on distribution of anonymous campaign literature unconstitutional); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 65 (1960) (holding ban on anonymous handbills unconstitutional).
142. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196-99 (2010) (upholding demand that individuals who
sign ballot proposition petitions reveal their identity on facial challenge). See generally Richard
Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed,
19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 985 (2011) (discussing disclosure doctrine in context of politi-
cal campaigns).
143. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
144. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 316 (2010).
146. But see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
163 (2002) (striking down ordinance that prohibited door-to-door advocacy and solicitation before
first registering with the city and receiving a permit, though stressing the extent to which this ordi-
nance applied beyond commercial context and might reach political speech and also constituted a
form of prior restraint).
147. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985) (emphasizing that the disclosure requirement at issue compelled disclosure of "purely
factual and uncontroversial" information about legal services and that the regulated party's interest
in nondisclosure was "minimal"); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559
U.S. 229, 250 (2010) (upholding mandatory disclosure provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act).
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Exemptions subject to a notice caveat would serve the government
interests in mitigating third-party burdens, promoting transparency, and
enabling employees and consumers to make informed decisions in time
to avoid the harshest consequences of the exempted conduct. The exemp-
tions identified here all involve deviations from otherwise generally ap-
plicable regulations. As such, the proposed notice requirements would
alert the relevant members of the public to departures from common
laws, which they would have little reason to foresee until the conse-
quences of the exempted behavior fall directly upon them. Also, and this
is key, other commercial actors are legally required to adhere to the rele-
vant nondiscrimination, health care benefits, or other regulations. Exit
from otherwise unlawful commercial conduct, subject to compelled dis-
closure, is distinguishable from compelled disclosure attached to lawful
commercial conduct.
In the case of health insurance benefits, the information also is quite
technical. Many employees may not fully appreciate the limitations until
they submit reimbursement requests and are denied benefits. They also
may not fully appreciate that coverage for the same benefits is legally
required of other employers who are subject to the mandate, or that
working elsewhere might have contributed to their full compensation
package in a material fashion.
The notion that employees who understand these variations would
not vote "with their feet" is extremely implausible.148 The information is
plainly relevant to employment decisions. Imagine, for example that an
employer did not cover cancer-related therapies under its health insur-
ance policy. An employee with a pre-existing condition, or even one with
a strong family history or identified genetic predisposition to a particular
form of cancer, surely would want up front information about this re-
striction before signing on. Notice provisions would provide employees
with job-related, material economic information at a key point in their
decision-making. Informed choices are a cornerstone of liberty.
2. Commercial Speech?
When the notice requirement proposed here would accompany the
commercial actors' advertisements, it may be subject to a lower standard
of constitutional review under the Court's commercial speech line of
cases. A threshold issue would be whether a mandatory notice fell within
148. EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 61; see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2776-77 (2014) (noting that "[h]ealth insurance is a benefit that employees value" and that not
providing it would place employers at a "competitive disadvantage"). The same is true of consumers
seeking other commercial goods. A telling example of the importance of notice as it relates to how
consumers may want to know in advance in order to plan their affairs is that there still exist gay
travel sites, which are designed to alert LGBT persons how to avoid discrimination, as well as where
to find gay-friendly accommodations. See Steven McElroy, Finding Comfort and Safety as a Gay
Traveler, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/travel/finding-comfort-
and-safety-as-a-gay-traveler.html.
354 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:2
the commercial speech rubric or constituted speech by a commercial
actor. The current test for commercial speech is a fuzzy one-does it
propose a commercial transaction, based on its contextl49-and has been
applied to labels on alcoholic beverages,'5 0 attorney solicitations of busi-
ness,15' trade names,152 and on-site price and other advertisements for
tobacco.'53 The location and context of a mandatory notice requirement,
therefore, would affect the analysis.
If the required notice is deemed to be commercial speech, then the
scope of cases that apply a rational basis test to demand that "purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial information" be included in the commercial
speech would be relevant.154 The rationale of these cases is that a manda-
tory, factual disclosure requirement is a less burdensome alternative to
prohibiting the commercial speech altogether.155 The application of this
reasoning in turn hinges on whether this rational basis test applies solely
to cases in which the mandatory notice is designed to prevent deception,
versus to promote other legitimate government goals. The available case
law on this is fuzzy.156
Finally, it hinges on whether a mandatory notice of exemption is in
fact designed to correct for public deception or confusion, where the rea-
sonable, baseline public expectation would be the generally applicable
law applied to the noncompliant commercial actor.
If the rational basis test is not applicable to such notices, then the in-
termediate scrutiny test of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission of New York'57 likely would apply.'5 8 This oft-
maligned'59 but still applicable60 commercial speech regulation test re-
149. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
150. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995).
151. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
152. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979).
153. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001).
154. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
155. Id. at 651 n.14.
156. See Keighley, supra note 93, at 562-67 (analyzing the relevant cases on compelled com-
mercial speech and concluding cases that limit the rational basis test to mandatory disclosures that
prevent consumer deception are too narrow and should extend to other cases in which the goal is a
more informed public). Indeed, as Keighley points out, if the goal is to prevent deception and the
commercial speech without the notice is fraudulent or misleading, then the speech arguably could be
banned wholly apart from the Court's commercial speech cases. Id. at 557 (noting that "misleading
commercial speech lies outside the First Amendment"). There still would need to be a link to harm
to others, but this likely is satisfied by the alleged deception of consumers. See United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546-47 (2012) (plurality opinion) (discussing the constitutional status of
falsehoods and noting that not all are unprotected speech).
157. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
158. See id. at 566.
159. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 628 (1990); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 452-58 (1971); Rodney
2015] NUTS AND SEEDS: MITIGATING THIRD-PARTY HARMS 355
quires that regulation of truthful and non-misleading commercial speech
about lawful activities directly advance a substantial government interest,
in a manner that is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest."l61
A possible curve ball to this is Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 162in
which the Court applied an "exacting scrutiny" test to commercial speech
regulations designed to prevent pharmacies from selling or disclosing
information about physicians' prescribing habits. 163 The regulation "dis-
favored speech by disfavored speakers" and sought to protect physicians
from factual information provided by pharmaceutical company repre-
sentatives about brand-name drugs.16 Key to this, however, was that the
Court felt the state's justifications for treating the regulated commercial
speakers differently from non-commercial speakers were insufficient. 165
In the exemption-subject-to-notice case, the government would have a
much stronger-likely compelling-reason to demand the notice of only
noncompliant businesses rather than all businesses, as the demand would
cover all similarly situated speakers. The distinction would not hinge on
the commercial actor's status as an economic actor per se, and would not
be selectively applied to them versus other similarly situated speakers
acting without a profit motive.
Thus, the most rigorous scrutiny that likely would apply to the
mandatory notice is intermediate scrutiny, if it is deemed to be commer-
cial speech. Because this demands less of government than the Barnette
strict scrutiny compelled speech test, success under Barnette should as-
sure success under intermediate scrutiny.
Crucial to the government's case under either scenario would be to
characterize the notice requirement as factual and non-ideologically mo-
tivated-a nudge less burdensome than a prohibition-and a carefully
tailored effort to prevent consumer confusion or deception and thereby
promote more informed marketplace choices and transparent government
policy.
Some religious businesses, of course, will argue against this charac-
terization. Key to their success will be to cast the notice mandate as regu-
A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of
Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 777, 780 (1993).
160. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (applying intermediate
scrutiny analysis).
161. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
162. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
163. Id 2668-69.
164. Id. at 2663.
165. Id. at 2670-71.
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lation of non-commercial speech and a form of viewpoint-specific com-
pelled speech that both triggers and flunks strict scrutiny.1 6 6
3. Trade Regulation?
Closely related to the argument for relaxed scrutiny of mandatory
disclosures imposed on commercial actors is the argument that govern-
ment policy decisions about factual disclosures and disclaimers in the
realm of commerce deserve significant deference. The First Amendment
interest in maximizing the flow of information is promoted, not hindered,
by these demands. The burden on the commercial actor's speech is min-
imal, not undue. This is especially true when government clearly has the
baseline power to demand compliance with its standards, yet grants ex-
emptions that are not constitutionally required subject only to this factu-
al, noncompliance notice condition.
The notice requirements at issue here also arguably are less about
the commercial actors' speech than about its commercial conduct-its
refusal to serve customers, to provide benefits, or to otherwise keep the
commerce doors open to all, on equal terms. Nothing prohibits the busi-
nesses from posting workplace signs that register their disapproval of
government policies that constrain their commercial conduct or to other-
wise distance themselves from any attribution of shared purposes or be-
liefs that accompany the conduct.'67
In any event, the proposed notice makes no direct demand they en-
gage in the offensive conduct; it excuses that conduct subject to a more
modest measure that has an expressive, but non-evaluative and non-
pejorative dimension designed to signal the departure from otherwise
applicable laws. And it does so for the purpose of alerting third parties
who will lose the benefits, services, or other protections they are entitled
to under the otherwise applicable government demands. It is notice tai-
lored to mitigating real harms to others who have every reason to expect
the business in question would offer the benefits, services, or other pro-
tections.
In other words, the government interest in demanding the notice is
even stronger than it is in demanding that consumers are alerted to the
presence of nuts and seeds; it is more like letting consumers know they
166. They may rely on arguments made against municipal regulations that require crisis preg-
nancy centers to disclose the nature of their services and make clear that they do not make referrals
for abortion or birth control services. See, e.g., Evergreen Ass'n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233,
249 (2d Cir. 2014); Greater Bait. Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 721 F.3d
264, 287 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
167. Cf Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst'l Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (noting in
a conditional funding case that Congress could have directly demanded that universities provide
access to military recruiters despite their disagreement with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" government
policy that applied to the military at the time, and that universities could take affirmative steps to
distance themselves from the offending government message by posting signs so stating).
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are buying a product that is exempt from applicable government stand-
ards. Absent the up front and timely disclosure, the consumer or employ-
ee has little reason to think or expect the commercial actor will deny
them the benefits or services, until the denial (and thus the full weight of
the harm) occurs.
Finally, any argument that these exemptions impose no real burden
on third parties because government need not provide the protections of
the regulations in the first place is unconvincing. The argument would go
as follows: Government-mandated health benefits and non-
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are not constitutionally
required baselines. If government does not have to make these demands
of commercial actors at all, it surely can make the demands subject to
exemptions.
The problem with this argument is that it is based on a questionable
"bitter with the sweet" theory of burdens and limits on government-
conferred benefits or regulations. The argument also has huge boomer-
ang potential; government may not be constitutionally required to pro-
vide these religious exemptions in the first place, under Free Exercise
case law.168 To credit the baseline argument when government shows
solicitude for third parties' constitutionally insufficient harms, but not
when it shows solicitude for religious commercial actors' constitutionally
insufficient harms smacks of impermissible favoritism.
More fundamentally, the argument ignores the way in which gov-
ernment should have the power to decide, as a policy matter, whether a
third-party burden is significant enough to warrant some form of gov-
ernment redress, even if it is not sufficient to trigger a constitutional
right. The notice proposal described here is not based on an assumption
that notice is constitutionally required, given the third-party burdens at
stake; it is based on an argument that notice is constitutionally allowed as
a means of protecting individuals from the potential harms of the ex-
empted behavior. These are not the same thing, and should not depend on
a unitary theory of burden.169
IV. GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED NOTICE
Constitutional and other concerns about compelling private com-
mercial actors to provide notice of exemptions might prompt government
168. See supra text accompanying notes 102-15. Cf United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261
(1982) ("When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice
[their personal limits] on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be super-
imposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemp-
tion from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on
the employees.").
169. The burden equivalence argument is much more central to arguments that granting an
exemption in the first place violates the Establishment Clause, though this is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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to offer this notice itself. A municipality could, for example, publish a
list of all businesses that comply fully with applicable non-discrimination
mandates. Motivated consumers could consult the lists before seeking
goods or services in that locality and could vote with their feet. Motivat-
ed citizens could use the government-provided notice to create social
media and other shout outs in support of the compliant businesses' prac-
tices. In all of these cases, the information would be factual and non-
misleading information relevant to a commercial transaction.
Noncompliant commercial businesses that objected to government-
sponsored sites, from which their noncompliance could be inferred,
might again launch freedom of religion or speech arguments. But they
would have a more difficult time establishing a burden sufficient to trig-
ger a constitutional violation. They would need to argue that the govern-
ment's actions constitute a form of coercion equivalent to requiring the
commercial actors themselves to disclose their noncompliance to make a
convincing compelled speech problem. This argument would be espe-
cially difficult to make if government listed only fully compliant actors,
versus offered a listing of businesses that sought and received exemp-
tions.
Government's own speech-which such a list would constitute-
arguably poses no free speech problem. 17 Government's use of its own
speech to celebrate, even on viewpoint-specific grounds, private expres-
sion or conduct that comports with its favored viewpoint likely would be
permissible. 171
Arguments that even this government listing of "good businesses"
should constitute a form of government censure of "bad businesses" and
thus violates the noncompliant businesses' constitutional rights, would
parallel the arguments made against the government in compelled notice
cases. Here, the government's posting would constitute the alleged bur-
den on expression, in place of the mandatory publication by the business
itself. If the businesses have a right not to disclose their noncompliance,
versus a right not to be compelled to carry a government imposed mes-
sage per se, then government arguably should not be allowed to out them
either.
170. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (describing a permanent
monument as government speech and thus not subject to First Amendment scrutiny); see also Jo-
hanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (noting that it matters whether the speech
is the government's own, in which case it is "exempt from First Amendment scrutiny"). For a criti-
cism of the apparent breadth of the government speech doctrine, see Massaro, supra note 119, at
401-03.
171. But see Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963) (holding unconstitutional
a law labeling certain expression morally "objectionable" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1987) (discussing whether government can label expression
"propaganda" without violating the First Amendment).
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One can quickly see, however, why courts might be reluctant to
embrace this reasoning. Government often uses its bully pulpit to en-
courage commercial practices that conform to government standards.
Courts would be faced with complex issues about when government bul-
ly pulpits become government billy clubs. Also, government has an ex-
pressive interest in signaling to the public its disassociation from the
message conveyed by a refusal to serve a sub-group of customers or em-
ployees or-at the least-to clarify the basis for its grant of an exemp-
tion.172 The same government interest that underlies the regulatory policy
itself may support the government interest in a notice condition on the
exemption. This, in turn, may promote the public's interest in a more
transparent government. Thus, government listing of fully compliant
businesses may be an effective and constitutional option that imposes a
less restrictive burden on the noncompliant business while furthering
legitimate government ends.
V. POLICY CONCERNS
Even if the notice proposals outlined here are constitutional, none of
them is a perfect remedy and all would need to be considered in context.
For example, many workers will not have the luxury of opting for an
employer that covers contraception fully under its health care plan or
simply avoiding one that does not. They do not want notice of noncom-
pliance departures; they want more uniform compliance.
Notice of the decision to invoke an exemption from general non-
discrimination laws-whether provided by the government or by the
commercial actor itself-also may have multiple untoward or uncontain-
able spillover effects, as is true of any expressive mandate.173 Publicity
could enhance the commercial success of the noncompliant businesses,
on the one hand, or it could inspire negative economic or other reprisals
that are not intended and that might be disproportionally harsh and
crude.174 To some businesses, mandatory notice may smack of a Scarlet
172. Compare this principle with cases that discuss a public employer's right to discipline
employees where their speech damages the image and effectiveness of the employer. See Pappas v.
Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146-48 (2d Cir. 2002).
173. I am against most government measures designed to shame offenders, though the thrust of
the argument is based on measures aimed at individuals versus corporate entities or businesses per
se. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 694, 696 (1997) (discussing spillover effects of shaming and proportionality
concerns).
174. For a discussion of the potential boomerang effects of disclosure in context of political
speech, see Michael D. Gilbert & Benjamin F. Aiken, Disclosure and Corruption, ELECTION L.J.
(forthcoming 2015). For an extremely interesting discussion of the "race" of corporate entities, and
how it may affect business strategies, see Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 2023 (2006).
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Letter punishment1 75 masquerading as fair warning to consumers and
employees.176
In other cases, there may be little way to provide notice that comes
sooner than the commercial actor's refusal to serve and does not pose
serious "shaming" consequences. A same-sex couple that enters Elane
Photography presumably will learn that the business will not photograph
a same-sex marriage ceremony when they seek to engage the business.177
A mandatory notice that would come sooner-a sign on the door or in
the business's web-based or other advertisements-would be more effec-
tive in steering the couple away from the business before making the trip
there, entering the store, and suffering the indignity of a refusal. But it
also is sure to have greater peripheral publicity effects than a face-to-
face, on-site refusal.
Of course, demanding that the business put a sign on the door pro-
duces its own ironies given the civil rights history of businesses that
proudly posted signs that read: "We Reserve the Right to Refuse Service
to Anyone," or worse, "Whites Only." These self-imposed notices were
based on the belief that such refusals too were justified by private liberty,
even religious liberty, interests. Yet for government to require signs may
raise concerns about religious persecution or sectarian boycotts facilitat-
ed by on-site notices that alert customers to the religion of the proprie-
tors.
These are very serious objections to on-site notice requirements.
But the concerns of those who will not be served, who will learn only
after arriving on a Hawaiian island that they will be denied a room previ-
ously reserved at a local bed and breakfast,178 or will not receive certain
health care benefits or other services, are likewise serious matters. And
these are real, not far-fetched or historically distant examples.
I conclude that the constitutional and policy objections are not
weighty enough to rule out context-specific, narrowly tailored and factu-
al disclosure mandates. Disclosure in certain cases can be a less burden-
175. See Massaro, supra note 173, at 694 (arguing against government shaming, in the context
of individual criminal sanctions). Private shaming also can have extensive, potentially merciless
consequences. See JON RONSON, SO YOU'VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED (2015) (discussing social
media shaming and the potentially harsh consequences on shamed persons).
176. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 203 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing possible
harassment of petition signers as basis for upholding right to anonymity); see also NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (discussing the chilling effect of compelled disclo-
sure of names of rank and file members). Of course social media options already exist that allow
private parties to inexpensively and widely out the commercial actor in any event. The request for an
exemption itself is not a wholly secret act, and the refusal to serve or provide benefits to employees
or customers is a non-secret message that the commercial actor itself must deliver to a person subject
to no constitutional constraint against publicizing the refusal.
177. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
178. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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some alternative to denying exemptions altogether, and a means of miti-
gating the third-party and social harms of regulatory patchworks.
The goal and primary effect of the notice mandate, however, must
be patron/employee notification, not commercial actor shaming or isola-
tion. Every effort should be made to assure that the notice requirement is
tied to the potential lack-of-notice harms and that such wider impacts are
contained. Thus, in the case of Elane Photography, the proper notice may
not be a sign on the door, but a disclaimer in any advertisements or bro-
chures that specifically describe the wedding or engagement photography
services. That notice might read: "Elane Photography provides photog-
raphy services for marriages and engagements between one man and one
woman."
All residual spillover or unintended effects of such a mandatory fac-
tual disclosure obviously could not be eliminated: other potential cus-
tomers may see the disclaimer and decide to avoid the photographer or
even decide to steer business there. But these publicity and spillover con-
sequences may occur in any event-whether through social media or
word of mouth, once the business invokes its exemption and refuses to
provide photography services for a same-sex couples' marriage or en-
gagement. This is not a case in which secrecy for religious conduct is
feasible or even allowed. Also, the same-sex couple may be spared the
indignity of entering the business and being denied services, if the notice
is accessible via the website or other commercial advertisements. Finally,
the residual consequences of this more tailored notice requirement may
be a reasonable price to pay for choosing to do business in a plural socie-
ty and being allowed to affirmatively deny service or benefits that other
commercial actors are required by law to offer.
CONCLUSION
In a liberal democratic order, religious freedom matters, as do the
risks of unreasonable government or private interference with religious-
based conduct. This is so even when religious freedom is expressed in
working lives and in public, business practices. Yet neither our Constitu-
tion nor public policy ever has afforded individuals a free pass for reli-
gious conduct, especially when engaged in the commercial arena.
Not all government mandates that burden religious conduct are
equally coercive. Exemption from general rules, subject to factual notice,
is not the same thing as a prohibition of an exemption. A regulatory
nudge is not always a government shove, even when it feels uncomforta-
bly sharp-elbowed.
As modem courts confront invigorated constitutional and statutory
objections to generally applicable laws by religious commercial actors,
they must balance these baseline concerns and should do so cautiously. A
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great deal of regulatory power is at stake, and strict judicial scrutiny of
that regulatory power may not be the best option.
When courts do uphold government power to allow religious-based
exemptions, they should consider seriously allowing government to do so
subject to the notice conditions described here. Moreover, religious ac-
tors should consider these conditions as the less restrictive price of doing
business in a plural world, lest they push government to the more bur-
densome option of denying the exemptions altogether when allowed to
do so. Government now must explore new routes through the pluralism
thicket, and courts should offer them constitutional room for these exper-
iments.
MAR VIN M BRANDT REVOCABLE TRUST V. UNITED STATES:
TURNING A NATIONAL ASSET INTO A PRIVATE GAIN
ABSTRACT
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress
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precedent, the Court held that railroad rights-of-way granted to railroad
companies pursuant to the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875
are easements that will terminate upon abandonment by the railroad
company and revert to the private landowner of the land underlying the
right-of-way.
In light of the significant historical context of these rights-of-way
and the potential repercussions of this conclusion, the Court rendered a
decision that will unjustly turn a national asset into a private benefit for
individual landowners.
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INTRODUCTION
In Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States,' the United
States Supreme Court addressed what happens to the land underneath
railroad tracks when the trains stop running and the railroad company
abandons its rail line, an issue arising from the complex history of rail-
roads in the United States. Throughout the early development of the
United States, the U.S. government granted land to railroad companies
by statute to encourage, facilitate, and subsidize the construction of a
system of railroads.2 Subsequently, the government sold or gave the land
surrounding the railroad tracks to private landowners.3 As the need for
railroads decreased in the early- to mid-twentieth century, railroad com-
panies began to abandon these railways and the underlying lands. This
created an issue regarding who would get the land after the railroad com-
1. 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
2. See generally Darwin P. Roberts, The Legal History of Federally Granted Railroad
Rights-of-Way and the Myth of Congress's "1871 Shif," 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 85 (2011) (providing
a detailed history of federal land grants to railroad companies).
3. See id. at 89-91.
4. See id.
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pany abandoned it: the people who owned the adjacent land or the U.S.
government.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed this question sever-
al times, and in early twentieth century cases, the Court held that the
United States retained an interest in the right-of-way it granted to the
railroads and that the government's interest survived the railroad's aban-
donment.6 Then, in Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States,7 the
Supreme Court changed course and held that the rights-of-way granted
after 1871 were easements that disappeared once the railroad abandoned
them. Since Great Northern, lower courts have rendered varying deci-
sions on the issue.9 The Supreme Court's decision in Brandt Trust has
resolved this confusion.
The Court in Brandt Trust affirmed Great Northern's conclusion
and held that rights-of-way granted to railroad companies under the Gen-
eral Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 were easements.'0 Unfortunate-
ly, the Court relied on precedent and did not conduct a thorough analysis
of the issue. The Court missed an opportunity to re-examine the histori-
cal and jurisprudential underpinnings of Great Northern. This missed
opportunity has the potential to disassemble a rail system that spans the
United States and to subject the government to takings liability for
rights-of-way that have been repurposed for other uses.
This Comment argues that the Brandt Trust Court's unquestioning
acceptance of Great Northern's historical analysis and the Court's frus-
tration with the government for changing its argument after seventy years
prevented the Court from conducting a thorough analysis of the evi-
dence, which resulted in a decision based on incomplete evidence that
could have several negative implications. Part I of this Comment summa-
rizes the history of federal land grants to railroad companies and de-
scribes significant case holdings that preceded Brandt Trust. Part II de-
tails the factual background, the procedural history, and the majority and
dissenting opinions from Brandt Trust. Part III presents the historical
evidence that the Court in Brandt Trust did not consider and shows how
this evidence could have led the Court to a different conclusion. Part III
also discusses the potential effects of this decision.
5. Id.
6. See Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44, 45-47 (1915) (holding that land
grants made pursuant to the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 (the "1875 Act") were
limited fees with an implied condition of reverter in the United States), abrogated by Marvin M.
Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
7. 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
8. Id. at 279.
9. Roberts, supra note 2, at 103. See also infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
10. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2014).
11. See id. at 1272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History ofLand Grants to Railroads
Throughout the development of the United States, the federal gov-
ernment used land grants as a means of financing internal improve-
ments.'2 One of these improvements was a railroad system that spanned
the United States.13 Starting in the 1830s, the United States government
initiated a practice of giving narrow strips of land to states and railroad
companies for the construction of railroads.14 Congress enacted individu-
al statutes for each distribution of land; the statutes granted to the rail-
road company a strip of land that ran across the public lands upon which
a railroad company could construct its roadbed.'5 These strips of land
12. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 341, 345-46 (1968)
("Congress early recognized that public aid for the construction of roads, canals, river improve-
ments, and railroads was necessary to make possible the settlement of the interior lands and that
these internal improvements would increase the demand for the public lands and enhance their
selling price."). The United States was land-rich and cash-poor, so Congress chose to use land to
subsidize the construction of canals and roads instead of financing them with cash;
[States] were planning internal improvements and were pleading for Federal aid in the
form of alternate sections of land.. . . Congress having established the principle, at least
for the time, that interstate canals and roads were fit projects for Federal appropriations,
one might expect it to have made money grants for these interior states but, with an
abundance of fertile land available, it seemed easier to use that.
Id. at 345.
Congress also decided not to build and operate the improvements itself despite
pressure for the United States to become the owner and operator of internal improve-
ments. Congress, however, chose to subsidize rather than to own. . . . Sectional rivalry
between the States, disagreement over the constitutional role of the federal government
regarding internal improvements and the effect such a federal role would have upon
State's [sic] rights made subsidies the only acceptable alternative.
THOMAS E. ROOT, RAILROAD LAND GRANTS FROM CANALS TO TRANSCONTINENTALS 12 (1987).
13. See GATES, supra note 12, at 350, 356-57.
14. Id. at 345, 350, 352, 357, 368 ("Congress had been granting railroads rights-of-way
through the public lands since 1835-the width ranged from 60 to 100 feet-and in 1852 it adopted
a general law giving 100-foot rights of way and authorizing companies to use earth, stone, and
timber from adjacent public lands and to have additional lands for depots and water tanks."); Rob-
erts, supra note 2, at 88-89, 110. The railroad companies also obtained rights-of-way through pur-
chase from private landowners and through powers of eminent domain, PAMELA BALDWIN &
AARON M. FLYNN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32140, FEDERAL RAILROAD RIGHTS OF WAY,
Summary (2006), available at http://atfiles.org/files/pdf/Federal-Rights-of-Way-CRS2006.pdf, but
the federally-granted rights-of-way are the subject of this Comment.
15. GATES, supra note 12, at 357, 368; Roberts, supra note 2, at 108-09. The Act of July 2,
1836 provides a good example of what many right-of-way statutes looked like throughout the nine-
teenth century until 1871 when Congress started changing its land-grant practices for railroad con-
struction. Id. at 113. The Act provided:
That there be, and is hereby granted to [the railroad company] . . . the right of way
through such portion of the public lands as remain unsold, Provided, That the portion of
the public lands occupied therefor, shall not exceed eighty feet in breadth . ...
And be it further enacted, That for such depots, watering places and work-shops as may
be essential to the convenient use of the said road; there shall also be granted to the said
company, such portions of the public land .. .on either side of the road ....
And be it further enacted, That so long as the public lands in the vicinity of the said road
shall remain unsold, the said company shall have power to take therefrom, such materials
of earth, stone, or wood, as may be necessary for the construction of the said road . . ..
Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 255, 5 Stat. 65.
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were called rights-of-way.16 This practice gained momentum in the
1860s as public support for a railroad extending to the Pacific Ocean
grew, and Congress wanted to facilitate the construction of a transconti-
nental railroad and encourage development of the West.'7
In 1850, Congress started granting land subsidies to railroad com-
panies as an additional method of financing railroad construction." The-
se subsidies were large tracts of land, which consisted of "alternate sec-
tions" of land on either side of the right-of-way forming a "'checker-
board' land grant pattern" 9 that the railroad company could develop or
sell to finance construction of the railroad.20 Between 1850 and 1871,
Congress granted over forty-five million acres of land to states and rail-
road companies to finance the railroads.21
Railroad companies were slow to sell these land subsidies, and this
interfered with settlers' abilities to obtain their own land; by the late
1860s, the public strongly resented these land subsidies.22 Succumbing to
16. Roberts, supra note 2, at 88-89, 110 (discussing the development of the actual language
granting the right-of-way beginning with the earliest right-of-way statutes). "The term 'right of way'
has two distinct meanings. In law it is synonymous with 'easement'-a legal concept. But it is often
used in railroad parlance and in lay speech to refer to the actual physical layout of the railroad-its
grade, roadbed, and tracks." Philip A. Danielson, Comment, The Real Property Interest CreatedIn a
Railroad Upon Acquisition of Its "Right of Way," 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 73, 74 (1954). Black's
Law Dictionary confirms that "right-of-way" has more than one meaning and provides three defini-
tions for the term: "1. The right to pass through property owned by another.... 2. The right to build
and operate a railway line or a highway on land belonging to another, or the land so used. . . . 3. The
strip of land subject to a nonowner's right to pass through." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (9th
ed. 2009).
17. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1260-61 (2014);
GATES, supra note 12, at 356 ("By the mid-19th century, . . . the West was demanding railroads,
exhibiting a remarkable confidence in their potential for economic progress."). Because of the Civil
War, the government lacked sufficient cash to fund a transcontinental railroad, so it continued "to
support the project through the now well-established practice of land grant subsidies." Roberts,
supra note 2, at 123-24. For a general description of the typical structure of the statutes granting the
rights-of-way and the land subsidies for these transcontinental railroads, see ROOT, supra note 12, at
23.
18. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1261; GATES, supra note 12, at 357; ROOT, supra note 12, at
13.
19. Roberts, supra note 2, at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1261. Congress began this practice of granting lands that the
railroad company could sell or develop to finance construction, also called grants in aid of construc-
tion, in the 1820s to develop canals and roads. GATES, supra note 12, at 345-50. The initial practice
involved granting "alternate sections of one half of the land within a strip along the line of the pro-
ject and reserving the other half for sale." Id. at 345-46. "There is a fairly straight line of develop-
ment from the first of these canal grants in 1827 to the railroad grants ..... Id at 358.
21. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 287 (1884). This method of financing con-
struction "was equal to a cash advance by the Nation." Id. at 258. In 1880, a survey estimated that it
would require 215,000,000 acres of public land to fulfill the subsidies Congress had granted to
railroad companies if the companies built all of the roadbeds and sold all of the land subsidies that
they received from the granting statutes. Id. at 268.
22. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1261; GATES, supra note 12, at 375-76, 380; Roberts, supra
note 2, at 126-28.
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the increasing pressure to cease giving land grants, Congress granted the
last land subsidy in 1871.23
However, this did not end railroad construction, just the means
that Congress used to subsidize the construction.24 The country still
25needed railroads, so Congress continued to pass individual statutes
granting rights-of-way that were unaccompanied by land subsidies.2 6
This practice became cumbersome,27 so in 1875, Congress passed the
General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 (the "1875 Act"). 28 The
1875 Act included several sections; the first section granted the right-of-
way to the railroad, and the fourth section explained the procedure the
railroad company needed to follow to obtain the right-of-way:
The right of way through the public lands of the United States is
granted to any railroad company . . . to the extent of one hundred feet
on each side of the central line of said road.29
Any railroad company desiring to secure the benefits of . .. this title,
shall, within twelve months after the location of . . . its road . . . file
with the officer . . . of the land office for the district where such land
is located a profile of its road; and upon approval thereof by the Sec-
retary of the Interior the same shall be noted upon the plats in said of-
fice; and thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall
pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way.30
Between 1875 and 1883, Congress made 149 grants to railroad compa-
nies under the 1875 Act.3 '
In the early- to mid-twentieth century, railroad companies began to
cease operation and abandon these rights-of-way.32 As early as 1920,
Congress started passing statutes to regulate abandonment33 and preserve
the rail corridors. These statutes operated to maintain federal jurisdiction
over the rights-of-way until Congress could determine the best use of the
23. Roberts, supra note 2, at 129, 131-32. Congress finally agreed to the cessation of this land
grant policy: "Resolved, That in the judgment of this House the policy of granting subsidies in
public lands to railroads and other corporations ought to be discontinued . . . ." Id. at 132 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1585 (1872)). For a more detailed discussion about the progres-
sion from the lavish land grants in the I 860s to the cessation of this policy, see Roberts, supra note
2, at 126-34.
24. ROOT, supra note 12, at 25.
25. Roberts, supra note 2, at 130, 140.
26. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 273-74 (1942); ROOT, supra note
12, at 25.
27. Roberts, supra note 2, at 142.
28. 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2012).
29. Id. § 934.
30. Id. § 937.
31. DONALDSON, supra note 21, at 769-771, 1263.
32. Roberts, supra note 2, at 89-91, 148.
33. Id. at 148.
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right-of-way.34 If the right-of-way would not be useful as a highway or to
the local municipality, it would pass to the underlying landowner.35
Today, railroad rights-of-way still exist, but most of the land sur-
rounding the rights-of-way belongs to individual landowners.36 As rail-
roads companies continue to abandon their rights-of-way, the question
arises: Who owns the land underlying the abandoned right-of-way, the
United States government or the private owner of the land adjacent to the
right-of-way?37 Answering this question necessarily involves determin-
ing what kind of property interest Congress granted to the railroad.3 8 The
Supreme Court has addressed this question, but has come to varying con-
clusions.39
B. The Railroad Received a Limited Fee
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Townsend,40 homesteaders
claimed title to a portion of a railroad company's right-of-way granted
under an 1864 statute, and the railroad company sought to eject them.
The Court held that the railroad received "a limited fee, made on an im-
plied condition of reverter."42 Congress granted the right-of-way to the
railroad company for the purpose of constructing and operating a rail-
road, and an individual's attempt to acquire that land for private use
could not override that public purpose.43 The Court premised its conclu-
sion on the fact that once a railroad company had filed a map of the loca-
tion of its right-of-way and constructed its railway, that land was "taken
34. Id. at 148-49.
35. Id. at 148.
36. Id. at 89. The government conveyed some of its public lands to homesteaders and to other
subsequent occupants of the land. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1257, 1260 (2014). The railroad rights-of-way burdened the lands that were in the vicinity of those
rights-of-way. Id.
37. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 89-91 (discussing the possible results after a railroad com-
pany abandons its right-of-way); Danaya C. Wright, The Shifting Sands ofProperty Rights, Federal
Railroad Grants, and Economic History: Hash v. United States and the Threat to Rail-Trail Conver-
sions, 38 ENvTL. L. 711, 721-23 (2008) [hereinafter Wright, Shifting Sands].
38. Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking: Can Recreational
Trails Survive the Court's Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence?, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399,
440 (2001) [hereinafter Wright, Railbanking].
39. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 94.
40. 190 U.S. 267 (1903).
41. Id. at 267-69.
42. Id. at 271. The "limited fee" is also referred to as a "defeasible fee." Wright, Shifting
Sands, supra note 37, at 725. "With a defeasible fee, the possibility of reversion remains in the
original grantor and usually passes to his or her heirs rather than to successors in interest of the
adjoining land." Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails,
Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-
First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351, 383 (2000). Black's Law Dictionary defines "fee simple
defeasible" as "[a]n estate that ends .. . because a special limitation, condition subsequent, or execu-
tory limitation takes effect before the line of heirs runs out." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (9th
ed. 2009). A "possibility of reverter" is "a future interest retained by a grantor after conveying a fee
simple determinable, so that the grantee's estate terminates automatically and reverts to the grantor if
the terminating event ever occurs." Id at 1284.
43. Townsend, 190 U.S. at 272.
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out of the category of public lands . . . and the land department was
therefore without authority to convey the rights therein" to another par-
ty.4
The Supreme Court applied this holding to a right-of-way grant
made under the 1875 Act in Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. String-
ham.45 In Stringham, a railroad company appealed a judgment declaring
that the company owned the right-of-way over a mining claim and as-
serted that it owned a fee simple in the land.4 The railroad company
specifically presented "the question respecting the nature of its title" in
that land to the United States Supreme Court.47 Disagreeing with the
railroad company, the Court cited Townsend and characterized the 1875
Act right-of-way as "neither a mere easement, nor a fee simple absolute,
but a limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter" if the com-
pany stopped using the land for the purposes specified in the grant.48
C. The Railroad Received an Easement
In Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
changed its course.4 9 This case arose from a dispute between a railroad
company and the United States to determine the owner of the oil and
mineral rights underneath an 1875 Act right-of-way.50 The government
asserted that the 1875 Act only granted an easement, meaning that the
United States retained ownership of the subsurface rights that the railroad
was trying to exploit.5 1 Agreeing with the government's argument, the
Court held that the railroad did not own the rights to the subsurface oil
and minerals.52 In support of its holding, the Court stated that the rights-
of-way granted under the 1875 Act were easements53 because, in 1871,
Congress stopped granting land subsidies to railroads, and this marked a
"sharp change in Congressional policy with respect to railroad grants."54
The Court based its conclusion predominantly on language in sec-
tion 4 of the 1875 Act, which provided that the land traversed by the
right-of-way would "be disposed of subject to [the] right of way"55 and
asserted that this clause was "wholly inconsistent with the grant of a
44. Id. at 270; see also Charles Melvin Neff, The Possibility of Reverter in Colorado, 18
DICTA 220, 220 (1941).
45. 239 U.S. 44 (1915), abrogated by Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
46. Id. at 45-46.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. Justice Van Devanter, who the Supreme Court characterized as "our foremost expert
on public land law," United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957), wrote the
opinion. Stringham, 239 U.S. at 45.
49. Roberts, supra note 2, at 96.
50. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 270 (1942).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 279.
53. Id. at 271.
54. Id. at 274-75.
55. Id. at 271 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 937 (2012)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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fee." 5 6 The Court dismissed the contradictory holding from Stringham,
finding that the Court in Stringham had been unaware of the policy shift
in 1871 and had based its conclusion on cases concerning statutes grant-
ing rights-of-way enacted prior to 187 1. The Court also explained that
when a grant is ambiguous, it should be "resolved favorably to a sover-
eign grantor-'nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit
language."'58 Because nothing in the 1875 Act purported to convey oil
and mineral rights to the railroad and because subsurface rights were
unnecessary for the construction of a railroad, the Court explained that
the right-of-way conveyed an easement.59
D. Post-Great Northern
Since Great Northern, there has been significant confusion among
lower courts regarding what type of interest the railroad received in post-
1871 right-of-way grants.o Some courts have relied on Great Northern
and held that the railroad received an easement,61 while other courts have
held that the United States retained an interest in the right-of-way.62 Still
other courts have overlooked that issue altogether and considered instead
whether the United States gave away its rights in the land underlying the
right-of-way when it subsequently sold or gave the adjacent land to pri-
vate parties.63
As to the nature of 1875 Act rights-of-way, the decision in Brandt
Trust has resolved this confusion.64 The following Part examines the
Brandt Trust decision in detail.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 279.
58. Id. at 272 (quoting Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 (1919)).
59. Id.
60. Roberts, supra note 2, at 103.
61. E.g., Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Trust v. Bayfield Cnty., 649 F.3d 799, 803-04 (7th Cir.
2011); Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1313-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Beres v. United States, 64
Fed. Cl. 403, 421-24, 426-28 (Fed. Cl. 2005); Home on the Range v. AT&T Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d
999, 1017-19 (D. Ind. 2005); City of Aberdeen v. Chi. & N. W. Transp. Co., 602 F. Supp. 589, 593
(D.S.D. 1984) (concluding that pursuant to Great Northern, the right-of-way granted to the railroad
company was an easement).
62. E.g., Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 31 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 1994) (conclud-
ing that the land conveyance to individuals of the whole tract traversed by the right-of-way did not
also convey the government's interest in the right-of-way); see also Wyoming v. Andrus, 602 F.2d
1379, 1382-83 (10th Cir. 1979); Idaho v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207, 212-13 (D.
Idaho 1985) (holding that the United States retained an interest in railroad rights-of-way granted
before and after 1871 even when the United States had subsequently patented that land away).
63. See, e.g., Hash, 403 F.3d at 1312-13 (explaining that the primary issue for landowners
who obtained their land from the government after the railroad company had obtained its right-of-
way was whether ownership of the land underlying the right-of-way ever left the United States and
thus whether the United States transferred that ownership to the settlers in their Homestead Act
patents).
64. See Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2014).
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II. MARVINM BRANDTREVOCABLE TRUST V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
In 1908, a Wyoming railroad company received a right-of-way un-
der the 1875 Act.65 The company completed construction of its railway
in 1911, but the railroad was unsuccessful and changed owners several
times through the 1900s.66 In 1996, the then-owner decided to abandon
the right-of-way.6 7 The railroad company followed the appropriate pro-
cedure for abandoning a right-of-way and finalized its abandonment in
2004.
Meanwhile, in 1976, the government granted an eighty-three-acre
parcel of land to Melvin and Lulu Brandt.69 The Wyoming railroad com-
pany's railway covered ten acres of this parcel.70 The patent conveying
the land to the Brandt's gave them "fee simple title," but it included sev-
eral provisions that reserved to the United States rights-of-way through
that parcel for specified purposes. The reservation at issue in this case
provided that the land conveyed by the patent was "subject to those
rights for railroad purposes as have been granted to the . . . Railway
,72Company, its successors or assigns." The patent did not address what
would result if the railroad abandoned the right-of-way.73 The future of
the abandoned right-of-way that crossed the Brandts' land was the sub-
ject of this lawsuit.74
B. Procedural History
In 2006, the government brought an action against several landown-
ers who owned land that embraced the abandoned right-of-way.5 The
government's claim sought to declare that the United States, and not the
adjacent landowners, owned the abandoned right-of-way.6 Marvin
Brandt, as trustee, filed a counterclaim asserting that, upon abandonment,
the Brandts took ownership of the portion of the right-of-way that tray-
65. Id. at 1262.
66. Id at 1262-63.
67. Id. at 1263.
68. Id.
69. Id at 1262.
70. Id. The right-of-way only crossed the Brandts' land for a half mile, but it was 200 feet in
width amounting to a ten-acre parcel of land at issue. Id.
71. Id. A "patent" is a "governmental grant of a right, privilege, or authority" or "[t]he official
document" granting that right. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1234 (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, in this
context, the patent the Brandts received was a document "by which the government convey[ed] a
grant of public land to a private person." Id.
72. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1262 (quoting the petition for certiorari) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1263.
75. Id
76. Id. The other landowners either settled with the government or had a default judgment
entered against them, and their potential interest in the abandoned right-of-way was much smaller
than the Brandts'. Id. at 1263 & n.2.
372 [Vol. 92:2
2015] BRANDT TRUST: NATIONAL ASSET TO PRIVATE GAIN 373
ersed their land.77 Brandt contended that the railroad's right-of-way was
an easement "that was extinguished" once the railroad abandoned it, so
the land was now unencumbered by the easement.78 The government
responded that it "retained a reversionary interest" in the right-of-way.
79
The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming ruled
in the government's favor and awarded the title to the right-of-way to the
United States.80 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed that decision, but it acknowledged the existence of a split be-
tween lower courts in determining whether the government had any in-
terest in abandoned rights-of-way granted under the 1875 Act and a disa-
greement as to what the nature of that interest might be.8 1 The Tenth Cir-
cuit court followed its own precedent and held that the United States
"retained an 'implied reversionary interest"' in 1875 Act rights-of-way.82
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "the nature of
the interest the United States conveyed to the [Wyoming Railway Com-
pany] in 1908 pursuant to the 1875 Act."
C. Majority Opinion
In an eight-to-one decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the
Court held that rights-of-way granted by the 1875 Act were easements,
which terminated upon a railroad company's abandonment, unburdening
the underlying land.84 As such, the Brandts had unencumbered ownership
of the full eighty-three-acre parcel.85
The Court relied primarily on Great Northern's conclusion that the
1875 Act granted easements.86 The Court also looked to common law
principles, defining an easement as a "nonposessory right to enter and
use land in the possession of another [that] obligates the possessor not to
interfere with the uses authorized by the easement."87 When "the benefi-
ciary of the easement abandons it, the easement disappears, and the land-
owner resumes his full and unencumbered interest in the land."88 Chief
77. Id. at 1263.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. United States v. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust, No. 06-CV-184-J, 2008 WL
7185272, at *7 (D. Wyo. 2008).
81. United States v. Brandt, 496 F. App'x 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
82. Id. at 824 (citing Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 31 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir.
1994)).
83. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1263-64.
84. Id at 1259, 1265-66.
85. Id
86. See id. at 1264-65.
87. Id at 1265 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2(l) (1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id
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Justice Roberts wrote, "Those basic common law principles resolve this
case."
The Brandt Trust Court emphasized how the Great Northern Court
had fully accepted the government's argument that the policy behind
land grants changed in 1871, so cases determining the nature of rights-of-
way granted under pre-1871 statutes were irrelevant for determining the
property interested granted by the 1875 Act.90 The Court then scolded the
government for its stark change of position from its argument in Great
Northern-that a grant under the 1875 Act was an easement-to its ar-
gument in Brandt Trust-that a grant under the 1875 Act conveyed
"something more than an easement."9' Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "The
Government loses that argument today, in large part because it won when
it argued the opposite before this Court more than 70 years ago."92
The government argued that similar language in pre-1871 statutes
and the 1875 Act evinced Congress's intent to retain a "reversionary
interest" in 1875 Act rights-of-way "just as it did in the pre-1871 stat-
utes."93 The Court responded that "Great Northern stands for the propo-
sition that the pre-1871 statutes . . . have little relevance to the question
of what interest the 1875 Act conveyed to railroads."94 The Court then
dismissed the holdings of two Supreme Court cases that the government
cited in support of its position because the Court in those cases did not
address the nature of the interest granted by the 1875 Act.9 5 Finally, the
government cited several statutes governing the disposal of the United
States' interests in abandoned or forfeited rights-of-way.96 The govern-
89. Id. at 1266.
90. Id. at 1264.
91. Id at 1264, 1266.
92. Id. at 1264.
93. Id. at 1266.
94. Id
95. Id at 1266-67. In Stalker v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., the issue involved compet-
ing claims to the same property. 225 U.S. 142, 144 (1912). A homesteader filed a claim for land
after the railroad had filed its map of location for those lands but before the land department had
withdrawn those lands from the grantable public lands, so the Court had to determine whether the
homesteader's patent conveyed a title. Id. at 144-45, 150-51. The Court held that when the railroad
filed its map of location, those lands were no longer eligible to be granted, so the homesteader's
patent failed to convey title to the land. Id. at 154. The Court addressed a similar issue in Great
Northern Railway Co. v. Steinke. 261 U.S. 119, 120 (1923) ("This is a suit ... to determine conflict-
ing claims to a small tract of land adjoining [a] right of way . . . ."). Because the defendants should
have been "on inquiry respecting the nature and extent of the company's claim," the defendants' title
did not transfer the land that had already been granted to the railroad company, and the railroad
company owned the land. Id. at 131-32. In Brandt Trust, the government contended that "[i]f the
right of way were a mere easement, . . . the patent would have passed title to the underlying land
subject to the railroad's right of way." 134 S. Ct. at 1267.
96. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1267-68. Two of the statutes the government cited were sec-
tions 912 and 940 of title 43 of the U.S Code. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1267-68. Section 940
addressed forfeiture of rights-of-way granted under the 1875 Act if the railroad did not build its
railway within five years of obtaining the right-of-way and provided that the government's retained
interest in the right-of-way would "inure to the benefit of' the adjacent landowner. 43 U.S.C. § 940
(2012). Section 912 addressed abandonment and forfeiture, providing that any right that the United
States retained in a right-of-way would vest in the municipality if located therein or in the adjacent
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ment argued that these statutes were vidence of Congress's belief that
the interest granted under the 1875 Act would revert to the United States
once relinquished by the railroad since the statutes would have been
meaningless if the government had not retained any interest.97 The Court
explained that those statutes only described how to dispose of interests
the United States possessed, not whether the United States retained an
interest or what type of interest the 1875 Act conveyed.98 Emphasizing
"the special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are
concerned,"99 the Court refused to "endorse" the government's "stark
change in position."'00
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor was the sole dissenter.'0 ' She contended that the
majority made two errors in its decision.102 First, the majority did "not
meaningfully grapple with prior cases that expressly concluded that the
United States retained a reversionary interest in railroad rights-of-
way."o3 Second, the majority "relie[d] on 'basic common law princi-
ples,' without recognizing that courts have long treated railroad rights of
way as sui generis property rights not governed by the ordinary com-
mon-law regime."1"'
Citing the holdings from Townsend and Stringham-that post-1871
railroad rights-of-way were limited fees with an implied condition of
reverter-Justice Sotomayor explained that if those cases were still
"good law on that point," the government should have won this case. 105
Thus, the real issue according to Justice Sotomayor was "whether . . .
Great Northern 'disavowed' Townsend and Stringham" on that point.106
She concluded that it did not. 07 Great Northern, she asserted, involved
deciding whether the United States conveyed subsurface mineral rights
to the railroad when it granted a right-of-way pursuant o the 1875 Act; it
did not involve deciding the nature of that right-of-way.108 She then high-
landowner if the right-of-way were not legally converted into a public highway within one year of
abandonment. 43 U.S.C. § 912.
97. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1267-68.
98. Id at 1268.
99. Id. (quoting Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
100. Id. It is notable that none of the eight Justices in the Brandt Trust majority were concerned
that the Great Northern decision had disregarded prior holdings that rights-of-way were limited fees.
See infra notes 103,105-13.
101. See id at 1269 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citation omitted)
104. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 1266 (majority opinion)).
105. Id. at 1269-70.
106. Id. at 1270.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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lighted lower courts' treatment of railroad rights-of-way as unique prop-
erty interests, not defined by "traditional property terms."09
Finally, Justice Sotomayor illustrated how the government's argu-
ments in Great Northern actually supported its position here.'o She ex-
plained that the policy shift of 1871, the policy behind the 1875 Act, and
"the conventional rule that 'a grant is to be resolved favorably to a sover-
eign grantor"' did not support the conclusion that the 1875 Act granted
the subsurface mineral rights to the railroad in Great Northern."' Nor
did those arguments support the conclusion that the 1875 Act granted an
indefeasible fee in Brandt Trust.112 She reasoned that those arguments
supported the conclusion that Congress did not stop granting a limited
fee in 1871 because an indefeasible interest would have been a more
generous interest than a limited fee." 3
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's opinion in Brandt Trust presented an issue of
technical property law: What property interest did the railroad receive in
its right-of-way, an easement or a limited fee?ll4 Furthermore, it is a case
about the federal government's power to manage the public lands of the
United States for the benefit of the public, with the issue being whether
the government has the power to construe railroad rights-of-way for the
benefit of the public. By focusing on the technicalities of railroad rights-
of-way and by relying only on Great Northern, the Court avoided ad-
dressing this difficult issue and failed to consider all of the relevant evi-
dence, case precedent, and the broader implications of its ruling.
The Court's decision provides certainty for landowners whose
property is subject to an 1875 Act railroad right-of-way, but there are
problems with the decision that might override the benefits of certainty.
The Court accepted Great Northern's conclusion that 1875 Act rights-of-
way are easements without questioning the case's accuracy, without
evaluating contradictory evidence, without considering the unique nature
of railroad rights-of-way, and without addressing Supreme Court prece-
dent that held the opposite. By focusing on the change in the govern-
ment's argument from Great Northern to Brandt Trust instead of the
underlying arguments the government raised, the Court did not address
the complicated law and complex issues surrounding property interests in
railroad rights-of-way.
109. Id. at 1270-71 (providing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's explanation "that
although the right acquired by a railroad was 'technically an easement,' it 'require[d] for its enjoy-
ment a use of the land permanent in its nature and practically exclusive' (quoting Hazen v. Boston
& Me. R.R., 68 Mass. 574, 580 (1854))).
110. Id. at l271-72.
Ill. Id. (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1260 (majority opinion).
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Moreover, the Court failed to address the bigger picture of public
policy. The government granted rights-of-way to the railroad companies
to facilitate the construction of a railroad system that would benefit the
country and the people as a whole." 5 These narrow, connected strips of
land can also serve other public purposes and have been used to run tele-
graph, telephone, and power lines and to bury fiber-optic cables and fuel
lines. "6 Abandoned railroad corridors have been repurposed as high-
ways, canals, tramways, and recreational trails." 7 With its decision in
Brandt Trust, the Court undermined the public-serving purpose of these
grants by allowing them to revert to the private landowner."8 Ultimately,
this decision could increase litigation in future instances where the gov-
ernment or another party wants to use an abandoned right-of-way for a
public purpose.ll9 In addition, it could instigate litigation regarding prior
conversions of abandoned rights-of-way to public uses.120 Potentially
most unfortunate, the decision could perpetuate the destruction of a
unique national asset-a system of connected strips of land that has
spanned the United States since the nineteenth century.121 Because of the
historical significance and the public nature of railroad rights-of-way, the
Court should have been more thoughtful in its decision.
A. The Court Did Not Conduct a Thorough Analysis of the Merits of the
Case
The decisions construing rights-of-way granted by post-1871 stat-
utes leading up to the decision in Brandt Trust are inconsistent.22 Courts
have disagreed about what interests the United States, the railroad com-
panies, and the adjacent landowners held in those rights-of-way.123
115. See Supreme Court Hands Down Disappointing Decision for Trails, RAILS-TO-TRAILS
CONSERVANCY TRAILBLOG (Mar. 10, 2014),
http://www.railstotrails.org/trailblog/2014/march/I 0/supreme-court-hands-down-disappointing-
decision-for-trails-in-us [hereinafter Disappointing Decision for Trails]; see also Roberts, supra note
2, at 108, 111, 146.
116. Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 356-57, 359, 361.
117. Id. at 356-57.
118. See Disappointing Decision for Trails, supra note 115.
119. Andrea C. Ferster, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: A Review of Legal Issues, 58 PLAN. &
ENVTL. L. 3, 7-8 (2006).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3. General counsel for the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy explained the predicament:
Our nation's rail corridor system, "painstakingly created over several generations," was
at risk of becoming irreparably fragmented. . . . [I]t would be virtually impossible to rec-
reate our national rail corridor system after it was broken into hundreds of parcels of land,
due to the difficulties and costs of assembling land in a more populous, increasingly ur-
banized 21st century America.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Reed v. Meserve, 487 F.2d 646, 650 (1st Cir. 1973)); see also What
the Marvin M. Brandt Case Means for America's Rail-Trails, RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY
TRAILBLOG (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.railstotrails.org/trailblog/2014/march/17/what-the-marvin-
m-brandt-case-means-for-america-s-rail-trails; Disappointing Decision for Trails, supra note 1]5.
122. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 94; see also supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
123. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 94, 103; Robert W. Swenson, Railroad Land Grants: A
Chapter in Public Land Law, 5 UTAH L. REV. 456, 460 (1957) ("There was always considerable
doubt as to the nature of the railroad's interest in the land.").
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Brandt Trust presented the Court with an opportunity to address these
conflicting opinions and the complicated law underlying federally-
granted railroad rights-of-way. Instead, the Court unquestioningly af-
firmed Great Northern and focused on its disapproval of the government
for changing its argument from Great Northern to Brandt Trust.124 In
doing so, the Court failed to consider the vast body of complex evidence
that suggests it should have reached a different conclusion. The follow-
ing Subpart addresses the historical background and case precedent that
the Brandt Trust Court disregarded.
1. The Historical Backgrounds of the 1875 Act and of Railroad
Rights-of-Way Suggest a Different Conclusion
a. The Nature of the Right-of-Way Did Not Change in 1871
The Brandt Trust decision affirms Great Northern's conclusion that
there was a "sharp change in Congressional policy with respect to rail-
road grants after 1871" leading to a change in the nature of the rights-of-
way granted after 1871.125 It is uncontested that railroad companies re-
ceived a limited fee from rights-of-way granted prior to 1871. Howev-
er, the only policy that changed in 1871 was that Congress stopped grant-
ing outright land subsidies to railroad companies.'27 The nature of the
right-of-way did not change.128
In 1871, Congress granted its last land subsidy to a railroad.129
Leading up to this and to the 1875 Act, there was strong support in Con-
gress to cease the practice of granting land subsidies to railroads.o30
However, though anti-subsidy supporters still recognized the importance
of continuing the expansion of the railway system,'3' they disagreed with
124. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2014).
125. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 271, 274-75 (1942).
126. See id. at 271, 277-78.
127. Brief for Rails to Trails Conservancy et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12,
Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014) (No. 12-1173), 2013
WL 6858293, at *12 [hereinafter RTC Amicus Brief] ("Congress's 'shift' in policy in 1871 was the
elimination of the land grant; what remained constant in grants both before and after 1871 was the
creation of transportation corridors--designated as a 'right of way' in each grant-which was placed
in the present possession of the railroad to satisfy public transportation needs."); Roberts, supra note
2, at 137.
128. Roberts, supra note 2, at 130-41 (providing a detailed history of railroad rights-of-way
and concluding that there was no change in the nature of these rights-of-way in 1871).
129. Id. at 129.
130. See id. at 129-34, 138-39; Swenson, supra note 123, at 459. One of the land grants to a
transcontinental railroad in 1864 involved the withdrawal of a strip of land between 30 and 50 miles
wide stretching from Nebraska to California. GATES, supra note 12, at 364. This meant that these
lands were not available for homesteaders. Id. These large withdrawals of lands from the lands that
individuals could settle increased the price of the lands that were available for settling. Id. at 365-66.
The railroad companies brought these massive land grants onto the market very slowly, which fur-
ther frustrated individuals' efforts to settle in the West and resulted in strong resentment towards the
railroads. Id. at 375.
131. Roberts, supra note 2, at 130; RTC Amicus Brief, supra note 127, at II ("While the
'grants in aid' were themselves unpopular, the desire for additional railroad lines had not dimin-
ished.").
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the pro-railroad contingent about how to do it.' 32 Thus, the debates in
Congress leading up to this last land subsidy focused on how to continue
this goal of expanding the railway system while ensuring that settlers had
access to sufficient land.133 The debates were not focused on the nature
of the property interests in the rights-of-way, but on the excess land at-
tached to the rights-of-way that were being sold to the settlers to subsi-
dize railroad construction.134 Because of this strong opposition to land
subsidies, "grant[ing] no land" was a phrase frequently used to describe
new railroad grants.'3 5 In this heated context, the phrase reiterated the
fact that no land subsidy accompanied the right-of-way; however, it did
not change what the government was granting as a right-of-way.136
To support its conclusion that the 1875 Act granted an easement,
the Court in Great Northern relied on a conversation between senators
about the language that eventually became section 4 of the 1875 Act to
support its conclusion that the 1875 Act granted an easement.137 The
Court quoted an excerpt of the conversation, which stated that the lan-
guage of section 4 "grant[ed] no land to any railroad company."'3 What
the Court did not do was provide the statement hat followed: "The bill
follows the uniform precedents in bills of this character."139 These state-
ments highlight the pro-railroad contingent's effort to ease the fears of
the anti-subsidy contingent by ensuring that the 1875 Act granted no
excess lands to the railroads but preserved the railroads' ability to con-
struct productive rail systems.140 The full disclosure of this conversation
suggests that while the land subsidy disappeared, the nature of the right-
of-way granted under the 1875 Act stayed the same-"uniform."
Other congressmen also made comments about statutes granting
rights-of-way between 1871 and 1875: "This bill does not grant a single
acre of land for any purpose whatever except for the right of way,"1 41 and
"There is no land grant further than a hundred feet on each side of the
road."1 42 These statements emphasized that the statutes granted no more
132. Roberts, supra note 2, at 133, 137.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 138-41.
135. Id. at 138 (alteration in original) (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262,
271 n.3 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id at 141.
137. Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 271 & n.3 (1942).
138. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2137 (1872)).
139. Roberts, supra note 2, at 156 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2137 (1872)).
140. Id. at 156-57.
141. Id. at 139 (emphasis added) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2951-52
(1872)).
142. Id. at 140 (emphasis added) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2138 (1872)).
Representatives made these statements in debates in Congress in 1872 about passing individual bills
granting the right-of-way to railroad companies. Id. at 138-40. Even the staunchest objector to land
subsidies described a right-of-way grant as a grant of land. Id. at 140.
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land than what was necessary for the right-of-way, but the statutes still
granted the right-of-way and all that was necessary for that purpose.143
Furthermore, the underlying purpose for granting railroad rights-of-
way did not change in 1871. Congress passed the pre-1871 statutes so
that railroad companies could build railroads that would benefit the pub-
lic.'" Similarly, Congress passed the 1875 Act for the construction of a
railroad to benefit the public.145 In Great Northern, the Court explained
that this purpose did not require granting the mineral rights to the rail-
road.146 The same reasoning applies in Brandt Trust. The purpose of the
1875 Act did not require Congress to change its policy of retaining a
reversionary interest in railroad rights-of-way.14 7 As Justice Sotomayor
wrote in her dissent, "[n]othing about the purpose of the 1875 Act sug-
gests Congress ever meant to abandon that sensible limitation."1 48 It does
not follow that the nature of the right-of-way changed when the underly-
ing purpose did not.
This more expansive view of the history surrounding the railroad
rights-of-way, the cessation of granting land subsidies to railroads, and
the 1875 Act suggest that Congress did not change the nature of the
right-of-way in 1871; rather, it only stopped granting land subsidies.14 9
By failing to consider this evidence, the Brandt Trust Court missed an
opportunity to question Great Northern, a decision that only focused on
the underlying mineral rights and was based on an incomplete view of
the facts, and to provide a more historically accurate basis for its deci-
sion.
b. Railroad Rights-of-Way Are Not Common Law Property
Interests
The Court further erred by applying common law property princi-
ples of easements to the rights-of-way granted under the 1875 Act. Evi-
dence and case precedent suggest that railroad rights-of-way are unique
property interests that defy common law definitions.150
143. See id at 139-41.
144. Id. at 108, 111.
145. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942); Roberts, supra note 2, at
146.
146. Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 272.
147. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1271 (2014) (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Roberts, supra note 2, at 141. In pre-1871 statutes granting railroad rights-of-way, the
right-of-way and the land subsidy were granted in different sections of the statute. Swenson, supra
note 123, at 460. Therefore, ceasing land subsidies would not necessarily change the nature of the
right-of-way.
150. Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 385 ("Fitting the interests into common-law categories
is counter productive."); id. at 394 ("[C]ourts have agreed that the railroad easement is a unique and
difficult-to-define property right that does not clearly fit into the easement or fee categories.").
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Justice Sotomayor wrote, "[T]his Court and others have long recog-
nized that in the context of railroad rights of way, traditional property
terms like 'fee' and 'easement' do not neatly track common-law defini-
tions. "'' The Court in Stringham wrote, "The right of way granted by
[the 1875 Act] and similar acts is neither a mere easement, nor a fee sim-
ple absolute."5 2 The United States District Court for the District of Idaho
addressed this same concern and wrote, "The term 'right-of-way,' in the
context of railroad property interests, is a term of art signifying an inter-
est in land which entitles the railroad to the exclusive use and occupancy
in such land." 53
In New Mexico v. United States Trust Co.,154 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question: "What . . . is meant by the phrase 'right of
way'?"'55 The Court held that the right-of-way was "real estate of corpo-
real quality"'56 and described a right-of-way as "the land itself, not a
right of passage over it."'57 The Court continued, "But if it may not be
insisted that the fee was granted, surely more than an ordinary easement
was granted.. . . 15 In support of its conclusion, the Court quoted sever-
al informative descriptions of railroad rights-of-way:
Now, the term "right of way" has a two-fold signification. It is some-
times used to describe a right belonging to a party,-a right of pas-
sage over any tract; and it is also used to describe that strip of land
which railroad companies take upon which to construct their roadbed.
151. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Richard A. Allen,
Does the Rails-to-Trails Act Effect a Taking of Property?, 31 TRANSP. L.J. 35, 39 (2003) ("[I]t
seems to be universally recognized by all state and federal courts that the easement is of a very
special kind. It is not simply a non-exclusive right of passage, as an individual might have across a
neighbor's property to access his own. A railroad easement grants the railroad exclusive use and
possession of the right-of-way, with the right to exclude all others from the property, including the
grantor."); Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 388 ("[Clourts have had great difficulty defining the
railroad easement because it so closely resembles the exclusive dominion and control of fee simple
ownership.").
152. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44, 47 (1915), abrogated by Marvin M.
Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
153. Idaho v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D. Idaho 1985) (emphasis add-
ed). See also Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 378 ("While the term easement was commonly
known, it was rarely used because the common law easement of the nineteenth century did not
permit the easement holder to have exclusive rights in the land.... Use of the term easement did not
generally appear in original railroad deeds until the turn of the century . . .
154. 172 U.S. 171 (1898).
155. Id. at 181.
156. Id. at 184-85.
157. Id. at 182.
158. Id. at 183.
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The easement is not that spoken of in the old law books, but is pecu-
liar to the use of a railroad, which is usually a permanent improve-
ment,-a perpetual highway of travel and commerce .... 159
These excerpts are from Supreme Court decisions that were more con-
temporaneous with the 1875 Act than either Great Northern or Brandt
Trust. The explicit descriptions of railroad rights-of-way show that
"basic common law principles" 6 0 do not apply, or at least that common
law principles do not sufficiently describe the property interest the rail-
road obtained in a right-of-way. The right that railroads received in a
right-of-way was much more than a common law easement; it included
"exclusive use and possession."'61 Thus, the "basic common law princi-
ples" applied by the Court in Brandt Trust are misplaced.
c. The Government Could Not Alienate the Land Underlying
the Right-of-Way
Even if railroad rights-of-way are easements and common law prin-
ciples apply, this does not guarantee the conclusion that the United States
did not retain an interest in that right-of-way. What the railroads received
does not determine who owns the abandoned right-of-way.162 The Brandt
Trust Court decided that the nature of the right-of-way is dispositive as to
what happens to the land underlying the right-of-way upon abandonment.
However, case precedent suggests hat the government could not alienate
the land underlying the right-of-way after the government had given the
land to the railroad. Without being able to patent away the underlying
land, it necessarily follows that upon abandonment by the railroad, the
government is the only party that retains interest in the land.
In Townsend, the Court held that the government retained an inter-
est in the right-of-way and explained that the government could not pa-
tent away land it had already given to the railroad for its right-of-way. 6 3
The Court found that once the government had granted the right-of-way
and the railroad had filed a map of location for its railway and built its
tracks, "the Land Department was ... without authority to convey rights
therein."'6 Therefore, regardless of whether the right-of-way was an
159. Id. at 182-83 (quoting Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 44 (1891) and Smith v. Hall, 72 N.W.
427, 428 (Iowa 1897)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 16 (providing the
definition of "right-of-way").
160. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1266 (2014).
161. Wright, Shifting Sands, supra note 37, at 731.
162. Danaya C. Wright, A New Era of Lavish Land Grants: Taking Public Property for Private
Use and Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, PROB. & PROP., September/October 2014, at 30,
35 [hereinafter Wright, Lavish Land Grants] ("[T]he fact that the railroad has an easement tells us
nothing about who owns the servient fee."); see also Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (phrasing the determinative issue as what property interest the adjacent landowner
received from her patent).
163. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 270 (1903).
164. Id.; see also Stalker v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 225 U.S. 142, 145, 153-54 (1912) (apply-
ing that same rationale to rights-of-way granted under the 1875 Act and holding that when the rail-
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easement or a limited fee, the underlying land could not be granted to
another party because the land had been "taken out of the category of
public lands subject to preemption and sale .... ,165
In contrast, the Court in Great Northern explained that language in
section 4 of the 1875 Act meant that the government could sell or give
the lands underlying the right-of-way to a third party after granting those
same lands to a railroad company.166 The relevant language of section 4
provided that after a railroad had filed its map of location, the lands en-
compassing the right-of-way "shall be disposed of subject to [the] right
of way."l 67 The argument is that providing for the disposal of the lands
underneath the right-of-way implies that these lands were eligible to be
granted to another party.168 However, section 4 of the 1875 Act covered
the logistics of how the railroad could "secure the benefits of [the]
act."l 69 It did not address what would happen to the land after it was
granted to the railroad. Section 1 of the 1875 Act contained the language
that actually granted the right-of-way.170 Section 1 granted "the right of
way" to the railroad company "through the public lands of the United
States."'7 1 This language highlighted the public nature of the lands grant-
ed to the railroad companies, not the lands' subsequent occupancy by
private individuals.17 2 The language further supports the conclusion from
Townsend that the lands were public lands that could not be patented to
another party.173 This land was necessary to maintain a system of trans-
continental transportation and commerce, so it is unlikely that the United
States would have subsequently given or sold the land to a private party
without any means of maintaining the system. It is more likely that those
strips of land belonged to the United States and were on loan to the rail-
roads to facilitate the government's objectives of developing the West
and would remain under governmental control if the railroad ceased to
operate.
2. The Brandt Trust Court Did Not Address Precedent That Con-
tradicted Great Northern
Prior to Great Northern, Townsend held that railroads received a
"limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter in the event that
road's map of location was approved, "the grounds so selected were segregated from the public
lands," so a subsequently filed patent for the same lands was inoperable to transfer title).
165. Townsend, 190 U.S. at 270.
166. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 278 (1942).
167. General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, ch. 152, § 4, 18 Stat. 482, 483 (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 937 (2012)).
168. See Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 271 ("This reserved right to dispose of the lands subject
to the right of way is wholly inconsistent with the grant of a fee.").
169. General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 § 4, 18 Stat. at 483.
170. Id. § 1, 18 Stat. at 482.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. See id.
173. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 270, 273 (1903).
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the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which it
was granted." 74 Stringham affirmed this holding for rights-of-way grant-
ed under the 1875 Act. 75 The Great Northern Court explained that
Stringham was not "controlling" because "it [did] not appear that Con-
gress' change of policy after 1871 was brought to the [Stringham]
Court's attention" and because the Court in Stringham relied on cases
that interpreted pre-1871 right-of-way grants that were inapplicable to
construing post-1871 grants.176 The Great Northern Court reasoned that
the Stringham Court did not notice the 1871 shift because neither party in
Stringham had filed a brief.177 The Court in Brandt Trust accepted this
conclusion without questioning its validity. 78 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote that the Great Northern Court "disavowed the [Stringham] charac-
terization of an 1875 Act right of way ....
The Court in Brandt Trust did not question Great Northern's rejec-
tion of a prior holding that had made an unequivocal statement regarding
the nature of railroad rights-of-way granted under the 1875 Act despite
Great Northern not addressing contradictory precedent.8 0 Instead, Great
Northern fashioned a new interpretation of events that occurred seventy
years ago, without the support of any cases that were contemporaneous
with the 1875 Act.' 8' This approach is problematic because the Great
Northern Court did not explain why the holding in Stringham was
wrong, thus it failed to clarify why 1875 Act rights-of-way were not lim-
ited fees.182 Additionally, the Great Northern Court's statement that
rights-of-way granted under the 1875 Act were easements was dicta
since the nature of the right-of-way was not the issue at the focus of
Great Northern.183 The Court in Brandt Trust had the chance to explain
and support Great Northern's dismissal of Stringham and to provide a
more thorough, objective analysis, but it missed this opportunity.
Furthermore, the Court's reliance on Great Northern was mis-
placed. Great Northern involved a dispute between the railroad company
and the United States regarding the right to exploit the oil and minerals
174. Id. at 271.
175. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44, 47 (1915), abrogated by Marvin M.
Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
176. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 277-79 (1942).
177. Id. at 279 & n.20.
178. See generally Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257
(2014).
179. Id. at 1264-65.
180. See Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 278-79 (explaining that Stringham was not controlling
but not providing a legal basis for that conclusion).
181. Roberts, supra note 2, at 103 ("Great Northern ... introduced the notion of an '1871
shift' in right-of-way law.").
182. Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 279 (explaining that Stringham was inapplicable because the
Stringham Court did not consider the 1871-shift but not providing a legal analysis).
183. See Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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beneath a right-of-way granted under the 1875 Act.'1 Brandt Trust in-
volved a dispute between a private landowner and the United States re-
garding the property interest in the right-of-way itself.' 85 The circum-
stances and the issues are distinct and warrant different treatment.
Despite the positive treatment of Great Northern, the Brandt Trust
Court dismissed two other Supreme Court cases because they did not
address the property interest in the right-of-way granted by the 1875
Act.1 8 6 The Government cited two cases where the railroad obtained title
to the land over homesteaders as support for its position that the United
States retained a reversionary interest in the 1875 Act right-of-way, but
the Brandt Trust Court dismissed them because those cases did not ad-
dress the nature of the right-of-way granted under the 1875 Act.'8 7 If the
Brandt Trust Court would not allow the government to rely on cases be-
cause they did not address the issue of the nature of the right-of-way
granted by the 1875 Act, it does not follow that the Court would then
rely on a case that did not address that specific issue either. In fact, the
dispute in those two cases-"competing claims to the right to acquire
and develop the same tract of land" is more aligned with the dispute in
Brandt Trust-competing claims to the right to acquire the land underly-
ing the abandoned right-of-way-than the dispute in Brandt Trust is
aligned with the dispute in Great Northern-competing claims to the
underlying oil and mineral rights.'88 Great Northern, in all aspects, pro-
vided a weak basis for the Brandt Trust Court's conclusion.
3. The Court in Brandt Trust Focused on the Government's Change
of Position Instead of the Underlying Arguments
The Court's disfavor for the government was evident from the first
paragraph of its analysis: "The Government loses [its] argument today, in
large part because it won when it argued the opposite before this Court
more than 70 years ago . ... 189 What followed was not a neutral consid-
eration of the merits of the case. Instead, the Court scolded the govern-
ment at every opportunity: "Contrary to that straightforward conclusion,
the Government now tells us that Great Northern did not really mean
184. Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 270 ("We are asked to decide whether petitioner has any right
to the oil and minerals underlying its right of way acquired under the general right of way statute.").
185. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1264 ("This dispute turns on the nature of the interest the
United States conveyed to the [Wyoming railroad company] in 1908 pursuant to the 1875 Act.").
186. Id. at 1267.
187. Id. ("[I]t does not appear that the Court in either case considered-much less rejected-an
argument that the railroad had obtained only an easement in the contested land . . . ."). The two
cases, cited above in footnote 96, involved a homesteader's and a railroad company's competing
claims to a portion of land for which the railroad company had filed its map of location before the
homesteader had filed his patent. Id The Court in those cases ruled that the patent to the homestead-
er could not pass title because the land was unavailable to be patented to someone else since the
railroad had already claimed it. Id. According to the Brandt Trust Court, the Court in those two cases
"did not purport to define the precise nature of the interest granted under the 1875 Act." Id.
188. Id
189. Id. at 1264.
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what it said";190 "We cannot overlook the irony in the Government's
argument";'91 "We decline to endorse such a stark change in posi-
tion... .".92 Those and similar remarks, dismissing the government's
arguments and emphasizing the government's change of position, were
scattered throughout the opinion and gave the Brandt Trust opinion a
tone of admonishment.
The Court did not objectively address the government's arguments.
For example, the government highlighted the similarity between the lan-
guage granting the right-of-way in the 1875 Act and the language grant-
ing the right-of-way in pre-1871 statutes and offered this similarity as
evidence that Congress intended for right-of-way grants to convey the
same interest before and after 1871. The Court dismissed this argu-
ment solely because it was "directly contrary" to what the government
had argued in Great Northern.194 The Court did not consider the merits
behind this argument. The Court explained that "Great Northern stands
for the proposition that the pre-1871 statutes . . . ha[d] little relevance to
the question of what interest the 1875 Act conveyed to railroads."'95
Congress did not significantly alter the language granting the actual
right-of-way in statutes it enacted after 1871. 9 For example, several
statutes enacted in 1836 included the language that was the precursor to
the language used in the 1875 Act.197 Those statutes granted a "route" to
the railroad "through the public lands of the United States . . . one hun-
dred and eighty feet wide."' 9 8 The Act of July 27, 1866 provided "[t]hat
the right of way through the public lands be . . . granted to the [railroad
company] . . . for the construction of a railroad." 99 The language from
1866 is substantively identical to the language in section 1 of the 1875
Act.200 Additionally, a discussion in Congress regarding the final version
of the 1875 Act highlighted similarities between the 1875 Act right-of-
way and the rights-of-way granted by pre-1871 statutes, under which the
United States definitely retained an interest in the right-of-way.20 With-
out any mention of significant change, Congress used the same language
to convey the rights-of-way in the 1875 Act as the pre-1871 statutes-
190. Id. at 1266.
191. Id. at 1268.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1266; Brief for Respondent at 32-34, Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (No. 12-1173),
2013 WL 6665052, at *32-34 (listing several statutes that were predecessors to the 1875 Act).
194. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1266.
195. Id at 1266.
196. See Roberts, upra note 2, at 143.
197. See id. at I l0.
198. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. 66, 24th Cong. § 1 (1836)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
199. Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278 § 2, 14 Stat. 292, 294.
200. "The right of way through the public lands of the United States is granted to any railroad
company . . . ." General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, ch. 152 § 1, 18 Stat. 482 (1875) (codi-
fied at 43 U.S.C. § 934 (2012)).
201. Roberts, supra note 2, at 144.
386 [Vol. 92:2
2015] BRANDT TRUST: NATIONAL ASSET TO PRIVATE GAIN 387
indicating an intent to preserve the nature of the right-of-way grants. The
Brandt Trust Court failed to weigh the evidence the government present-
ed and make a merit-based conclusion simply because the government's
argument contradicted what it argued seventy years earlier.
In Great Northern, the government sought to enjoin the railroad
from drilling for oil underneath its right-of-way and argued that the right-
of-way was a mere easement, not granting the railroad any rights to the
subsurface oil.202 In Brandt Trust, the government sought to quiet title in
the United States to an abandoned right-of-way and argued that the 1875
Act granted more than an easement, ultimately "reserving an implied
reversionary interest" to the United States.203 Remove the term "ease-
ment," and the government argued the same thing in both cases-that it
retained some type of interest in the right-of-way. The government just
phrased its argument two different ways. The Court called it a "self-
serving" argument;204 however, the government granted those lands to
the railroads to create a system of transportation throughout the United
States to benefit the public, 205 and the government should be entitled to
repurpose those lands for another public benefit when railroad service
ceases to fulfill that public goal. The Court relied so heavily on the word
"easement" that it did not look beyond the seemingly inconsistent gov-
ernment arguments to conduct a significant analysis of reasoning behind
the government's claim it retained an interest in the right-of-way.
The Court in Great Northern held that the United States retained an
interest in the right-of-way it granted to the railroad,20 6 but the Court in
Brandt Trust concluded that the United States lost an interest in the right-
of-way when it was abandoned. The Court's decision in Brandt Trust
allows private landowners to undermine the longstanding history of pub-
lic lands providing public benefit.207 This system of connected railroad
rights-of-way that have traversed the United States since the nineteenth
century is a significant public asset that is now in jeopardy of being dis-
assembled.208
B. Potential Effects of the Court's Decision
Now that the Supreme Court has determined that a railroad right-of-
way granted under the 1875 Act reverts to the underlying landowner
202. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 270-71 (1942).
203. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2014).
204. Id at 1266.
205. Roberts, supra note 2, at 111; Great N. Ry. Co. v. Steinke, 261 U.S. 119, 124 (1923)
("[The 1875 Act's] purpose was to enhance the value and hasten the settlement of the public lands
by inviting and encouraging the construction and operation of needed and convenient lines of rail-
road through them. Nothing was granted for private use or disposal, nor beyond what Congress
deemed reasonably essential, presently or prospectively, for the quasi public used [sic] indicated.").
206. Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 272.
207. See generally Wright, Lavish Land Grants, supra note 162, at 30, 35.
208. See Ferster, supra note 119, at 3-4.
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when the railroad company abandons it, the issue becomes: What effect
does this have on previously-abandoned rights-of-way and on future
abandonments? In the dissenting opinion in Brandt Trust, Justice So-
tomayor wrote that the Brandt Trust decision "undermines the legality of
thousands of miles of former rights of way that the public now enjoys as
means of transportation and recreation."209 Justice Sotomayor's comment
alludes to the effects that this ruling might have on roads, highways, and
trails built on abandoned rights-of-way, and to the possibility that adja-
cent landowners could seek compensation for the right-of-way that trav-
ersed their property and now serves as a highway or recreational trail.
Justice Sotomayor explained that this could lead to takings claims against
the government that could total "hundreds of millions of dollars."2 10
1. Scope: The Brandt Trust Decision Will Likely Apply to Other
Post-1871 Rights-of-Way
The Brandt Trust Court confirmed that rights-of-way granted pur-
suant to the 1875 Act are easements.2 11 By applying common law princi-
ples to these easements, the Court confirmed that the owner of land un-
derlying an 1875 Act right-of-way will enjoy full, unburdened ownership
of her land if and when the railroad abandons its right-of-way.2 12 Alt-
hough this decision technically applies only to 1875 Act rights-of-way,
lower courts may also construe it to apply to other rights-of-way granted
by statutes enacted between 1871 and 1875.
Brandt Trust affirmed Great Northern,213 which based its holding
on a Congressional policy shift that occurred in 1871 when the govern-
ment stopped granting anything "more than a right of passage."2 14 Be-
cause Great Northern focused on the policy shift of 1871 instead of on
the 1875 Act, courts will be able to point to that policy shift as evidence
that all railroad rights-of-way granted after 1871 were nothing "more
than a right of passage." The conclusion that all rights-of-way granted
after 1871 were easements logically follows from that reasoning. This
will expand the pool of landowners that can rely on Brandt Trust for
clarification about their property interests.
2. Repurposing Abandoned Rights-of-Way
Rights-of-way have many potential public uses when the railroad
215
company no longer needs them. A state or local municipality can con-
209. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1266 (majority opinion).
212. Id. at 1265-66.
213. See id at 1265.
214. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275 (1942).
215. Roberts, supra note 2, at 89.
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vert the right-of-way into a public highway.216 The local government or
an independent organization can purchase or lease the right-of-way and
repurpose it for a recreational trail, road, or other purpose; 217 or a third
party can assume financial and legal responsibility for the right-of-way
and convert it into a recreational trail through the Rails-to-Trails Act.218
The holding in Brandt Trust could undermine the highways, roads, and
trails already established from abandoned rights-of-way, and the holding
could frustrate efforts to repurpose them in the future.
As cars and trucks took over as the predominant means of transpor-
tation in the early twentieth century, railroad companies wanted to close
and abandon their unprofitable lines.2 19 Railroad operations were regulat-
ed by federal law, so to close its line, a railroad company had to get per-
mission from a federal agency.220 However, once the closure of the rail
line was approved, state property law applied to the disposal of the right-
221of-way. Various state regulations frustrated or prevented this aban-
donment, so Congress enacted the Transportation Act to remedy the in-
consistencies created by the application of state law to railroad property
222interests. In the 1970s, railroad companies continued to close their
unprofitable rail businesses and abandon their railways.22 3 Concerned
about the fast rate of right-of-way abandonment and the potential de-
struction of the rail system, Congress enacted several statutes aimed at
224
preserving the rail corridors. One of the statutes that Congress imple-
mented to preserve the rail corridors was section 8(d) of the 1983
Amendments to the National Trails System Act (the Trails Act).2 25 The
next Subsections discuss the evolution of some of the federal laws gov-
erning abandonment and repurposement of railroad rights-of-way.
216. 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2012) (providing for the construction of a public highway within one
year of right-of-way abandonment or forfeiture of a right-of-way).
217. See 49 U.S.C. § 10905 (2012) (providing a means for railroad companies to sell aban-
doned rights-of-way for public purposes).
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (providing that a third party can negotiate with a railroad company to
convert an unused right-of-way into a recreational trail as long as the trail is subject to the potential
future reactivation of rail service).
219. Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 374-75, 435; see also Ferster, supra note 119, at I
("[Als the miles of rail line peaked, other methods of increasingly popular transport-most notably,
the trucking industry-began eclipsing the rail industry's dominance, and a long period of decline
began.").
220. Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 434-36.
221. Id. at 436; see Ferster, supra note 119, at 1, 4 (explaining that state law applies after
railroad companies have legally abandoned their rights-of-way).
222. Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 435.
223. Ferster, supra note 119, at 1.
224. Id. at 2; see also Wright, Shifting Sands, supra note 37, at 721-22.
225. The National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-11, sec. 208, § 8(d), 97
Stat. 42 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2012)).
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a. The Transportation Act of 1920 Established Federal Juris-
diction Over Abandoned Rights-of-Way
The Transportation Act of 1920 imposed federal jurisdiction over
the abandonment process of railroad rights-of-way.226 The Surface
Transportation Board (STB) has the authority to determine whether a
railroad company may abandon its railway.227 The STB may permit
abandonment if abandonment would not significantly hinder "public
convenience and necessity."228 After such a determination, the STB can
attach a condition to the certificate of abandonment if "public conven-
ience and necessity [may] require."229 Some examples of the conditions
include using the abandoned rail corridor as a highway, as a passageway
for energy transmission, or as a form of recreation.2 30 The scope of the
STB's authority under this Act is broad.2 31 The Transportation Act
preempted any state law in the realm of railroad right-of-way abandon-
ments.232
b. The Rails-to-Trails Act and Takings
The Trails Act provides a means for the government to establish a
system of trails to meet the nation's needs for outdoor recreation, preser-
vation, and enjoyment.233 Creation of recreational trails requires connect-
ed narrow strips of land that traverse multiple tracts of land,234 and aban-
doned rights-of-way are ideal to serve this purpose.235 In response to
"shrinking rail trackage," Congress amended the Trails Act in 1983 to
simultaneously facilitate the creation of this system of trails and preserve
the abandoned rights-of-way for potential future railroad use by using the
rights-of-way as recreational trails in the interim. 236 Commonly referred
to as the Rails-to-Trails Act,237 section 8(d) of the amendments provides:
[I]n furtherance of the national policy to preserve established railroad
rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service [and] to protect
rail transportation corridors, . . . in the case of interim use of any es-
226. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
227. 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (2012).
228. Id. § 10903(d).
229. Id.
230. Allen, supra note 151, at 44.
231. Id. at 43.
232. Id. at 42.
233. National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241(a) (2012).
234. Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 409.
235. Ferster, supra note 119, at 3; Roberts, supra note 2, at 89.
236. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Preseault 1), 494 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1990). "The
principal goal of the rails-to-trails program is to preserve from fractionation valuable rail corridors
that were assembled at a tremendous cost to the public." Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 357.
"[A] strong public interest exists in preserving these corridors for trails and utilities.... Many of
these corridors were assembled with public funding, public land, and eminent domain powers. They
are, in a fundamental way, public assets." Id. at 385.
237. Allen, supra note 151, at 35.
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tablished railroad rights-of-way . . . in a manner consistent with this
chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction
for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for pur-
poses of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such
rights-of-way for railroad purposes.238
This means that a railroad company seeking to abandon its right-of-way
can negotiate with another party that is willing to take control of the
right-of-way to construct, finance, and manage a recreational trail. 239 If
the parties agree, the railroad may transfer the right-of-way to the third
party to operate the trail.240 The effect of this statute is that interim use of
a railroad right-of-way as a trail pursuant to section 8(d) does not consti-
tute abandonment.241 By precluding a determination of abandonment,
section 8(d) preserves federal jurisdiction over the right-of-way and pre-
vents the application of state law that could operate to prevent the rail-
242
trail conversion. Since its enactment in 1983, various organizations
have built over 20,000 miles of recreational trails under the Rails-to-
Trails Program.243
The landmark case that affirmed the constitutionality of the Rails-
to-Trails Act was Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission (Pre-
seault I). 244 In the Preseault line of cases, landowners claimed an interest
in an abandoned railroad right-of-way that crossed their property and
sought to quiet title to that right-of-way.245 The State of Vermont inter-
vened and obtained permission pursuant to section 8(d) of the Trails Act
to use the abandoned railway as a public trail.246 The landowners then
challenged the constitutionality of section 8(d) and alleged that it violat-
ed the Fifth Amendment by authorizing a taking of private property
247
without just compensation.24 Addressing "the constitutionality of a fed-
eral 'rails-to-trails' statute," the United States Supreme Court held that
section 8(d) was "a valid exercise of congressional power."248
238. National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-11, sec. 208, § 8(d), 97 Stat.
42 (1983) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2012)).
239. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 6-7.
240. Id. at 7.
241. Id. at 8.
242. Ferster, supra note 119, at 4-5.
243. History of RTC and the Rail-Trail Movement, RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY,
http://www.railstotrails.org/about/history/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
244. 494 U.S. 1 (1990). There are "eight reported court decisions in the state and federal
courts" regarding the Preseaults' efforts to secure compensation for the rail-trail conversion of the
abandoned right-of-way that ran across their property. Ferster, supra note 119, at 6. For a more
detailed discussion about the background and the different dispositions of Preseault line of cases,
see Marc A. Sennewald, Note, The Nexus ofFederal and State Law in Railroad Abandonments, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1412-18 (1998).
245. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 9.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 10.
248. Id. at 4-5.
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The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."24 9 When the government appropriates an individual's land for
a public purpose, it is called a taking. The Constitution does not prohibit
the government from doing this, but it requires the government to pro-
vide just compensation to the individual who lost her land.250 Providing
just compensation means compensating the landowner for the fair market
value of the property on the day the government appropriated the land.25 1
In Preseault I, the Court explained that the language of section 8(d)
that precluded interim trail use from constituting abandonment "gives
rise to a takings question in the typical rails-to-trails case because many
railroads do not own their rights-of-way outright but rather hold them
under easements or similar property interests."252 "By deeming interim
trail use to be like discontinuance rather than abandonment, Congress
prevented property interests from reverting under state law." 253 The
Court did not address whether Vermont's use of section 8(d) was a tak-
ing, but it found that "rail-to-trail conversions giving rise to just compen-
sation claims are clearly authorized by § 8(d)[,]" so the landowners could
seek compensation through an available remedy.2 54
A section 8(d) conversion is not a taking per se.255 It effects a taking
when the landowner resumed fee simple ownership of the underlying
property interests after the railroad company abandoned the right-of-way
but before the right-of-way was appropriated to be a trail.256 If the con-
version happened before any interests reverted to the underlying land-
owner, then there might not be a taking.2 57 "By explicitly halting the
abandonment process, [section 8(d)] allows railroads to prevent the re-
moval of federal jurisdiction and thus the reinstitution of state property
law rules that might lead to the extinguishment of their property rights in
the corridor land."258
By preserving federal jurisdiction over the right-of-way, this statute
provides a means for parties seeking to convert an abandoned right-of-
249. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
250. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at I1.
251. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
252. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 8.
253. Id. (citation omitted).
254. Id. at 13, 17.
255. See id. at 16 ("[U]nder any view of takings law, only some rail-to-trail conversions will
amount to takings."); Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(explaining the "determinative issues for takings liability," one of which was whether the landowner
ever "held a fee simple unencumbered by the easement" because the railroad's easement erminated
before the taking happened and concluding that whether a rail to trail conversion amounted to a
taking depended on the "prior conclusion that the railway abandoned the right-of-way"); see also
Sennewald, supra note 244, at 1407 (explaining that a taking per se is a "permanent physical taking"
versus a regulatory taking).
256. Ellamae, 564 F.3d at 1373.
257. See id
258. Wright, Shifting Sands, supra note 37, at 735.
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way into a trail to circumvent the application of state law. This is im-
portant because under the decision in Brandt Trust, rights-of-way revert
to the underlying landowner once a railroad abandons them, subjecting
the land to state property laws and removing any federal jurisdiction.
3. Rails-to-Trails Conversions Are Safe While Other Conversions
Are More at Risk
According to the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, the Court's decision
in Brandt Trust will not affect trails already built under section 8(d) be-
cause they were built pursuant to a constitutional statute.259 However, the
decision could affect trails that were not built under the Rails-to-Trails
Act, and it will likely increase litigation over future trail projects.260
Several scholars argue that the Rails-to-Trails Act does not effect a
taking.261 These scholars base their conclusions on the fact that the or-
ganization assuming control of the rail corridor appropriates the corridor
to be a trail before the railroad abandons the right-of-way, so the right-
of-way remains under federal jurisdiction.2 62 Preservation of federal ju-
risdiction prevents state law from applying to the right-of-way, so the
adjacent landowner's future interest in the right-of-way never vests.263
Therefore, the conversion from a rail to a trail does not take a present
property interest from the underlying landowner.2 6
In the cases that challenge a rail-trail conversion under the Rails-to-
Trails Act, the landowners contend that he Rails-to-Trails Act operates
as a taking.2 65 They argue that the rail-trail conversion takes their proper-
ty by preventing them from obtaining full, unburdened ownership of
their land, which should occur when the railroad abandons its rail line.266
However, all that the Rails-to-Trails Act does is postpone the vesting of
that interest.26 7 If the landowner has any interest in the right-of-way, it is
the expectancy that she will obtain full ownership of the underlying land
268
upon the happening of a condition, abandonment of the right-of-way.
By perpetuating federal jurisdiction over the right-of-way, the Rails-to-
Trails Act prevents abandonment from occurring, and thus, it postpones
the vesting of any interest the adjacent landowner may have.269 Addition-
259. RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY TRAILBLOG, supra note 121.
260. Id.
261. See Allen, supra note 151, at 49-61; Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 455-68.
262. Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 455-57.
263. Allen, supra note 151, at 51-54.
264. Id.; Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 444-47, 455-57; Sennewald, supra note 244,
at 1410 ("The perpetuation of an easement pursuant to federal law, therefore, does not destroy or
'take' a future interest without just compensation. Instead, the owner of the servient estate continues
to hold the land in fee simple subject to an easement for railroad purposes.").
265. Allen, supra note 151, at 40, 49.
266. Id.
267. Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 444.
268. Id. at 456.
269. Id. at 447.
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ally, scholars contend that the adjacent landowners bought or received
their land with the expectation that railroad service would never stop.2 70
These scholars contend that the destruction of the future expectancy of
an event that might never happen does not constitute a taking because
there is no present interest.271 However, because a later Preseault deci-
sion found that the Rails-to-Trails Act did effect a taking,272 landowners
could be eligible for just compensation for ail-trail conversions.
Trails that were not built under the Rails-to-Trails Act are vulnera-
ble to lawsuits that could prevent the construction of the trail or require
the closure of an existing trail. 2 73 These non-Rails-to-Trails conversions
do not have the protection of a federal statute that prevents abandonment
of the right-of-way from occurring and thus preserves federal jurisdiction
over the right-of-way.274 Therefore, when a railroad abandons its right-
of-way, state property law applies, and the adjacent landowner obtains
unencumbered ownership of that land.275 Because the landowner's future
interest vests, the landowner obtains ownership of the land, so any sub-
sequent conversion of that land to another use could constitute a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.27 6 This entitles a landowner to seek de-
struction of an already-converted trail, prevention of future conversions,
or just compensation for either.
4. Just Compensation Could Be Expensive
Preseault I explained that the Fifth Amendment did not preclude the
government from taking an individual's land, but the government must
provide a reasonable means for the landowner to obtain compensation.27 7
The Court in Preseault I clarified that a landowner has to "avail[] itself
of the process" to obtain compensation before it can file a takings claim
against the government.278 The Tucker Act provides the process for indi-
viduals to pursue claims against the United States to recover damages for
constitutional violations in the United States Claims Court.279
Providing just compensation "requires that the property owner be
put 'in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been tak-
en. He must be made whole but is [not] entitled to . . . more."'2 80 After
270. Allen, supra note 151, at 57.
271. Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 448.
272. Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(plurality opinion).
273. Ferster, supra note 119, at 7.
274. See Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 457.
275. Id at 444.
276. Id at 465.
277. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1990). "[T]he sole remedy available to the claimant is
payment ofjust compensation; trail use cannot be halted or disrupted." Ferster, supra note 119, at 7.
278. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 11.
279. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012); Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 11-12.
280. Preseault v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667, 672 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (alteration in original)
(quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
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the Supreme Court concluded that the Rails-to-Trails Act was constitu-
tional, the Preseaults sought just compensation in the United States Court
of Federal Claims.2 8 1 The federal claims court awarded the landowners
$234,000 as compensation for their property plus interest to accrue from
the date of the taking.282 Vermont built the trail in 1986, and the claims
court awarded compensation i 2002, which means interest accrued for
fifteen years.283 The Court of Federal Claims also awarded the landown-
ers $894,855.60 in attorney's fees.284 This amounts to over $1.7 million
for one compensation claim.
Throughout its practice of granting lands to railroad companies, the
federal government granted thousands of miles of rights-of-way and over
285
one million acres in land grants2. At the height of the railroad era, there
were over 270,000 miles of railroad tracks that traversed the United
28States,286 and under the 1875 Act, the government granted "thousands of
miles of land for right of way across the public domain for transportation
and communications purposes."287 These rights-of-way ranged from sixty
feet in width288 to four hundred feet in width. 289 There is no record that
identifies how many of the 1875 Act grants have been abandoned,29 0 but
the high amount of the compensation award in Preseault multiplied by
thousands of miles of rights-of-way suggests that the potential compen-
sation claims resulting from abandoned 1875 Act rights-of-way would be
substantial. Further, if the Brandt Trust holding does apply to all post-
1871 rights-of-way, then this only increases the financial burden on the
government, which could result in "hundreds of millions of dollars."29 1
Preseault I instigated a "flood of takings claims" for rail-trail con-
versions under the Rails-to-Trails Act.292 By 2010, relatively few cases
had reached the point of determining whether the rail-trail conversion
resulted in takings liability. 29 3 Since 2010, however, takings claims in the
281. Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 451.
282. Preseault v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667, 670, 684 (2002).
283. Id. at 669-70, 684.
284. Id. at 684.
285. Roberts, supra note 2, at 88-89.
286. Ferster, supra note 119, at 3.
287. 11 -78A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 78A.15 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2014).
288. GATES, supra note 12, at 357.
289. Id. at 364. The typical width of a railroad right-of-way is one hundred feet. Allen, supra
note 151, at 37.
290. Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States: A Victory for Private
Landowners in an Abandoned Right-of- Way Case, PROB. & PROP., September/October 2014, at 10,
14.
291. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1272 (2014) (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting).
292. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 287, § 78A.15.
293. Id.
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federal claims court have resulted in "millions of dollars in compensa-
tion. 29 4
The decision that certain railroad rights-of-way are easements cou-
pled with the decision that conversion of an abandoned right-of-way to
create a recreational trail can trigger a takings claim has a twofold effect.
First, there is the future effect where the government might have to pay
just compensation if it wants to reclaim abandoned rights-of-way for trail
use or other purposes. Second, there is the retroactive effect where indi-
viduals whose land underlying a right-of-way now serves another pur-
pose might be able to bring a takings claim against the government. In
either scenario, the government would have to pay private individuals for
land that it gave gratuitously to the railroads over a century ago for the
purpose of constructing a railroad for the public benefit. This is the un-
appealing result of the Court's holding in Brandt Trust; the government
now has to pay individuals to preserve something that it once owned but
gave away for free to benefit the public. This effectively converts a pub-
lic asset into private gain.
C. Congress Should Make the Ultimate Decision About the Disposition
of Railroad Rights-of- Way
The Court in Brandt Trust focused on the technical property ques-
tion of whether the railroad received an easement or a limited fee;295
however, railroad rights-of-way are part of a bigger picture. These rights-
of-way once belonged to the United States and were part of the public
lands that the government used and gave away for internal improvements
to benefit the American people.296 They are a public asset.297 As a public
asset, the difficult issue underlying the technical property issue is: Who
can determine what is in the best interests of the people of the United
States regarding this asset, Congress or the courts?
The Constitution gives Congress the "Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States."298 "When Congress grants a
property interest, the grant is both a grant of property and a law and
Congress is free to specify terms or elements different from those that
otherwise would apply either by virtue of the common law or in other
statutes."299 The police power enables Congress to enact legislation to
advance public purposes, the most common of which include the health,
294. Id.
295. Brandt Trust, 134 S. Ct. at 1264.
296. See generally GATES, supra note 12, at 356-86.
297. See Wright & Hester, supra note 42, at 385 ("Many of these corridors were assembled
with public funding, public land, and eminent domain powers. They are, in a fundamental way,
public assets.")
298. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
299. BALDWIN & FLYNN, supra note 14, at 4.
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safety, and welfare of the people.300 With the responsibility to promote
public welfare and make laws regarding U.S. territory, it seems that the
future of abandoned rights-of-way is best left to Congress's discretion.
The First Circuit addressed Congress's role regarding rights-of-way and
gave deference to the legislature to govern abandonment.30' Here, the
First Circuit explained:
To assemble a right of way in our increasingly populous nation is no
longer simple. ... A federal agency charged with designing part of
our transportation policy does not overstep its authority when it pru-
dently undertakes to minimize the destruction of available transporta-
tion corridors painstakingly created over several generations.
302
The decision in Brandt Trust perpetuates the trend in federal courts
to favor the claims of individual property owners "at the expense of the
public interests in preserving rail corridors for future reactivation and
allowing interim trail use on land."303 This results in the government hav-
ing to pay to preserve the railroad rights-of-way that it initially gave
away for free.304 This shows "the Court's utter disregard for the public's
interest in these important public lands."305
Railroad rights-of-way are part of a complex history of national ex-
pansion, interstate commerce, public benefit, and Congressional legisla-
tion.30 6 Granted from the public lands of the United States, these rights-
of-way have served important public purposes. The Court in Brandt
Trust disregarded the broad historical context of these lands in order to
uphold the property rights of the individual.
CONCLUSION
When making a decision that will affect the property rights of indi-
viduals and the government alike, it is important to consider all available
evidence. The Court in Brandt Trust affirmed the statement from Great
Northern that railroad rights-of-way are easements without question.307
The Court failed to consider significant contradictory evidence; it did not
300. Wright, Railbanking, supra note 38, at 412 & n.49.
301. Reed v. Meserve, 487 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1973).
302. Id. at 649-50; see also N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Smith, 171 U.S. 260, 275 (1898) ("By granting
a right of way 400 feet in width, [C]ongress must be understood to have conclusively determined
that a strip of that width was necessary for a public work of such importance, and it was not compe-
tent for a court, at the suit of a private party, to adjudge that only 25 feet thereof were occupied for
railroad purposes, in the face of the grant . . . .").
303. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 287, § 78A. 15.
304. Id. ("[This decision] in effect requir[es] the government to buy back lands that it granted
for public transportation purposes in order to continue using them for public transportation purpos-
es.").
305. Id.
306. See generally Roberts, supra note 2.
307. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-66 (2014).
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address precedent that had held the opposite of Great Northern; and it
focused on the change in the government's arguments from Great North-
ern seventy years before to Brandt Trust instead of on the merits of those
arguments.308 This disregard for the merits of the underlying arguments
has resulted in a decision that will benefit private landowners at a sub-
stantial expense to the government and thus the public.
Former railroad rights-of-way now serve a multitude of purposes
including highways and recreational trails. This decision undermines
those new uses and could preclude future conversions of rights-of-way to
other purposes. Instead, private landowners will receive compensation in
the event that a right-of-way traversing their property is converted to
another use, and the public will lose the opportunity to benefit from this
great asset. This is an unjust result, especially when a thorough analysis
of the underlying evidence does not support it. Furthermore, these rail-
road rights-of-way are part of a much larger historical context than just
technical property law.309
In light of the significance of the potential repercussions and the
importance of the historical context, the Court did not give the issue the
attention it was due. As a result, the Brandt Trust holding will unjustly
convert a unique national asset created for the public benefit into a pri-
vate gain for individual landowners.
Hannah Christian*
308. See supra Part III.A.
309. See supra Part III.C.
* J.D. Candidate 2016. 1 would like to express my sincere gratitude to Lindsey Dunn, David
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FERNANDEZ V. CALIFORNIA: CO-OCCUPANT CONSENT
SEARCHES AND THE CONTINUED EROSION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
ABSTRACT
Consent searches allow the police to search a residence without a
warrant when an occupant gives the police permission to do so. Howev-
er, the situation becomes complicated when multiple individuals live at a
residence and one of the residents allows the police to search over anoth-
er resident's objection. In the 2006 case, Georgia v. Randolph, the Su-
preme Court somewhat limited ability of authorities to conduct co-
occupant consent searches by declaring a search of a residence invalid
when the objector was both expressly objecting and physically present.
Justice Souter suggested in limiting dicta that a search would be invalid
if there was evidence that the police removed a suspect from the scene
for the purposes of avoiding a possible objection to a search. In the 2014
case, Fernandez v. California, the Court retreated from Souter's position,
holding a co-occupant consent search valid even when the police arrest
and remove the objector from the scene and then obtain consent from
another occupant. Writing for the Fernandez majority, Justice Alito de-
clared that as long as an officer's removal of the suspect from a crime
scene was objectively reasonable, the search is valid. No subjective in-
quiry into officer motivations is required.
This Comment criticizes Fernandez on three reasons. First, it argues
that Fernandez ignores the intention of the Fourth Amendment's drafters,
who wanted to limit the arbitrary and discretionary authority of law en-
forcement. Second, it argues that Fernandez further demonstrates the
inherently coercive nature of consent in consent-search cases. Finally, it
contends that Fernandez further weakens the Court's already inadequate
protections against potential police abuse in co-occupant consent-search
cases.
399
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and ensures that
court warrants for such searches will not be issued "but upon probable
cause."' Early twentieth-century Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fo-
cused on the protection of defendants from warrantless searches, even
when a co-occupant consented to a search.2 By the middle of the century,
this protective stance evolved into the Court holding that warrantless
searches are "per se unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. In
Mincey v. Arizona,4 Justice Stewart even went so far as to declare that,
"the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment."
Since the early 1970s, however, the Supreme Court has slowly
eroded the Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches,
especially in cases involving third-party consent to enter a premises, to
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. See e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 (1921) (declaring a co-occupant con-
sent search of joint premises as being of "unconstitutional character"); see also George M. Dery, Ill
& Michael J. Hernandez, Blissful Ignorance? The Supreme Court s Signal to Police in Georgia v.
Randolph to Avoid Seeking Consent to Search from All Occupants of a Home, 40 CONN. L. REv. 53,
56 (2007).
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
4. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
5. Id. at 393.
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the extent that the exceptions have almost swallowed the original rule.6
In United States v. Matlock,7 the Court confirmed that consent of one co-
occupant to conduct a search was sufficient to give the police the power
to search the entire premises,8 and in Illinois v. Rodriguez,9 the Court
held that the police only needed to reasonably believe that a consenting
third party was an occupant, even if that belief was mistaken.'0
More recently in Georgia v. Randolph," the Court seemed to re-
store some constitutional protections when it held that a search is uncon-
stitutional if conducted over the clear objections of a physically present
co-occupant.12 The Court also recognized the possibility that its ruling
would give the police an incentive to simply remove potential objectors
from the scene before an objection is made in order to avoid needing a
warrant.13 Consequently, the majority suggested that a search is invalid if
there is evidence that the police removed a potential objector with the
goal of avoiding an objection.14
This Comment will consider the Court's most recent third-party
consent case, Fernandez v. California,15 which held that a search based
on third-party consent is valid even if the police removed a previously
present objecting party.16 Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the
historical development of the Court's third-party consent-search juris-
prudence, starting with the early twentieth century. Part II summarizes
the facts and Court's holding in Fernandez, which allowed a warrantless
search of a home to stand when the police arrested the party objecting to
the search and then obtained consent from the objector's live-in girl-
friend. Part III criticizes the precedent set by Fernandez on three inde-
pendent grounds: First, Fernandez, like other recent consent-search cas-
es, ignores the Framers' original Fourth Amendment intent and perverts
that intent by giving the police the discretion to override an objector by
simply removing him from the scene. 17 Second, Fernandez largely ig-
nores the coercive power that consent searches inherently create for the
police. Third, Fernandez further exacerbates the incentives that the po-
lice already have to manipulate citizens in order to conduct a warrantless
6. Marc McAllister, What the High Court Giveth the Lower Courts Taketh Away: How to
Prevent Undue Scrutiny of Police Officer Motivations Without Eroding Randolph 's Heightened
Fourth Amendment Protections, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008).
7. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
8. Id. at 170.
9. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
10. Id. at 185.
11. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
12. Id. at 122-23.
13. See id. at l21.
14. Id.
15. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
16. Id. at 1134.
17. Id. at 1134-35.
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search. This Comment concludes by briefly suggesting eliminating con-
sent searches altogether as a solution to the issues discussed in Part III.
I. BACKGROUND
Over the past century, the Supreme Court's position on warrantless
searches authorized by a third party who also occupies the searched
premises has evolved from rejection of such searches to near universal
acceptance today.'8 In the early 1900s, the Court prioritized the privacy
of defendants over searches authorized by third parties. For example, in
Amos v. United States,'9 the defendant's wife consented to a search of
their home when asked by government officers.2 0 During the search, the
officers found illegal whiskey, yet the Court declared the search unlawful
because by the very nature of not having a warrant and requesting access
21to the home via the wife, the search implied coercion.
Two decades after Amos, the Court began to loosen its restrictions
on Fourth Amendment consent searches and began examining the volun-
22 2tariness of the search in each case. In Davis v. United States,23 the
Court upheld the warrantless search of a gas station, despite evidence
that the government agents told the defendant that he was required to
open the door and even tried to force a window open themselves.2 4 Ignor-
ing the evidence of possible government coercion, the Court held that the
search was valid because the defendant eventually consented.25 However,
as recently as the early 1960s, the Court intermittently employed a strict
application of the Fourth Amendment to third-party consent search cases,
as evidenced by Chapman v. United States26 and Stoner v. California,27
in which the Court refused to allow searches of rented premises based on
the consent of a landlord and hotel desk clerk respectively.28 In Stoner,
Justice Stewart noted that only the defendant himself could waive his
Fourth Amendment rights.29 The Court closed out the 1960s by adopting
an assumption of the risk-based approach in the third-party consent case
of Frazier v. Cupp.30 In Frazier, the defendant and his cousin were joint-
ly using a duffel bag for the storage of clothing.31 In the course of a mur-
18. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 664-65.
19. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
20. Id. at 315.
21. Id. at 317.
22. See Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme
Court, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 27,37 (2008).
23. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
24. Id. at 586-87, 593-94.
25. Id. at 593.
26. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
27. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
28. See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 57-58 (summarizing the facts and holdings of
Chapman, 365 U.S. at 611-12, 616-18, and Stoner, 376 U.S. at 484-86, 488).
29. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489.




der investigation, the cousin consented to a police search of the bag,
which produced incriminating evidence against the defendant.32 The
Court upheld the admissibility of the evidence, reasoning that in sharing
the duffel bag, the defendant "assumed the risk" that his cousin would
grant someone else permission to search the bag.
The 1970s were a crucial decade in consent-search jurisprudence,
containing three landmark cases. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, a po-
lice officer requested and obtained permission to search a car during a
traffic stop.35 The central issue of the case revolved around whether the
police obtained voluntary consent for the search.36 In defining voluntari-
ness, the majority ultimately decided that it is "determined from all the
circumstances" surrounding the consent to search.37 Such circumstances
include subjective factors, such as the defendant's intelligence and
awareness of his rights, although no single factor, such as the awareness
of the right to refuse, is dispositive.38 However, the Court declined to
require an obligatory warning regarding consent searches, such as it did
with police interrogations and Miranda warnings, reasoning that unlike
the constitutional right to remain silent, the right to refuse a search is not
a constitutionally based right pertaining to the administration of a fair
trial.39
United States v. Matlock, decided in 1974, built on Frazier's as-
sumption of the risk logic for third-party consent cases.4 0 In Matlock,
police arrested the defendant in his front yard on suspicion of committing
bank robbery.4 1 The police subsequently asked for and received permis-
sion to search the house from the defendant's girlfriend, and upon
searching their shared bedroom, discovered evidence tying the defendant
to the robbery.42 Holding that the search was valid, the Court declared
searches permissible if "permission to search was obtained from a third
party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relation-
ship to the premises."3 Explaining its rationale in a footnote, the Court
reasoned that co-occupants essentially assume the risk that their house-
mates may allow a search."
32. Id. at 732, 740.
33. Id. at 740.
34. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
35. Id at 220.
36. Id at 223.
37. Id at 248-49.
38. Id. at 226.
39. Id. at 232, 237.
40. Maclin, supra note 22, at 45.
41. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974).
42. Id
43. Id. at 171.
44. Id. at 171 n.7 (recognizing that common authority to grant a search rests on the "mutual
use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is
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A decade later in 1990, Illinois v. Rodriguez drastically expanded
the holding of Matlock by allowing a search even if the police mistakenly
believed a third party actually had the authority to consent to such a
search when the party in fact did not.45 In Rodriguez, the police arrested
defendant Rodriguez in his own apartment and subsequently seized drug
paraphernalia after Ms. Fischer, who referred to the location as "our"
apartment, granted them access.46 However, Rodriguez contended that
Ms. Fischer did not have authority to consent to a search because Ms.
Fischer had moved out a few weeks prior and was not on the lease.47 In
holding the search valid, Justice Scalia adopted a reasonableness test that
dictated that Fourth Amendment consent searches do not actually require
"factual accuracy," but only require that an officer's actions "always be
reasonable."4 8 Therefore, the law merely requires that the government's
actions were reasonable when evaluating whether a third party has con-
sented to a warrantless search of co-occupied premises.49
The final major co-occupant consent-search case preceding Fernan-
dez is Georgia v. Randolph, in which the Supreme Court attempted to
rein in some of its prior rulings.so In Randolph, the police were interven-
ing in a domestic dispute when they asked for defendant, Scott Ran-
dolph's, permission to search his house after accusations from his wife
regarding "drug evidence" in the house.' Mr. Randolph refused, so the
police then sought permission from Mrs. Randolph, who consented and
admitted the police into the house, where the police found incriminating
evidence against Mr. Randolph.52 Invalidating the search on both social
and legal norms,53 the Court issued a narrow rule declaring that "a war-
rantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal
of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified" based
solely on a co-occupant's consent.54 Fearing, however, that the police
may abuse the Court's new rule by simply removing potential objectors
from the scene, the majority wrapped up a "loose end" by noting in dicta
that there cannot be any evidence that the police removed the potentially
objecting party solely for the purpose of avoiding an objection.55
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his
own right and that the others have assumed th[at] risk").
45. 497 U.S. 177, 183-88 (1990); see also McAllister, supra note 6, at 665.
46. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id at 180.
48. Id at 185.
49. Maclin, supra note 22, at 69.
50. 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006).
51. Id at 107 (internal quotation mark omitted).
52. Id
53. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 72.
54. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.
55. McAllister, supra note 6, at 666 (quoting and explaining Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120-22)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Through its narrow holding in Fernandez, the Court refined the
Randolph holding, furthering the potential for police abuse, and ignoring
the intent of the Founding Fathers.
II. FERNANDEZ V. CALIFORNIA
This section discusses the 2014 case of Fernandez v. California.
Part A reviews the facts and procedural history of the case. Parts B
through D examine the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In October 2009, Walter Fernandez and four of his associates
mugged Abel Lopez, kicking him and stealing $400, his wallet, and cel-
lular phone.57 Two members of the Los Angeles Police Department ar-
rived to investigate.58 A man then tipped off the officers that Fernandez
was in a nearby apartment, and the officers subsequently heard the
sounds of an altercation coming from the apartment.59 The officers
knocked on the door of the apartment and Roxanne Rojas appeared,
demonstrating visible signs of a possible beating, including a bloody
shirt and injured hand.6 One of the officers requested permission to do a
protective sweep of the premises, and upon the officer's request, Fernan-
dez came to the door, stating, "You don't have any right to come in
here."61 Based on the suspected assault against Rojas, the officers re-
moved Fernandez, placed him under arrest, and transported him to the
62
police station.
Roughly one hour after Fernandez's arrest, the officers returned to
the apartment and received both written and oral consent from Rojas to
search the dwelling.6 3 During the course of the search, the police discov-
ered "gang paraphernalia, a butterfly knife, [and] clothing worn by the
robbery suspect," as well as an illegally sawed-off shotgun.6" Authorities
subsequently charged Fernandez with, among other things, robbery, pos-
session of a firearm by a felon, possession of a short-barreled shotgun,
and infliction of corporal injury.6 5
The trial court denied Fernandez's motion to suppress the evidence
66
from the apartment. Fernandez was subsequently convicted of robbery
56. See infra text accompanying notes 101-195 for a discussion of the Court's use of original-
ism in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.




61. Id (internal quotation mark omitted).
62. Id
63. Id. at 1130-31.
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and infliction of corporal injury.67 California's Court of Appeal affirmed,
the Supreme Court of California declined to review the case, and the
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.68
B. Majority Opinion
Justice Alito authored the majority opinion.69 Chief Justice Roberts,
as well as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined him. 70
The Supreme Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal's ruling,
refusing to extend the protections of Randolph to Fernandez's situation.
The Court began by recognizing that consent searches are a permissible
category of warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment, reason-
ing that property owners may want to clear their names and obtaining
needless warrants inconveniences all involved parties.72
The majority opinion then reviewed the Court's previous third-party
consent jurisprudence, including Matlock, Rodriguez, and Randolph,73
taking care to emphasize that a co-occupant third party may consent to a
search unless the objecting party is (1) physically present and (2) ex-
pressly objecting.74 Justice Alito emphasized how "[t]he Court's opinion
[in Randolph] went to great lengths to make clear that its holding was
limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present."7 5 He
also emphasized the xtent to which the Court limited Randolph to situa-
tions where a person is both objecting and present by noting that "[t]he
Court's opinion could hardly have been clearer on [physical presence]."76
Justice Alito then rejected Fernandez's two main arguments.77 First,
he rejected the claim that because the police caused the objector's ab-
sence, the absence was irrelevant.78 Interpreting Justice Breyer's protec-
tions in Randolph as merely a test of the objective reasonableness of the
officers' conduct of removing the objector-as opposed to a subjective
inquiry into the officers' motivations-Justice Alito dismissed Fernan-
dez's claim because Fernandez never contested the reasonableness of the
police removing him from the scene.7 9 Accordingly, the majority ulti-
mately held that an objecting occupant, who is removed by the police
because of a "lawful detention or arrest," has no more Fourth Amend-
ment protection against a co-occupant authorized search than an objector
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1129.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1130,1137.
72. Id.at1132.
73. Id. at 1132-34.








absent for any other reason.80 Justice Alito also rejected the argument
that Fernandez's objection to the search did not expire, reasoning that
allowing objections to extend indeterminately into the future violates
social expectations and creates practical complications such as extending
objections for years if a party is absent due to incarceration.' Justice
Alito further noted that allowing indefinite objections creates procedural
issues for determining the scope of continuing objections and burdens
law enforcement operations.82 At no point in the course of the opinion
did the majority consider the history behind the Fourth Amendment or
the intent of the Framers.
C. Concurring Opinions
In a nod to his originalist leanings, Justice Scalia's brief concurring
opinion framed the issue using concepts from property law property
law.8 3 He noted that if traditional property law had dictated that Rojas
could not admit a guest to the joint premises over Fernandez's objec-
tions, then the case would not be as clear-cut.84 However, because tradi-
tional property law does not establish the above scenario as trespassing,
the police did not infringe on any of Fernandez's property rights.85
Justice Thomas used his short concurring opinion to express his
view that a consent searches are actually outside the scope of Fourth
Amendment searches because a consent searches are voluntary.86 Justice
Thomas reasoned that if a person authorized to give consent provides it,
then a warrantless search is permissible.87 Co-occupants such as Rojas
are authorized to give consent to search a shared residence because Fer-
nandez assumed the risk that she would allow a search of the premises.
88
D. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, devoted significant consideration to em-
phasizing how the current Court deviated from previous precedent.8
9
Noting how the Court previously declared warrantless searches "per se
80. Id.
81. Id.at1135-36.
82. Id. at 1136-37.
83. For more on the Court's (and especially Justice Scalia's) recent trend of deciding Fourth
Amendment cases on the basis of property law, see David C. Roth, Comment, Florida v. Jardines:
Trespassing on the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 91 DENV. U. L. REv. 551, 556, 560-63
(2014) (discussing how the Court insufficiently based its decision in Flordia v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409 (2013) solely on property law and should have taken a privacy-based approach as well).
84. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 137-38 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id at 1138 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1138-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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unreasonable,"90 Justice Ginsburg compared the facts in Fernandez to
those in Randolph, stressing that, like the objector in Randolph, Fernan-
dez was actually present at the time he made his objection.91 The dissent
argued that Randolph in no way suggested that a previously present ob-
jector's request "could be ignored if the police reappeared post the objec-
tor's arrest."92
The dissent also objected to the social expectations reasoning em-
ployed in Randolph and carried through into Fernandez by noting how
the police "have power no private person enjoys."93 Even if a co-
occupant has the power to admit a social guest over a housemate's objec-
tion, unlike a social guest, the police have the power to arrest individuals
and remove them from the house.94 Justice Ginsburg then criticized the
"practical problems" that the majority imagined by extending Randolph
protections indefinitely into the future95 For example, if an objecting
party is incarcerated, getting an actual search warrant should not be diffi-
cult and would solve the problem of an inmate withholding consent to
search a residence.96 Additionally, obtaining search warrants in the mod-
ern world is now an efficient process due to modern technology, so war-
rants do not represent the burden on law enforcement that they once
did.9 7 Lastly, the dissent invoked the intent of the Constitution's Framers,
noting that the law should require warrants because "the Framers saw the
neutral magistrate as an essential part of the criminal process shielding
all of us, good or bad, saint or sinner, from unchecked police activity."9 8
III. ANALYSIS
The Court set an unfortunate precedent in Fernandez because it fur-
ther removed consent-search jurisprudence from the Framers' underlying
intent of the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the Court also worsened
the perverse incentives created in Randolph for the police to use their
discretionary and coercive power to manipulate situations in order to
conduct warrantless searches.
A. Fernandez Continues the Trend ofIgnoring the Framers' Fourth
Amendment Intent
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has not given significant con-
sideration to the intent of the Founding Fathers or the history behind the
90. Id. at 1139 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id at 1139-40.
92. Id. at 1140.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1141 (internal quotation mark omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1142.
98. Id. at 1143.
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Fourth Amendment.99 In those rare instances when the Court has used
history as a guide, it has done so inconsistently.' The Court's neglect of
the Framers' intent is particularly noteworthy given that two of the
Court's current Justices have strong originalist leanings.'o' The Fernan-
dez Court's neglect of history has given the police the discretionary abil-
ity to avoid warrants contrary to the Amendment's original intent, as
revealed through the lens of past Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
historical research surrounding the Amendment's drafting.
When the Court has used history to interpret the Amendment, it has
primarily taken two differing approaches. The first and earliest approach
involves interpreting the Amendment by discerning the general intent of
the Framers through the lens of the historical events that motivated
them.102 The second, more recent approach relies on a review of common
law at the time of the nation's founding.103 One of the most prominent
early examples of the Supreme Court's use of history and the Framers'
intent occurred in the late-nineteenth century case of Boyd v. United
States.1 0 In Boyd, the Court reviewed whether a forced production of a
person's private papers in the course of a customs investigation was an
unreasonable search or seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment.05
In determining the answer, Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, ex-
amined the state of search and seizure law in both the colonies and Eng-
land in the mid- 1700s and analyzed how developments at that time influ-
enced America's Founding Fathers.'0 The Boyd Court paid particular
attention to how English authorities in the colonies issued writs of assis-
tance, which gave the English authorities a wide discretion to conduct
searches.1 07 The majority even quoted the famous eighteenth-century
Massachusetts lawyer, James Otis, 08 who declared that England's search
and seizure procedure was "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the
99. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (2002).
100. See id. (noting that during two Supreme Court terms during the early 2000s, the Court
decided eleven Fourth Amendment cases, yet only significantly analyzed history in one).
101. Maclin, supra note 22, at 27.
102. See infra notes 115-129 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 130-147 and accompanying text.
104. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2000).
105. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.
106. Id. at 624-25.
107. Id.
108. James Otis was a prominent lawyer in Massachusetts during the mid 1700s. Otis graduat-
ed from Harvard College and was practicing law by the age of twenty-three. Otis was the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony's Acting Advocate General when he was asked to represent various merchants in
the Writs of Assistance case against the Crown. In order to argue the case, Otis had to give up his
position as Advocate General and even refused to take compensation from the merchants following
the case. See John M. Burkoff, "A Flame of Fire": The Fourth Amendment In Perilous Times, 74
Miss. L.J. 631, 635-38 (2004).
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most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of
law, that ever was found in an English law book."1 09
The Boyd opinion also paid homage to the prominent eighteenth-
century English case of Entick v. Carrington,110 in which Lord Camden
condemned the breaking open and seizure of the plaintiff's desk and per-
sonal papers as an unwarranted violation of a man's right to be secure in
his property.' In reaching the conclusion that the forced production of
the papers was unconstitutional, the Boyd Court asserted that the nation's
founders were surely familiar with the Lord Camden ruling and that Lord
Camden's propositions and language were on their minds as they drafted
the Fourth Amendment.12 Subsequent Supreme Court majorities and
dissents have relied on Boyd's analysis to justify their historical argu-
ments in Fourth Amendment cases.113
In the early twentieth century, Justice Brandeis authored what
would become a well-known dissent in Olmstead v. United States,l4 in
which the Justice contested the constitutionality of wiretapping a suspect
without a warrant.' 5 Drawing heavily on the approach used by Justice
Bradley in Boyd,l6 Justice Brandeis argued that the general intent of the
Framers was to provide for citizens "against the government, the right be
let alone."'"7 By the middle of the century, Justice Frankfurter took over
109. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Bradley also quoted
Founding Father John Adams, who referred to the Otis statement as "the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born."
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
110. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
11. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626 (discussing the holding of Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807).
Justice Bradley quoted Lord Camden's opinion extensively, placing emphasis on the sections of the
opinion where Lord Camden emphasized how "[t]he great end for which men entered into society
was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances
where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole." Id at
627 (internal quotation mark omitted).
112. Id. at 626-27, 630.
113. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965) (using Boyd to emphasize the
connection between the Founders' dislike of vague general warrants and the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1959) (referring to Boyd to justify the
holding on the constitutionality of a forced home health inspection); id. at 377 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to Boyd to justify the position on the constitutionality of a forced home health inspec-
tion). But see Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1752-53 (questioning the historical validity of Justice
Bradley's analysis of intent in Boyd and declaring it "legal creativity" as opposed to "historical
scholarship").
114. 277. U.S. 438 (1928).
115. Id at 471-86 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
116. Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1740.
117. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Leading off his protest against ex-
pansive Fourth Amendment powers, Brandeis lamented how the Court has continually given Con-
gress power "over objects of which the [founding] fathers could not have dreamed." Id. at 472. The
majority in Olmstead had concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not protect against the wiretap
because the Amendment only protect against the search and seizure of "things," which voices over
an electronic telephone line decidedly were not. Id. at 464-66. No items were searched or seized and
"the evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only." Id The majority gave a
brief nod to history by examining some common law surrounding the exclusionary rule at the time of
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as the Court's leading proponent of using history and the Framers' intent
to interpret the Fourth Amendment.118 In a series of dissenting opinions,
Justice Frankfurter vigorously defended the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement and sought to illuminate the general intent of the
Amendment as opposed to its intricate applications.'l9 In defending the
need for strong constitutional protections against warrantless or unlim-
ited searches, Justice Frankfurter noted how the Fourth Amendment was
a reflection of the Framers' own experience with an unchecked police
state and contended that the Amendment "was the answer of the Revolu-
tionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants and searches
with warrants unrestricted in scope."l20 Justice Frankfurter also analyzed
the intent of the Fourth Amendment in light of the state constitution that
the Founders modeled it after. 121 Given that the Fourth Amendment more
closely resembles the Massachusetts Constitution's protection against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures, as opposed to the Virginia Consti-
tution's more loosely worded language of simply opposing broad and
unlimited warrants, Justice Frankfurter concluded that Congress intended
to create sweeping protections against the government's ability to con-
duct searches and seizures. 122
Another revealing analysis of the Framers' original intent occurred
in Justice Douglas's dissent in the 1974 case of Matlock where, in a foot-
note, Douglas analyzed the history of the searches in the colonies that
motivated the creation of the Fourth Amendment.'2 3 The footnote sug-
gested that the Framers added the "unreasonable" requirement to the
searches and seizures language of the Amendment not to give courts
discretion to allow warrantless searches, but to strengthen the protections
of the Amendment.124 Paralleling the historical account given in earlier
the Fourth Amendment's passage, but only spent one sentence discussing why the Amendment was
necessary in the first place. See id. at 463.
118. Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1763.
119. See id. at 1763-64 (noting how Justice Frankfurter sought to examine exactly what prac-
tices most incensed the Founding Fathers in order to discern their intent); see also United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that search and seizure
cases must be decided in the context "of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment").
120. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 69-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment "was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be
one of the potent causes of the Revolution"); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[W]e are in danger of forgetting that the Bill of Rights reflects experi-
ence with police excesses."); see also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("[The Fourth Amendment] sought to guard against an abuse that more than any one
single factor gave rise to American independence.").
121. Harris, 331 U.S. at 158 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.l (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Maclin, supra note 22, at 47.
124. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 n.l (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Framers added the first
clause to give additional protections to the people beyond the prescriptions for a valid warrant, and
not to give the judiciary carte blanche to later dilute the warrant requirement by sanctioning classes
of warrantless searches.").
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dissenting opinions by Justice Frankfurter, Justice Douglas supported his
arguments by elaborating in-depth how the colonists were subject to, and
detested, royally-issued "general warrant[s], . . . which gave the officials
of the Crown license to search all places and for everything in a given
place, limited only by their own discretion."'25 Justice Douglas subse-
quently explained how during Virginia's debate surrounding the Bill of
Rights, a proposed amendment limiting government searches clearly
presumed that unreasonable searches could only be avoided using a war-
rant. 126 When the First Congress convened and James Madison proposed
constitutional amendments, a fear of general warrants motivated a
searches and seizures amendment, as evidenced by the Fourth Amend-
ment's two distinct clauses.127 Justice Douglas contended that the history
of the Fourth Amendment's clause of "and no warrant shall issue" indi-
cates that it was "created in an effort to strengthen the prohibition of
searches without proper warrants and to broaden the protections against
unneeded invasions of individual privacy."1 28
The entire Court subsequently ignored history and the Framers' in-
tent in Fourth Amendment cases from the 1970s until the 1990s, when
the Court's originalist Justices, such as Justices Thomas and Scalia, be-
gan inconsistently examining the common law in place at the time of the
nation's founding in order to determine intent in some Fourth Amend-
ment cases.129 The Court's more recent emphasis on common law rules
has been the focus of criticism and is in stark contrast to the Court's ear-
lier approach that emphasized the general intent of the Amendment.'30
For example, in the 1995 case of Wilson v. Arkansas, a unani-
mous opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, the Court declared that the
police are required to knock and announce their presence when serving a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test.132 In arriv-
ing at that decision, the majority noted that the Court has "looked to the
traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afford-
ed by the common law at the time of the framing."' 33 The Court then
examined common law during colonial times and concluded that the
knock and announce rule was embedded in the early laws of the colo-
nies.'34 However, the Wilson Court then deviated from a pure historical
common law approach by announcing that there are exceptions to the
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The two distinct clauses are "shall not be violated" and "no Warrants shall issue." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 n.l (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 n.l (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Maclin, supra note 99, at 895-96; Maclin, supra note 22, at 27.
130. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 897-98, 901; Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1744.
131. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
132. Id. at 929.
133. Id. at 931.
134. Id. at 933.
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knock and announce rule in the presence of "countervailing law en-
forcement interests."3 The Wilson Court arrived at this conclusion de-
spite the fact that there is significant evidence that prior to the Fourth
Amendment any exceptions to the knock and announce rule were ex-
tremely limited in scope and that colonial era scholars, and the English
courts, did not recognize any exceptions to the rule at all. 136 Essentially,
in Wilson, the Court selectively used common law to discern the Fram-
ers' intent when convenient and ignored common law when carving out
exceptions as the Court saw fit.137
The Court continued its inconsistent and seemingly contradictory
common law approach to the question of Fourth Amendment intent in
Wyoming v. Houghton,'38 which dealt with the question of whether a
warrantless search of a container in an automobile was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.3 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia furthered
the doctrine of common-law review by stating that the Court would first
look at whether the search or seizure was legal at the time the Amend-
ment was ratified and, if that approach did not provide an answer, would
then look to other places.140 However, when it came time to evaluate
such common law, the Court found none and subsequently found the
search constitutional based on eighteenth-century federal legislation
granting warrantless searches of ships smuggling goods into the United
States, ignoring the distinction between ships crossing international bor-
ders and cars traversing within the interior of the country.141
The 2001 case of Atwater v. City ofLago Vista 42 demonstrates how
restricting an analysis of intent to the common law at the nation's birth
can create illogical results. In Atwater, the Court upheld the arrest of a
driver for a misdemeanor seatbelt infraction as a permissible seizure un-
der the Fourth Amendment.143 To support such a conclusion, Justice
Souter, writing for the majority, concluded that commentators disagree
on whether or not English common law traditionally forbade misde-
meanor arrests.'" The Court then examined other historical factors to try
to discern founding-era common law, such as the practices of colonial
135. Id. at 934.
136. Maclin, supra note 99, at 911-13 (discussing how there were incredibly few exceptions in
pre-Fourth Amendment American and English law to the knock and announce rule, including no
exceptions for officer safety and noting how efforts to legislate such exceptions in England repeated-
ly failed due to widespread resistance).
137. See id. at 911-912; see also Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1770 (noting the tendency of
Supreme Court justices, regardless of their interpretive method, to find the Framers' views as incred-
ibly similar to their own).
138. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
139. Id. at 297.
140. Id. at 297, 299-300.
141. Maclin, supra note 99, at 924-25; Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1760.
142. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
143. Id. at 323-24, 354.
144. Id. at 322, 332.
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state legislatures.145 Additionally, to support its assertion of the correct
interpretation of common law and the Framers' views, the Court cited the
acts of the very parliament that the colonists rebelled against, stating that,
"throughout the period leading up to the framing, Parliament repeatedly
extended warrantless arrest power to cover misdemeanor-level offens-
es."l46 The absurdity of this approach is apparent. Although the Founders
surely intended to preserve many of the rights that they had as British
subjects, it is illogical to conclude with any certainty that they intended
to enshrine into American law many of the oppressive statutory British
search and seizure practices that they were rebelling against.147
The best example of the contrast between the two historical ap-
proaches, and the case demonstrating that the general intent approach is
better at protecting the rights of citizens and projecting the Framers' in-
tent, is Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.148 In Acton, Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, upheld the constitutionality of a school district's
drug program that included mandatory participation for all student ath-
letes.149 Despite the fact that the athletes being tested were not necessari-
ly under suspicion for drug use, Justice Scalia first determined that there
"was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted," and
then applied a balancing test to determine that the district's interest in
preventing drug abuse outweighed the students' expectation of priva-
cy. 150 Rejecting Justice Scalia's contentions and writing for the dissent,
Justice O'Connor argued that the Framers certainly would have intended
to reject mass, suspicionless searches, despite the obvious lack of eight-
eenth-century common law addressing drug testing.' ' Supporting her
argument, Justice O'Connor pointed to the fact that the Founders were
most clearly against broad searches, such as general warrants or any oth-
er unrestrained intrusions and sought to eliminate such abuses.15 2 There
also was no historical evidence that the Framers would have preferred
blanket, mandated searches of everyone over the detested general war-
rants, which allowed officials to search arbitrarily at their discretion.i5 3
Therefore, the dissent's approach in Acton better reflected what is known
about the Framers' intent by casting the Fourth Amendment in broad
145. Id at 337.
146. Id at 334.
147. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 958-59, 962.
148. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
149. Id. at 648, 664-65.
150. Id. at 652-53, 661, 664-65.
151. Maclin, supra note 99, at 918-19.
152. Acton, 515 U.S. at 669-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Id at 670. In a parenthetical, O'Connor quoted an earlier dissent by Justice Rehnquist,
referring to the approval of blanket searches as the ."misery loves company theory' of the Fourth




terms, as opposed to simply dismissing the significance of history when
there is no eighteenth-century common law on point.154
The Court continued its trend of inconsistently using history and in-
tent in its recent consent-search jurisprudence, as neither Randolph nor
Fernandez attempt a significant discussion of the history surrounding the
Amendment or attempt to discern the Framers' intent in depth. Neverthe-
less, the Court has used the common-law approach as recently as 2013,
in Florida v. Jardines,15 5 in which the Court declared the use of a drug-
sniffing dog on the defendant's front porch to be an invalid warrantless
search.156 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia used a common-law
interpretation of the Amendment's intent, emphasizing the historic com-
mon-law focus on the sanctity of the home and expectations of priva-
15 7
Cy.
In recent years, scholars have examined the historic underpinnings
of the creation of the Fourth Amendment, and although their individual
conclusions about what the Amendment's history means for modem day
jurisprudence have differed somewhat, their historical accounts have
essentially been the same.'58 Such consistent accounts verify the history
behind the general intent approach to interpreting the Fourth Amend-
ment.159 Research indicates that the Fourth Amendment was significantly
influenced by Founding Father John Adams and resulted from a combi-
nation of early search and seizure jurisprudence as well as historical
events.160 English legislation dating back to 1662 authorized colonial
writs of assistance, which were essentially unlimited search warrants and
enabled customs officers to search where they pleased, without reason or
probable cause.' Early in John Adams's career, Adams observed the
1761 Writs ofAssistance case, in which prominent Massachusetts law-
yer, James Otis, argued against the renewal of the writs of assistance in
154. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 919-20.
155. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
156. Id. at 1413-16, 1417-18.
157. Id. at 1412, 1414-15.
158. Compare Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 989-1052 (2011) (discussing the works of John Adams as a means of
ascertaining the Framers' original intent), with Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 560-71 (1999) (arguing that some conventional accounts of
Fourth Amendment history, while useful, provide little assistance in determining when a warrant is
actually required), and Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70-73 (2012) (examining search and seizure cases at the time of the nation's
founding as a window into the Fourth Amendment), and Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the
Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 939-58 (1997) (reviewing how the
evolution of general searches and specific warrants in Colonial America influenced the inception of
the Fourth Amendment), and Maclin, supra note 99, at 959-61 (explaining how the Fourth Amend-
ment was a reaction to heavy-handed British search and seizure practices).
159. See supra note 158.
160. Clancy, supra note 158, at 979-8 1.
161. Id. at 991-92 (discussing the virtually unlimited scope of writs of assistance and noting
how that the informer who was authorized to do the searching under the writs was actually permitted
to keep a percentage of any illicit goods).
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the colonies.162 The historical record shows that during the course of the
argument Otis decried the writs as "plac[ing] the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer" and warned that because a judge did not
review specific writs, individuals were subject to officials' "arbitrary
power."' During and following the case, Adams compiled first-hand
notes and a case abstract, which emphasized that the writs of assistance
"place[d] the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer,"
because the officers were "accountable to no person for [their] doings"
and violated the traditional notion of protecting a man's house as if it
were his castle.'6
The authorities' use of writs of assistance in Colonial America cre-
ated general hostility and is credited with directly starting the colonies
down the path to revolution and inspiring the Fourth Amendment.165 The
implementation of the Townshend Acts by the English Parliament further
authorized general writs of assistance in all of the colonies, creating addi-
tional hostility, as well as a rift between British officials and colonial
judges.'66 Colonial judges even refused to issue the writs, fearing even
more search and seizure discretion in the hands of English officials.' 67
Following the Townshend Acts, Adams represented the town of Boston
in opposing the seizure of fellow founder John Hancock's ship, arguing
that the seizure was unjustified due to lack of probable cause.i Based
on some of Adams's personal letters, Adams was also likely well-versed
in the contentious, and often conflicting, English search and seizure cases
of the time, such as the famous case of Wilkes v. Wood.16 9 In Wilkes,
Lord Camden170 criticized a general warrant authorizing the search of all
persons and places for the author of a supposedly treasonous paper, call-
ing the process "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." '
162. Id. at 992. The previous writs of assistance needed to be renewed because of the death of
the king. Id.
163. Davies, supra note 158, at 580-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Clancy, supra note 158, at 999-1000; see also Davies, supra note 158, at 602-03 (noting
how colonial figureheads such as John Dickerson, William Henry Drayton, and Samuel Adams also
specifically attacked arbitrary searches of private residences as particularly egregious).
165. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1002; Davies, supra note 158, at 566; see also Maclin, supra
note 99, at 960.
166. Maclin, supra note 99, at 961.
167. Davies, supra note 158, at 581-82.
168. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1019. Further emphasizing the hatred that seizures inspired in
the colonists, riots broke out in Boston following the seizure of Hancock's ship, forcing the British
to send in troops and led directly to the Boston Massacre. Interestingly, John Adams also represented
the British soldiers accused in the massacre. Id. at 1019-20.
169. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
170. At the time of the case, Lord Camden was known as Chief Justice Pratt, as he was not yet
a lord. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1007.
171. Id. at 1006-07, 1Ol (quoting and summarizing Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(K.B.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1800 (questioning
the usefulness of many English search and seizure cases, such as Wilkes, because the inconsistent
reasoning and holdings in many of the cases make them "amenable to any number of readings").
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Following the American Revolution, but prior to the adoption of the
United States Constitution, many states adopted their own constitu-
tions.172 Many state constitutions contained search and seizure sections
addressing general warrants, but John Adams, in drafting the Massachu-
setts Constitution, went a step further by incorporating language guaran-
teeing a citizen's right to be "secure" against "unreasonable" searches.7 3
Additionally, Adams clarified that any issued warrants must be specific
in nature and must follow certain legal formalities.174 Following the
adoption of the original provisions of the United States Constitution,
James Madison was tasked with drafting a search and seizures proposal,
which would become the Fourth Amendment.175 Madison modeled his
text after Adams's provision in the Massachusetts Constitution, including
the "unreasonable" provision and the clause requiring specific warrants,
with the only substantive change being the identification of "probable
cause" as a proper level of suspicion.176 In a speech to the House of Rep-
resentatives accompanying his draft, Madison clearly stated that his in-
tent was to ban general warrants.7 7
As the historical evidence shows, the Founding Fathers, including
Adams and Madison, did not simply intend to enshrine sometimes con-
tradictory English common-law into the Constitution, but desired to re-
spond to the abuses that the colonists experienced under general warrants
and writs of assistance to ensure that such abuses could not happen
again. 178 After all, if the Framers had merely wanted to continue with the
status quo of English common law regarding searches and seizures, an
amendment outlining the scope of search and seizures practices was not
needed. The mid-century opinions of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter
comport with this historical analysis by emphasizing the historic right of
the people to be free from government interference and discretionary or
unchecked police authority.179
The Court's holding in Fernandez frustrates the Framers' original
intent and places the exact kind of discretion into the hands of law en-
forcement that the colonists themselves detested in the general warrants
and writs of assistance of the eighteenth-century. Much as general war-
rants and writs of assistance allowed British officials to conduct almost
172. Kerr, supra note 158, at 71.
173. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id
175. Id. at 1045-47.
176. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id at 1045-46.
178. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 962.
179. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69-70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment "was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by
the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution"); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 474-79
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
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limitless searches at their discretion, Fernandez gives the police broad
discretion to arrest or otherwise lawfully detain and remove an objecting
suspect, therefore avoiding the need for a warrant, simply because a con-
senting co-occupant is present. Additionally, Fernandez interpreted Ran-
dolph's limiting dicta, which made a subjective inquiry into officer moti-
vations so that the police could not remove an objector "for the sake of
avoiding a possible objection,"'80 as a mere reasonableness test.8 ' There-
fore, officers may now remove an objecting suspect from a crime scene
with the sole purpose of avoiding the warrant process, so long as the sus-
pect's detention was reasonable.'8 2 Giving the police such powerful dis-
cretion as to override the expressly stated objections of an occupant
merely by removing him from the scene, offends the Framers' desire to
protect individuals from invasions of their privacy.183 Because of the
elimination of a subjective inquiry into officer motivations in Fernandez,
the police may now at their discretion remove a suspect from a scene for
the sole purpose of obtaining a warrantless consent search and still be
within the law. This newfound discretion in the hands of police officers
draws a parallel to John Adams's summary of the Writs of Assistance
case, in which James Otis expressed his fear that an officer executing an
unrestricted warrant was "accountable to no person for his doings."18
The Fernandez ruling also ignores the Court's more recent com-
mon-law approach to the Fourth Amendment-which it applied as re-
cently as 2013 in Jardines-by emphasizing the traditional common law
importance of expectations of privacy in the sanctity of one's home.'85
Yet, the Fernandez majority disregards the traditional position that a
search of a home is a more serious matter deserving higher protection
than a search of other places and simply analyzes the search from the
lens of social expectations.186 Given that it was neither Fernandez's car
nor his place of business, but his actual, private residence that the police
searched, it is illogical that the majority opinion gave no mention to the
precedent it continued to apply a mere year earlier stressing the im-
portance of protecting the sanctity of the home from warrantless search-
180. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
181. See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (2014) ("[T]he test [regarding an
officer's actions] is one of objective reasonableness . . . .").
182. Id. (stating that an officer's motivation does not void "objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment" (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
183. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing
how the grammatical construction of the Amendment indicates how it was formed to "strengthen the
prohibition of searches without proper warrants and to broaden the protections against unneeded
invasions of individual privacy").
184. See Clancy, supra note 158, at 1000.
185. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) ("[W]hen it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."'
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
186. See Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at I135.
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es. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia tries to address this contradiction
with Jardines by noting how under a traditional common-law, property-
based approach to searches, a co-occupant would have been able to admit
a guest to the house over Fernandez's objection without the guest com-
mitting trespass. However, the Fernandez dissent noted the absurdity
of Scalia's argument by commenting how a normal houseguest does not
have the search and seizure powers of the police.'88
Applying the more useful, general intent oriented approach of
Fourth Amendment interpretation as Justice Frankfurter did in Davis v.
United States, the Court's developing body of consent search law be-
comes absurd.189 Justice Frankfurter noted that if the function of the
courts is to place limits on searches, then it is illogical that the Constitu-
tion was "meant to make it legally advantageous not to have a warrant,"
allowing the police to conduct more expansive and discretionary search-
es when given an occupant's consent as opposed to a court's directive.190
In Justice Frankfurter's view, consent searches were the very kind of
unchecked state intrusion into the lives of private citizens that the Fourth
Amendment intended to control.191 Justice Frankfurter's position is sup-
ported by the experiences of the Founders dating back to the Writs of
Assistance case, in which James Otis famously expressed such a fear that
officials unchecked by judges could become "petty tyrants." 92 The Fer-
nandez ruling creates such a potential by allowing the police to remove
objectors from the scene and then conduct a warrantless search anyway.
By simply removing an objecting individual from the premises via lawful
detention or arrest, the police can now rely on a co-occupant's consent
and conduct a more expansive search of the premises than if they sought
an actual warrant from a court. This incentivizes police officers to con-
duct warrantless consent-based searches over seeking a warrant and is
incompatible with the Fourth Amendment's general objective of protect-
ing against invasions of privacy and promoting a government of limited
powers. As Justice Brandeis argued in his dissent, the Fourth Amend-
ment is best understood as guaranteeing citizens the "right to be let
alone" and protecting the "privacy of the individual." 93 Justice Brande-
is's contentions about the intent of the Fourth Amendment are corrobo-
rated by the Founders' arguments against the unlimited discretion of
general warrants and writs of assistance.194 In the Fernandez holding, the
Supreme Court ignored such historical concerns by allowing the police
187. Id. at 1137-38 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
189. Maclin, supra note 22, at 40-41 (discussing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 595
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
190. Davis, 328 U.S. at 595 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
191. See Maclin, supra note 22, at 40-41.
192. See Clancy, supra note 158, at 993-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Maclin, supra note 22, at 13-14 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 959.
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the discretion to arrest an objector and conduct a search based on third-
party consent.
B. Fernandez Demonstrates How Even in Co-Occupant Consent Cases,
the Notion of "Consent" May Include Coercion from the Police
One of the primary questions concerning any sort of consent search
is why would a rational suspect, or for that matter anyone who cares
about and is living with a suspect,'9 5 consent to the search of premises in
which he knows that there is incriminating evidence?l9 6 Yet, despite al-
most certain self-incrimination, or incrimination of a close family mem-
ber or friend, individuals in such situations often consent to searches.197
In fact, consent searches are incredibly frequent, occurring tens of thou-
sands of times a year, and in a study of one city-albeit in the 1980s-an
estimated 98% of police searches were consent searches.'98 In Fernan-
dez, the defendant's girlfriend, Roxanne Rojas, was the one who gave the
officers permission to search the apartment after the police arrested Fer-
nandez.199 However, the current body of scholarly research on fear, hu-
man behavior, ignorance of the law, and race relations calls into question
200whether the police-either explicitly or implicitly-coerced Rojas.
Many commentators have observed that even under the most casual
and friendly encounters, most citizens would not feel free to deny a po-
lice officer's request because common sense dictates that it is unwise to
tell an officer no.201 This is because in the presence of "an imposing au-
thority figure," many people feel that they do not actually have a right to
refuse.202 Various studies and psychological research over the past sever-
al decades have demonstrated that individuals will tend to acquiesce to
195. This assumes that any co-occupant does not wish to see the suspect convicted for his or
her crimes. See infra text accompanying notes 239-45 for an in-depth discussion of this dynamic in
Fernandez.
196. John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2007).
197. As Professor John Burkoff, very bluntly, framed it in a hypothetical:
How much of an idiot-how stupid, moronic, imbecilic-would a person carrying a gram of
crack cocaine stashed in her underwear, for example, have to be to really consent-"freely and
voluntarily"-to being searched by a police officer, knowing full well that such a search would
result inevitably in the discovery of the cocaine and a subsequent arrest?
Id. Some courts have even acknowledged the illogical absurdity of consent searches, with a judge on
the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals expressing surprise that a defendant would freely consent to a
search of a room and box that he knew contained drugs. Id at 1128 (discussing United States v.
Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (McMillian, J., concurring)).
198. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 214 n.8
(2002).
199. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014).
200. See Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of
Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 112 (2011) (discussing how a
person may allow a search for reasons such as "fear, ignorance, or folly"); Strauss, supra note 198,
at 213, 237 (discussing how most people will feel pressured into consenting to a search regardless of
how politely a police officer makes the request).
201. Strauss, supra note 198, at 236.
202. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1114.
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apparent authority, even in the absence of overt coercion.203 For example,
in one study, researchers had actors make requests of strangers on the
street, dressed in business attire, a milkman's uniform, or a security
guard's uniform (without a weapon).20 When asking the subjects to pick
up trash, the security guard had an 82% success rate whereas the milk-
man and man in business attire had 64% and 36% success rates respec-
tively.205 When inconveniencing strangers by asking them to vacate a bus
stop that they were perfectly entitled to be standing at, the guard had a
56% success rate whereas the success rate of the others was roughly
20%.206 It is arguable that the above experiment is not applicable to con-
sent-search situations in which a party personally has something to
207lose. But as the bus stop experiment illustrates, people will defer to
those with apparent authority, such as a police officer, even where there
is inconvenience or harm to themselves.208
Studies also show that normal citizens are likely to interpret even
polite requests by authority figures such as police officers as com-
mands.209 This is because the police often command others, conditioning
the public to view any police request as an order.210 Even if an officer is
making a polite request, the subject of the request is likely to view the
politeness as "face-maintaining because the [subject] understands that
coercion may be used."211 Consequently, even when making polite re-
quests, officers will actually appear commanding to the average citizen
because a significant part of any command is conveyed via the status of
"the badge and gun."2 12 Additionally, racial minorities are more likely
than others to view police requests for a search as commands because,
due to the racial biases in law enforcement, failing to acquiesce can lead
to violent consequences.213 The impacts of consent searches on minori-
ties are particularly significant because the police are more likely to stop
minorities and ask for a search on account of their color.214
203. Id.
204. Strauss, supra note 198, at 238.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 238-39.
207. Id. at 239-40.
208. Id. Another prominent study demonstrating deference to authority is the famous Mil-
gram's experiment, in which a notably high number of adults were willing to deliver electric shocks
causing apparent pain to a victim at the command of an authority figure. See id at 236-38.
209. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1115.
210. Id
211. Id
212. Id. See also Strauss, supra note 198, at 241, where Professor Strauss emphasizes how
"[i]n everyday life, demands are often phrased as polite requests," using a hypothetical of a boss
asking if his secretary would mind fetching some coffee. The command may have been phrased as a
polite request, but most secretaries would not feel comfortable refusing.
213. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 242-43 (noting how even some judges actually recognize
that minorities cannot refuse a search without the risk of being detained, attacked, or shot).
214. Id. at 244; see also id. at 214 n.9 (noting the disparate impact that bus and traffic stops
have on minorities).
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Last but not least, citizens may also consent to a search that they
would not otherwise consent to out of ignorance.2 15 A person could be-
lieve that they have no legal right to object to a search; that even with an
objection, the officer will conduct the search anyway; or that if they re-
fuse, the refusal itself will then give the officer the necessary legal suspi-
cion to conduct a search.2 16
Whether there is evidence of implicit coercion-such as fear, igno-
rance, or racial biases, or explicit coercion such as the implied use of
force or actual police misconduct-courts have traditionally been hesi-
tant to invalidate consent searches on the basis of coercion. One signifi-
cant consent-search case involving voluntariness is the 1973 case of
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.217 In Schneckloth, the Court denied a sus-
pect's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a consent search, hold-
ing that the voluntariness of a search is to be determined from "all the
circumstances."218 In reviewing the circumstances, courts may consider
numerous factors such as age, education, intelligence, whether the sus-
pect was detained, and whether there was prolonged or repeated ques-
tioning.219 The Court also declined to extend a Miranda v. Arizona220
type of warning to consent searches, reasoning that it would be im-
practical to impose such a warning informing suspects about their rights
and expressing concern that "[c]onsent searches are part of the standard
investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies."222 Ultimately, the
Schneckloth Court seemed to be more concerned with protecting the abil-
ity of the police to conduct consent searches223 than with protecting the
rights of individuals to be free from the inherent psychological coercion
that occurs when the police request a search.224
In practice, Schneckloth has done little to protect the rights of sus-
pects as courts have rarely voided searches based on the totality of the
circumstances test.225 In a survey of hundreds of consent cases, courts
actually analyzed the Schneckloth factors such as age and intelligence in
215. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1118.
216. Id
217. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
218. Id at 219-20, 248-49.
219. Id at 226.
220. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
221. See id at 498-99 (holding that before a suspect in police custody may be interrogated,
they must be informed of their rights against self-incrimination). However, some question whether
Miranda warnings are actually effective at protecting defendants because police still have some
discretion as to how and when they give the warning. See Sekhon, supra note 200, at 126.
222. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall contended that
there is nothing impractical about a simple warning of the right to refuse at the time a consent search
is requested and argued that the Court was more concerned with protecting "the continued ability of
the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens." Id. at 286-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223. Strauss, supra note 198, at 219-20.
224. See id at 236-40 (discussing the various studies demonstrating how individuals will defer
to authority figures); Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1115 (explaining how requests from authority
figures are often interpreted as demands).
225. Strauss, supra note 198, at 221-22.
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only a select few cases, and even when the court did analyze the factors,
it often found the search to be voluntary.226 In one instance, the D.C.
Circuit determined that a suspect's consent was valid despite the fact that
the suspect had psychological problems and an IQ of only 76.227 In an-
other case, the D.C. Circuit found that a suspect gave voluntary consent
despite the fact that he only had a tenth-grade education and was encir-
cled by several sizable officers at the time of consent.2 28 In the rare in-
stances that courts invalidated consent, it was often because of blatantly
coercive police misconduct such as making threats, depriving the suspect
of necessities, or falsely claiming that the police had the right to
search.229 Essentially, as long as the police do not grossly misbehave or
lie about having an actual warrant, the courts will seemingly rubber
stamp the suspect's consent, regardless of other extenuating circum-
stances.230
However, even in the face of overt police coercion or a show of
force, courts are sometimes hesitant to invalidate consent searches.231 For
example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found valid consent de-
spite the fact that a suspect consented to a search only following a situa-
tion in which officers, who had their guns drawn, arrested him lying on
the ground.232 In another case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals validat-
ed a suspect's consent, despite the fact that the consent occurred at gun-
point, because the suspect routinely had encounters with law enforce-
ment and therefore was less likely to be intimidated.233 The Supreme
Court validated the use of overt demonstrations of force in consent-
search cases in the 2002 case of United States v. Drayton.234 In Drayton,
the Court upheld the consent search of two individuals on a bus, even
though at the time of the search, officers stood at both the back and front
of the bus, implying to the average passenger that they might not be free
to leave.235 The Court reasoned that when an officer asks for and receives
consent, it "dispels inferences of coercion."236
Statistics confirm the courts' reluctance to invalidate consent
searches. In a survey of all the federal appellate cases involving criminal
consent search motions to suppress between 2005 and 2009, the defend-
226. Id. at 222-23.
227. Id at 223 (discussing United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
228. Id. at 224 (discussing United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
229. See id at 225.
230. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1131.
231. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 226.
232. See id. (summarizing the holding of United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 704 F.2d 507
(1 I th Cir. 1983)).
233. See Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1127 (summarizing the holding of United States v. Bar-
nett, 989 F.2d 546 (1st Cir. 1993)).
234. 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002).
235. Id. at 197-98, 207.
236. Id. at 207.
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ant prevailed in a mere 16 of 148 cases, an 11% success rate.237 It is not
surprising that the courts are hesitant to invalidate consent searches be-
cause consent searches are a significant tool in the law enforcement arse-
nal; and police forces even train their officers on how to talk their way
into receiving consent.238 Finally, as one scholar has pointed out, unlike
forced confessions, which are of dubious reliability, coerced searches
produce evidence that is just as concrete and reliable as uncoerced
searches, and therefore give courts an incentive to find them valid.239
Fernandez continues the trend of the Supreme Court downplaying
issues of coercion in consent-search cases. The Court brushed aside
claims made in Fernandez's brief that during the course of the encounter
between the police and Fernandez's girlfriend, Roxanne Rojas, an officer
stated that the investigation would "determine whether or not we take
your kids from you right now or not." 240 Such a statement is clearly a
serious threat when directed at any mother. In the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Alito dismissed the defendant's claim of overt coercion as not within
the necessary scope of the Court's ruling, as the trial court conducted the
fact-finding and apparently had some doubts about Rojas's credibility.241
Justice Alito's dismissal of the possible coercion continues the trend of
courts ignoring all but the most outrageous police misconduct when
evaluating coercion. Despite the fact that the burden of proving freely
242given consent belongs to the prosecution, holdings such as Fernandez
suggest that here is in reality a de facto burden on the defense to prove
that the consent was coerced.
In addition to potential overt coercion, the Fernandez ruling ignores
the inherent coercion that is present in all consent-search encounters.243
After a traumatic experience in which she was apparently battered and
witnessed the arrest of her boyfriend, two presumably armed police of-
ficers returned to Rojas's apartment and requested a search.244 The Court
failed to consider the psychological state Rojas may have been in after
such an incident, especially when subsequently confronted by two au-
thority figures. Given the circumstances, it is likely Rojas felt she had no
choice but to consent. There is also no evidence that Rojas was aware of
237. Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi, Consent Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013 WIS L.
REV. 751, 778-79 & app. B. Interestingly enough, when police required defendants to sign consent
search forms in criminal cases, the defendant success rate fell to an even more futile 5%, compared
to a 9% success rate when no form was used. Id. For an in-depth discussion on the topic of consent
search forms and their impact on the rights of defendants, see generally id.
238. See Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1121.
239. Strauss, supra note 198, at 229.
240. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) (No. 12-7822),
2013 WL 3972445, at *4 (internal quotation mark omitted).
241. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130 n.2.
242. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
243. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 236-40 (discussing the various studies demonstrating how
individuals will defer to authority figures); Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1115 (explaining how re-
quests from authority figures are often interpreted as demands).
244. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
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her right to refuse a search or aware that her consent to a search would
enable the police to prosecute her boyfriend for crimes unrelated to his
assault on her. Thinking that she had no other option but to acquiesce to
the police officer's request for a search, Rojas may have given in, think-
ing that the search would happen regardless of whether she consented.
Therefore, the "consent" that Rojas gave is likely no more than a legal
fiction. If the Court had applied the "totality of all the circumstances"
test, as required in Schneckloth,24 5 and further considered the inherent
confusion and fear present in many consent-search cases,246 it likely
would have reached a drastically different conclusion on whether Rojas
truly consented.
C. Fernandez Weakened the Already Inadequate Protections Against
Police Misconduct
In Fernandez, the Court loosened Randolph's already flimsy protec-
tions against police overreach by declaring that there need not be a sub-
jective inquiry into the intent of police officers removing an objector.247
Rather, the majority said that the officer's removal of an objector must
merely be "objectively reasonable."2 48 Even using a subjective standard,
the protections in Randolph were already a failure, as they sent "a signal
to police to move people as if they were pieces on a chessboard" in order
to avoid having to obtain a warrant.249 Because subjective intent is diffi-
cult to prove, Randolph fostered an environment in which it was advan-
tageous for the police to create an implicit policy of not asking for con-
sent so that a suspect could not object before the police had a chance to
obtain consent from a separate co-occupant instead.250 Therefore, Ran-
dolph sent a message to police that it was permissible to manipulate situ-
ations by separating individuals at the outset of an incident and then seek
permission for a search from the co-occupant whom the police believed
was the most likely to give it.2 5 1
Fernandez worsens incentives for police manipulation because it
not only gives the police an incentive to separate individuals, but also it
gives the police an incentive to arrest or detain objectors simply to re-
move them from the scene so that a search may be conducted based on
co-occupant consent. Given that Randolph's subjective inquiry protec-
tions were already inadequate, the complete elimination of an inquiry
245. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
246. See Sekhon, supra note 200, at 112.
247. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
248. Id.
249. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 55.
250. Id. at 82. For an in-depth discussion of an alternate view arguing that subjectivity is of
questionable utility in a Fourth Amendment analysis, see Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The
Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2448617.
251. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2 at 80, 82.
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into officer motivations in Fernandez makes the situation worse. As long
as the arrest or detention appears objectively reasonable, the warrantless
search is legitimate, even if the sole reason the police removed the objec-
tor was to avoid the need for a warrant.252 Professor Tracey Maclin pre-
dicted this exact scenario following the Randolph ruling in 2008, noting
how "an absent suspect's refusal to give consent will not be the final
word when the police can obtain the consent of the suspect's co-
occupant. And if necessary, the police can always remove or arrest a
suspect before seeking the co-occupant's consent."253 Fernandez en-
shrined Professor Maclin's fear into law by giving the police the ability
to overrule objectors by detaining or arresting them if there is a consent-
ing co-occupant present.
In Fernandez, the Court attempted to limit such abuses by creating
254the objective reasonableness tandard. However, the Court's limit will
protect objectors more in theory than in fact, as demonstrated by a survey
of cases that attempted to take advantage of Randolph's subjective pro-
tections since 2006.255 Even though the test moved from a subjective
examination of police motivations to an objective reasonableness test,
there is reason to believe that courts will still use the same tactics to dis-
miss defendant claims of consent-search discretion abuse. It may even be
easier for courts to dismiss Fernandez claims because now a court can
outright ignore evidence of police manipulation, as long as the police or
court can concoct any sort of "reasonable" reason for the objecting par-
ty's detention or arrest.256
In a 2008 survey of cases in which objectors sought the protection
of Randolph against police overreach, Professor Marc McAllister re-
viewed the various ways in which courts sought o side with the police in
a consent-search dispute.257 There is little reason to believe that these
legal trends will change simply because Fernandez shifted the standard
from a subjective to an objective one. For example, when applying the
Randolph test that looked into the subjective motivations of police offic-
ers, the courts gave defendants a difficult burden of proving police im-
25825propriety. In the 2006 case of United States v. Parker,259 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to extend Randolph protections to a
defendant because the precise circumstances surrounding the police ob-
taining a co-occupant consent search were unclear and the defendant
could not present concrete evidence of officer motivations in the rec-
252. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
253. Maclin, supra note 22, at 75-76 (footnote omitted).
254. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
255. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 668, 672-90 ("[P]ost-Randolph courts have developed at
least five ways to reject an otherwise legitimate Randolph claim . . . .").
256. See Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134 ("[T]he test is one of objective reasonableness . . .
257. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 668, 672-90.
258. Id at 668.
259. 469 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2006).
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ord.260 The court placed the burden of proving an unlawful removal on
the defendant and denied the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim de-
spite the fact that the police detained the defendant immediately upon
arriving on the scene to investigate a report of shots fired. 26 ' The defend-
ant in Parker never had an opportunity to object to a search because the
police immediately removed him from the scene. Because the court was
unwilling to extend Fourth Amendment protections to the Parker de-
fendant under the previous subjective test even given the defendant's
immediate removal, it is unlikely that courts will be any more sympathet-
ic to detained or arrested defendants who subsequently have their homes
searched under the new objective reasonableness test of Fernandez.
Even under the old subjective Randolph test, courts deferred to the
police to such an extent that officers could openly admit to intentionally
obtaining a consent search when the objector was not home with the pur-
pose of avoiding the need for a warrant.262 In the 2006 Pennsylvania case
of Commonwealth v. Yancoskie,263 the state court validated the search of
a defendant's house based on the consent of his wife, even though the
police admitted to planning their consent search around the fact that the
defendant was out of town.264 The state court reasoned that the defendant
assumed this risk-his wife letting the police search the premises-every
time he left the house.265 At its most absurd, this assumption-of-the-risk
reasoning would mean that every time a defendant left his house, the
police could intentionally bypass the warrant process by seeking a co-
occupant consent search. Essentially, under Fernandez and Randolph,
the Fourth Amendment protects a citizen only when they are physically
at home. Once a person steps outside or is otherwise removed from their
dwelling, the Fourth Amendment protection of their home evaporates.266
Applying the new Fernandez rule, the police could even plan arrests
to avoid the need for search warrants. For example, suppose the police
have an arrest warrant for a defendant for a minor infraction, such as
missing a court date for a public intoxication citation. The police also
suspect that the defendant is running a methamphetamine operation on
the side but do not have enough evidence to obtain a search warrant from
a judge. Under the tests and logic of Fernandez and Randolph, the police
could knock on the defendant's door, immediately arrest him on his fail-
ure-to-appear warrant, and then seek consent to search the house from
another occupant. Under Fernandez, it would be completely irrelevant
whether the defendant objected to the search when the police arrived at
260. McAllister, supra note 6, at 672-73 (summarizing Parker, 469 F.3d 1074).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 682-83 (summarizing Commonwealth v. Yancoskie, 915 A.2d Ill (Pa. Super. Ct.
2006)).
263. 915 A.2d III (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
264. McAllister, supra note 6, at 682.
265. Id.
266. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 55, 80.
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his house. This is despite the fact that the only reason the police aggres-
sively pursued the failure-to-appear warrant for a minor infraction was
that they wished to arrest the defendant in order to search his house for
more serious infractions. Surely, under Randolph's reasonableness test,
the defendant's arrest was reasonable because he had an actual outstand-
ing warrant.267 Yet, the entire purpose of the arrest was not to bring the
defendant to justice for his failure to appear, but to conduct a warrantless
consent search of his house. It cannot be that the Framers, who likely
envisioned the Fourth Amendment as protecting a citizen's right to pri-
vacy and "right to be let alone," would condone such unchecked police
search powers.268
D. A Possible Solution?
Although a complete analysis of the fixing the problems created by
co-occupant consent searches i outside the scope of this Comment, there
is a solution to the perverse incentives and violation of the Framer's in-
tentions created by Fernandez, and that solution is simply requiring a
search warrant once any occupant, present or not, objects to a search.269
The dissenting opinion in Fernandez suggested this approach.270 Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan noted that in a world of modem elec-
tronic communications, search warrants are as quick and effortless to
27 1obtain as they have ever been, and that if police officers have a legiti-
mate need to collect evidence, a warrant will easily overcome any de-
fendant's objections.272 This approach also comports with the views of
the Framers, who "saw the neutral magistrate as an essential part of the
criminal process."273
Some may object that eliminating consent searches by requiring
warrants will hinder an innocent co-occupant's ability to work with law
274enforcement. However, even an innocent person who may feel com-
pelled to work with the police experiences an invasion of their privacy
during a consent search.275 For example, in the process of searching a
common household, the police may uncover many completely legal, yet
highly personal items, such as material related to an individual's sex life
or medical conditions.27 6 Such items, although legal, may be a source of
significant embarrassment o both the suspect and the consenting co-
267. See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (2014) (declaring that a defendant is
not protected when under a "lawful detention or arrest").
268. Maclin, supra note 22, at 39-40 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1142.
272. Id. at 1141.
273. Id. at 1143.
274. See Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1125.
275. Id.
276. Id at 1126.
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occupant, who only allowed a search to begin with out of an implied
obligation to help the police.2 77 Additionally, consent searches, while
convenient for the police, unnecessarily create significant "delay and
inconvenience" for those who are being searched, often out of the mere
sense that a search could not be refused.278
Furthermore, eliminating co-occupant consent searches would not
significantly hinder the ability of the police to investigate crimes as some
fear.27 9 Because the police often utilize consent searches when they
would have the necessary probable cause to search via a warrant anyway,
consent searches often only save the police the actual and arguably min-
imal hassle of obtaining a warrant.280 This means that often the only
damage that the police and society would suffer from eliminating consent
searches is that the police and the judiciary have to spend more time and
energy on paperwork.28 1 Therefore, in the majority of cases, eliminating
consent searches would not result in the apprehension of fewer criminals,
but would simply ensure that the police follow proper procedure when
investigating crimes.282 Additionally, in the event there is no time to get a
warrant, the current exigency exceptions that the Court has carved out
would give the police the ability to conduct a search anyways, as long as
there is probable cause.283
CONCLUSION
With the Fernandez decision, the Supreme Court continued its trend
of eroding Fourth Amendment protections in co-occupant consent
searches. Both Fernandez and Randolph create perverse incentives for
the police to manipulate situations and people for the purposes of avoid-
ing the need for a search warrant. If they desire, the police may now plan
arrests so as to immediately remove an objector from the scene and ob-
tain consent to search a residence from a third-party to avoid a warrant.
The subjective motivations of the police will not be examined even if the
police are consciously trying to manipulate the need for a warrant. When
officers arrest an objecting suspect, remove him from the scene, and
conduct a search based on third-party consent, courts may only review
the objective reasonableness of the arrest.
277. Id
278. Id.
279. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 260 (discussing how similar fears of an ineffective police
force never materialized following the implementation of Miranda rights).
280. Id. at 261, 263 (contending that the police are often able to obtain the same information
that is obtained in a consent search through more traditional investigatory techniques and thorough
police work as well).
281. Id. at 261.
282. Id
283. Strauss, supra note 198, at 261. For example, exigency exceptions to the warrant require-
ment can include when police need to enter a residence immediately to prevent the destruction of
evidence. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
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The resulting situations of warrantless searches violate the spirit and
intent of the Fourth Amendment, which the Framers created to guarantee
all citizens a degree of privacy and place reasonable restrictions on po-
lice power. Justice Frankfurter once proclaimed that it is illogical to think
the Constitution was "meant to make it legally advantageous not to have
a warrant,"284 yet that is the scenario the Fernandez Court created, put-
ting the exact kind of discretion in the hands of law enforcement that the
nation's Founding Fathers feared.
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